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Sidgwick and Self-interest

Utilitas 2 (2):267 (1990)

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  1. Überraschende Thesen des klassischen Utilitarismus. Henry Sidgwicks vernachlässigte Vollendung der klassischen britischen Moralphilosophie / Surprising Theses of Classical Utilitarianism. Henry Sidgwick’s Neglected Completion of Classical British Moral Philosophy.Annette Dufner - 2012 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 98 (4):510-534.
    This paper argues that Henry Sidgwick's theory of the good is a form of enlightened preference hedonism. In order to support this conclusion, the paper argues that the correct interpretation of his notorious passage about the 'ideal element' of the good should get tied to his views about weakness of the will. Sidgwick believes that reaching your own good requires overcoming weakness of the will. An applied section illustrates the practical significance of this finding. In cases in which shooting down (...)
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  • Well-Being and Value.Jeffrey Goldsworthy - 1992 - Utilitas 4 (1):1.
    Something can be said to be good for a particular person, whether or not it is good for anyone else, let alone good ‘overall’ or ‘good simpliciter ’. Sometimes we speak of ‘John's good’ as well as of things that are ‘good for John’. What is ‘good for John’ is whatever enhances his ‘good’ or, to use an apparently synonymous term, his ‘well-being’. But what is a person's well-being: in what does it consist?
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  • Self-Interest and Self-Concern.Stephen Darwall - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):158.
    In what follows I consider whether the idea of a person's interest or good might be better understood through that of care or concern for that person for her sake, rather than conversely, as is ordinarily assumed. Contrary to desire-satisfaction theories of interest, such an account can explain why not everything a person rationally desires is part of her good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we would sensibly want, insofar as we care about her. First, (...)
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