As is well known the derivative of a computable and C1 function may not be computable. For a computable and C∞ function f, the sequence {f} of its derivatives may fail to be computable as a sequence, even though its derivative of any order is computable. In this paper we present a necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence {f} of derivatives of a computable and C∞ function f to be computable. We also give a sharp regularity condition on an (...) initial computable function f which insures the computability of its derivative f′. (shrink)

For semi-continuous real functions we study different computability concepts defined via computability of epigraphs and hypographs. We call a real function f lower semi-computable of type one, if its open hypograph hypo is recursively enumerably open in dom × ℝ; we call f lower semi-computable of type two, if its closed epigraph Epi is recursively enumerably closed in dom × ℝ; we call f lower semi-computable of type three, if Epi is recursively closed in dom × ℝ. We show that (...) type one and type two semi-computability are independent and that type three semi-computability plus effectively uniform continuity implies computability, which is false for type one and type two instead of type three. We show also that the integral of a type three semi-computable real function on a computable interval is not necessarily computable. (shrink)

The project was partially supported by a NSF grant of China. The author was grateful to Professor S. Lempp for his encouragement and suggestion while the author was visiting the Department of Mathematics at the University of Wisconsin.

We will study several weak axiom systems that use the Subtraction and Division primitives (rather than Addition and Multiplication) to formally encode the theorems of Arithmetic. Provided such axiom systems do not recognize Multiplication as a total function, we will show that it is feasible for them to verify their Semantic Tableaux, Herbrand, and Cut-Free consistencies. If our axiom systems additionally do not recognize Addition as a total function, they will be capable of recognizing the consistency of their Hilbert-style deductive (...) proofs. Our axiom systems will not be strong enough to recognize their Canonical Reflection principle, but they will be capable of recognizing an approximation of it, called the "Tangibility Reflection Principle". We will also prove some new versions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem stating essentially that it is not possible to extend our exceptions to the Incompleteness Theorem much further. (shrink)

In a 2022 paper, Hamami claimed that the orthodox view in mathematics is that a proof is rigorous if it can be translated into a derivation. Hamami then developed a descriptive account that explains how mathematicians check proofs for rigor in this sense and how they develop the capacity to do so. By exploring introductory texts in computability theory, we demonstrate that Hamami’s descriptive account does not accord with actual mathematical practice with respect to computability theory. We argue instead for (...) an alternative account in which imagination, anticipation, and interpretations of natural language play roles in establishing mathematical rigor. (shrink)

We consider the strongest forms of enumeration reducibility, those that occur between 1- and npm-reducibility inclusive. By defining two new reducibilities which are counterparts to 1- and i-reducibility, respectively, in the same way that nm- and npm-reducibility are counterparts to m- and pm-reducibility, respectively, we bring out the structure of the strong reducibilities. By further restricting n1- and nm-reducibility we are able to define infinite families of reducibilities which isomorphically embed the r. e. Turing degrees. Thus the many well-known results (...) in the theory of the r. e. Turing degrees have counterparts in the theory of strong reducibilities. We are also able to positively answer the question of whether there exist distinct reducibilities ≤y and ≤a between ≤e and ≤m such that there exists a non-trivial ≤y-contiguous ≤z degree. (shrink)

We try to answer the question which is the “right” foundation of mathematics, second order logic or set theory. Since the former is usually thought of as a formal language and the latter as a first order theory, we have to rephrase the question. We formulate what we call the second order view and a competing set theory view, and then discuss the merits of both views. On the surface these two views seem to be in manifest conflict with each (...) other. However, our conclusion is that it is very difficult to see any real difference between the two. We analyze a phenomenon we call internal categoricity which extends the familiar categoricity results of second order logic to Henkin models and show that set theory enjoys the same kind of internal categoricity. Thus the existence of non-standard models, which is usually taken as a property of first order set theory, and categoricity, which is usually taken as a property of second order axiomatizations, can coherently coexist when put into their proper context. We also take a fresh look at complete second order axiomatizations and give a hierarchy result for second order characterizable structures. Finally we consider the problem of existence in mathematics from both points of view and find that second order logic depends on what we call large domain assumptions, which come quite close to the meaning of the axioms of set theory. (shrink)

Using possibly infinite computations on universal monotone Turing machines, we prove Martin-Löf randomness in ∅' of the probability that the output be in some set.

We present a critical discussion of the claim (most forcefully propounded by Chaitin) that algorithmic information theory sheds new light on Godel's first incompleteness theorem.

We refine the definition of II-computability of [12] so that oracles have a “consistent”, but natural, behaviour. We prove a Kleene Normal Form Theorem and closure of semi-recursive relations under ∃1. We also show that in this more inclusive computation theory Post's theorem in the arithmetical hierarchy still holds.

In this paper we define the concept of a system function language which is a language generated by a system function. We identify system function languages with recursively enumerable sets which are non-simple and co-infinite. We then define restricted system function languages and identify them with recursive sets which are co-infinite. Finally we state and prove some independence and dependence relationships between system function languages and some of the more well-known decision problems. MSC: 03D05, 03D20, 03D25.

We present some natural examples of countable Borel equivalence relations E, F with E ≤ B F such that there does not exist a continuous reduction from E to F.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate continuity properties arising in elementary (i.e., first-order) logic in the hope of illuminating the special status of this logic. The continuity properties turn out to be closely related to conditions which characterize elementary logic uniquely, and lead to various further questions.

Simpson introduced the lattice of Π0 1 classes under Medvedev reducibility. Questions regarding completeness in are related to questions about measure and randomness. We present a solution to a question of Simpson about Medvedev degrees of Π0 1 classes of positive measure that was independently solved by Simpson and Slaman. We then proceed to discuss connections to constructive logic. In particular we show that the dual of does not allow an implication operator (i.e. that is not a Heyting algebra). We (...) also discuss properties of the class of PA-complete sets that are relevant in this context. (shrink)

We prove a number of elementary facts about computability in partial combinatory algebras. We disprove a suggestion made by Kreisel about using Friedberg numberings to construct extensional pca’s. We then discuss separability and elements without total extensions. We relate this to Ershov’s notion of precompleteness, and we show that precomplete numberings are not 1–1 in general.

This article reformulates the theory of computable physical models, previously introduced by the author, as a branch of applied model theory in first-order logic. It provides a semantic approach to the philosophy of science that incorporates aspects of operationalism and Popper’s degrees of falsifiability.

I examine the abstraction/representation theory of computation put forward by Horsman et al., connecting it to the broader notion of modeling, and in particular, model-based explanation, as considered by Rosen. I argue that the ‘representational entities’ it depends on cannot themselves be computational, and that, in particular, their representational capacities cannot be realized by computational means, and must remain explanatorily opaque to them. I then propose that representation might be realized by subjective experience, through being the bearer of the structure (...) of abstract objects that are represented. (shrink)