This article compares treatments of the Stern–Gerlach experiment across different physical theories, building up to a novel analysis of electron spin measurement in the context of classical Dirac field theory. Modeling the electron as a classical rigid body or point particle, we can explain why the entire electron is always found at just one location on the detector but we cannot explain why there are only two locations where the electron is ever found. Using non-relativistic or relativistic quantum mechanics, we (...) can explain both uniqueness and discreteness. Moving to more fundamental physics, both features can be explained within a quantum theory of the Dirac field. In a classical theory of the Dirac field, the rotating charge of the electron can split into two pieces that each hit the detector at a different location. In this classical context, we can explain a feature of electron spin that is often described as distinctively quantum but we cannot explain another feature that could be explained within any of the other theories. (shrink)

We present an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new inter- pretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. Elementary particles are considered as extended objects and nonlocal effects are included. The role of the new concepts in the problems of measurement and of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations is described. Experiments to distinguish the proposed interpretation from the Copenhagen one (...) are pointed out. (shrink)

Idealist Heresies in Philosophy of Science: Cassirer, Carnap, and Kuhn. As common wisdom has it, philosophy of science in the analytic tradition and idealist philosophy are incompatible. Usually, not much effort is spent for explaining what is to be understood by idealism. Rather, it is taken for granted that idealism is an obsolete and unscientific philosophical account. In this paper it is argued that this thesis needs some qualification. Taking Carnap and Kuhn as paradigmatic examples of positivist and postpositivist philosophies (...) of science it is shown that these accounts share important features with Cassirer's idealist philosophy of science developed in the first half of this century. As it turns out, often Cassirer is more modern than those classical philosophers of (post)posivitist philosophy of science. For instance, Quine's criticism against Carnap's empiricist philosophy of science launched in Two Dogmas of Empiricism is anticipated by Cassirer for several decades. (shrink)

In this paper—dedicated to Prof. Asim O. Barut—we generalize the Diracnon-linear electrodynamics by introducing two potentials(namely, the vector potential A and the pseudo-vector potential γ5B of the electromagnetic theorywith charges and magnetic monopoles) and by imposing the pseudoscalar part of the product ωω* to be zero, with ω≡A+γ5B. We show that the field equations of such a theory possess a soliton-like solution which can representa priori a “charged particle,” since it is endowed with a Coulomb field plus the field of (...) a magneticdipole. The rest energy of the soliton is finite, and the angular momentum stored in its electromagnetic field can be identified—for suitable choices of the parameters—with the spin of the charged particle. Thus, this approach seems to yield a classical model for the charged (spinning) particle which does not encounter the problems met by earlier attempts in the same direction. (shrink)

A detailed analysis is made of Grunbaum's claim that the Abraham-Lorentz (AL) and Dirac-Lorentz (DL) equations have no bearing on causality. It is pointed out that (a) both equations are derived from F = ma, and thus should obey the same causality conditions as Newton's law, (b) independently of what boundary conditions are imposed, non-causal behavior is always along the same straight line as the force, (c) the distinction in status between laws and boundary conditions which Grunbaum imposes is one (...) which is not always useful, especially since what is a law in one formulation of the theory can become a boundary condition in another, and thus it is argued that a complete theory must be such that laws and boundary conditions form a coherent whole, (d) the asymptotic boundary conditions that are applied are in agreement with experiment, (e) the AL equation is such that if the "effect," the acceleration as function of time, is known, then the "cause," the force, can be determined. In addition, it is noted that in the DL equation the acceleration at times later than t influences the acceleration at t. Finally, it is pointed out that electrodynamics is indeed a causal field theory, and that retrocausality is due to the transition from a field description to a particle description. (shrink)

This paper is part II of a trilogy on the transition from classical particle mechanics to relativistic continuum mechanics that one of the authors is working on. The first part, on the Trouton experiment, was published in the Stachel festschrift (Janssen 2003). This paper focuses on the Lorentz-Poincaré electron, and, in particular, on the "Poincaré pressure" or "Poincaré stresses" introduced to stabilize the electron. It covers both the original argument by Poincaré (1906) and a modern relativistic argument for adding a (...) negative pressure term to the system's energy-momentum tensor inspired by the work of Laue (1911a, b). It highlights the importance of a paper by Lorentz (1899) in this context and of the "electromagnetic mechanics" of Abraham (1903). (shrink)