This article traces the history of the concept of dignity in Western thought, arguing that it became a formal Catholic theological concept only in the late nineteenth century. Three uses of the word are distinguished: intrinsic, attributed, and inflorescent dignity, of which, it is argued, the intrinsic conception is foundational. The moral norms associated with respect for intrinsic dignity are discussed briefly. The scriptural and theological bases for adopting the concept of dignity as a Christian idea are elucidated. The article (...) concludes by discussing the relevance of this concept of dignity to the spiritual and ethical care of the dying. (shrink)

This paper presents a moral–emotional critique of environmental restoration, through discussion of narratives of redemption. The importance of ‘redemption’ vis-à-vis other environmental discourses rests with its capacity to unpack how, why and in what circumstances the idea of ‘putting something back’ for nature exerts a hold on the popular imagination. This paper thus examines the ethical and emotional experiences bound up in restoration discourses, to identify the motives deployed to confront shame and an associated guilt, and achieve restitution. In turn, (...) the paper also offers new insights into the value of restored nature. (shrink)

The source of the value of naturalness is of considerable relevance for the conservation movement, to philosophers, and to society generally. However, naturalness is a complex quality and resists straightforward definition. Here, two interpretations of what is “natural” are explored. One of these assesses the naturalness of species and ecosystems with reference to a benchmark date, such as the advent of industrialization. The value of naturalness in this case largely reflects prioritization of the value of biodiversity. However, the foundation of (...) our understanding of naturalness is that it describes processes that are free of human intervention. Conflict between the two interpretations of naturalness is apparent in the claim that naturalness can be enhanced by human intervention, in the form of ecological restoration. Although naturalness in its purest form precludes human intervention, some human activities are also apparently more natural than others. This continuum of naturalness relates to the autonomy of the individual from abstract instrumentalism, which describes a particular form of influence ubiquitous in contemporary society. The value of naturalness reflects both dissatisfaction with these threats to personal autonomy, and respect for wild nature as the embodiment of a larger-than-human realm. (shrink)

Intuitive conceptions guide practice, but practice reciprocally reshapes intuition. The intuitive conception of intelligence in AI was originally highly anthropocentric. However, the internal dynamics of AI research have resulted in a divergence from anthropocentric concerns. In particular, the increasing emphasis on commonsense knowledge and peripheral intelligence (perception and movement) in effect constitutes an incipient reorientation of intuitions about the nature of intelligence in a non-anthropocentric direction. I argue that this conceptual shift undermines Joseph Weizenbaum's claim that the project of artificial (...) intelligence is inherently dehumanizing. (shrink)

This essay provides an overview of the field of environmental ethics. I sketch the major debates in the field from its inception in the 1970s to today, explaining both the central tenets of the schools of thought within the field and the arguments that have been given for and against them. I describe the main trends within the field as a whole and review some of the criticisms that have been offered of prevailing views.

This essay takes a critical look at aesthetics as the basis for nature preservation, presenting three reasons why we should not rely on aesthetic foundations to justify the environmentalist program. First, a comparison to other kinds of aesthetic value shows that the aesthetic value of nature can provide weak reasons foraction atbest. Second, not everything environmentalists want to protect has positive aesthetic qualities. Attempts have been made to get around this problem by developing a reformist attitude towards natural aesthetics. I (...) argue that these approaches fail. Third, development can be as aesthetically positive as nature. If it is simply beauty we are looking for, why can't the beauty of a wellconstructed dam or a magnificent skyscraper suffice? (shrink)

What moral reasons, if any, do we have to ensure the long-term survival of humanity? This article contrastively explores two answers to this question: according to the first, we should ensure the survival of humanity because we have reason to maximize the number of happy lives that are ever lived, all else equal. According to the second, seeking to sustain humanity into the future is the appropriate response to the final value of humanity itself. Along the way, the article discusses (...) various issues in population axiology, particularly the so-called Intuition of Neutrality and John Broome’s ‘greediness objection’ to this intuition. (shrink)

Americans’ excessive consumption of food harms their health and quality of life and also causes direct and indirect environmental degradation, through habitat loss and increased pollution from agricultural fertilizers and pesticides. We show here that reducing food consumption could improve Americans’ health and well-being while facilitating environmental benefits ranging from establishing new national parks and protected areas to allowing more earth-friendly farming and ranching techniques. We conclude by considering various public policy initiatives to lower per capita caloric intake and excessive (...) meat consumption, and to translate this temperate behavior into substantial environmental protection. (shrink)

Marco Armiero and Marcus Hall, eds. Nature and History in Modern Italy. Series in Ecology and History, xvi + 295 pp. £25.95/€30.00 paper. John H. Astington...

In the first place, I propose to specify the debate between non-anthropocentrists and anthropocentrists as one between those who defend that the environment has intrinsic value, that is, value that while independent of all relation to human beings is still morally binding, and those who deny this, i.e., assert that the environment only has extrinsic value. I argue for the second option but claim that this should not be an obstacle to address some of the worries of environmental ethics, since (...) extrinsic value is not limited to instrumental value. In this regard, I present sentimentalism as an alternative according to which there are ways of valuing things as ends in themselves and not only as means. (shrink)

In the past thirty years environmental ethics has emerged as one of the most vibrant and exciting areas of applied philosophy. Several journals and hundreds of books testify to its growing importance inside and outside philosophical circles. But with all of this scholarly output, it is arguably the case that environmental ethics is not living up to its promise of providing a philosophical contribution to the resolution of environmental problems. This article surveys the current state of the field and offers (...) an alternative path for the future development of environmental ethics toward a more publicly engaged model of applied philosophy. (shrink)

The standard argument for longtermism assumes that we should care as much about far future people as about our contemporaries. I challenge this assumption. I first consider existing interpretations of ‘temporal discounting’, and argue that such discounting seems either unwarranted or insufficient to block the argument. I then offer two alternative reasons to care less about far future people: caring as much about them as about our contemporaries would make our lives less authentic and less meaningful. If I’m right, this (...) undermines at least the strongest versions of longtermism. Plausibly, we should do much more for the far future than we’re currently doing. Still, we often ought to act for contemporaries’ sakes, even if longtermist actions would expectably do more good. (shrink)

Stefan Solleder reconstructs topologies of conflict-ridden Northern Ireland via an alternative excavation program, where street views and walls attest to layers of marked territories and framed identities.

Naess and Sessions “Deep Ecology Platform” provided a loose framework for a movement that was gaining momentum after a series of successful social and political actions and events throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Most of the points are essentially adopted from Naess’ earlier work, which provided the basis for a number of the core concepts expressed in the later eight points and is largely an expression of a movement that sought to create a shift in consciousness of society towards (...) the natural world. It is probably better understood as a lose framework that encapsulates a world view and perspective of nature which is better understood as an aesthetic movement rather than a moral or ethical movement. (shrink)