Recent critiques of normative universalism have helped entrench a dichotomy between formalist universal egalitarian claims (typical of the liberal tradition) and particularist attention to cultural difference (in contemporary communitarianism, and in more or less postmodernist approaches). Focusing on the work of Richard Rorty and Iris Marion Young, this article explores whether, and how, we might find space for a universalism which avoids problems encountered by the formalist model. I argue that, while both Rorty and Young reject ‘Enlightenment’ universalism, the approaches (...) of both contain covert universalist assumptions. They thus represent different forms of ‘soft’ universalism: approaches which are fallibilist about current moral knowledge but which hold out the possibility of genuinely inclusive pan‐human normative frameworks. The trouble with both is that neither, in the end, provides a persuasive basis for their own position – one which avoids an ultimate arbitrariness about the winning out of one normative conception (be it humanitarian or not) over another. I suggest that recourse to ontology, and the kinds of metaphysical claim deemed outmoded in the mainstream of social and moral philosophy, provide such a basis. I argue too that a conception of human being as relational, and of the flourishing of the individual as requiring relations with others, is the best‐placed candidate to do the work required. (shrink)