Este artigo consiste em um diálogo com textos de Jürgen Habermas e Richard Rorty referentes ao tema da religião e seu lugar na sociedade contemporânea. Em vista do tom dialogal, as citações desses autores são relativamente numerosas, a fim de que as suas vozes sobressaiam no texto. O objetivo do diálogo é extrair pistas para a construção de uma filosofia da religião em tom pós-metafísico, ou não fundacional. Não é um texto exaustivo, mas sugestivo. Não se propõe a tecer críticas (...) ao sistema de ideias dos autores com quem dialoga, mas aproveitar criticamente algumas de suas ideias para a definição de possíveis rumos para uma filosofia da religião pós-metafísica. Os termos pós-metafísico e não fundacional são usados aqui de modo intercambiável e não se referem a um tipo de filosofia antimetafísica, mas sim, a uma filosofia para a qual os temas da metafísica não assumem papel de explicação fundacional da realidade como um todo. Palavras-chave : Filosofia pós-metafísica; Habermas; Rorty; Religião.This essay is a dialogue with Jürgen Habermas’s and Richard Rorty’s texts on the theme of religion and its place in contemporary society. Given the conversational tone, the number of quotations from those authors is relatively large, so that their voices can speak up in the text. The goal of that dialogue is the formulation of clues to the elaboration of a post-metaphysical or non-foundational philosophy of religion. The essay is not exhaustive, but suggestive. It does not mean to criticize Habermas’s and Rorty’s systems of thought, but to appropriate critically some of their ideas as guidelines to a post-metaphysical philosophy of religion. The terms ‘post-metaphysical’ and ‘non-foundational’ are interchangeable here and do not refer to an anti-metaphysical philosophy. They try to express a kind of philosophy in which metaphysical themes do not play a role of foundational explanation of reality as a whole. Key words : Post-metaphysical philosophy; Habermas; Rorty; Religion. (shrink)

This essay critically examines the political philosophy of John Dewey in relation to U.S. imperialism in the Asia-Pacific. First, using the work of Louis Menand and Robert Brandom's critical refinement of it, the significance of U.S. imperialism for pragmatism is discussed. Second, the essay argues that Dewey's work reveals a structured and generative absence of reflection on the expansion of American racial hegemony across the Pacific in spite of Dewey's serious engagement with Asia and especially China. The configuration of this (...) absence can be traced to his antidemocratic philosophical rendering of the classic frontier chronology of the U.S. nation-state. (shrink)

The sociological debate about globalization has often neglected the place of religion in a global age. This absence is problematic, given the creative role of the world religions in the shaping of the modernization and globalization processes. This article treats globalization as a particular phase of the general process of modernity, and considers religion in terms of four paradoxes. The first (the Nietzsche paradox) argues that, against the received wisdom, fundamentalism is a form of modernization. Although religious fundamentalism may be (...) a reaction to the hybridity brought about by globalization, it is not a traditional reaction. The second (the Parsonian paradox) argues that modernization and globalization constitute religion as a special and separate institutional sphere of society, and hence transform religion into a problem of modernity. Fundamentalism attempts to reverse this pattern and, in the marginal societies of the global system, fundamentalist religion challenges this western version of modernized religion. The third (the McLuhan paradox) is that religious values in a global village expose the incommensurability of cultural systems, but relativism is not easily sustained in practice and globalization paradoxically increases the need for human rights universalism. While nationalism as a framework for cultures conflicts with attempts to develop general systems of rights discourse, it is not evident that the creation of alternative rights systems (such as Confucian codes) appears to be immediately viable. The final (the Montaigne paradox) explores the contradiction between Orientalism as a necessary consequence of the discovery of Otherness and Otherness as a necessary experience of cosmopolitan humanism. The article concludes with a discussion of the possibilities of cosmopolitan virtue in the context of these paradoxes of globalization and religion. (shrink)

I seek to provide a systematic and comprehensive framework for the description and analysis of scientific practice—a philosophical grammar of scientific practice, ‘grammar’ as meant by the later Wittgenstein. I begin with the recognition that all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions, of the physical, mental, and ‘paper-and-pencil’ varieties. When we set out to see what it is that one actually does in scientific work, the following set of questions naturally emerge: who is doing what, why, and how? (...) More specifically, we must arrive at some coherent philosophical accounts of the following elements of scientific practice: the agent—free, embodied, and constantly in second-person interactions with other agents; the purposes and proximate aims of the agent; types of activities that the agent engages in; ontological principles necessarily presumed for the performance of particular activities; instruments and other resources that the agent pulls together for the performance of each activity. After sketching the general framework, I also give some illustrative contrasts between the more traditional descriptions of scientific practice and the kind of descriptions enabled by the proposed framework. (shrink)

Neither traditional philosophy nor current applied ethics seem able to cope adequately with the highly dynamic character of our modern technological culture. This is because they have insufficient insight into the moral significance of technological artifacts and systems. Here, much can be learned from recent science and technology studies. They have opened up the black box of technological developments and have revealed the intimate intertwinement of technology and society in minute detail. However, while applied ethics is characterized by a certain (...) “technology blindness,” the most influential approaches within STS show a “normative deficit” and display an agnostic or even antagonistic attitude toward ethics. To repair the blind spots of both applied ethics and STS,the authors sketch the contours of a pragmatist approach. They will explore the tasks and tools of a pragmatist ethics and pay special attention to the exploration of future worlds disclosed and shaped by technology and the management of deep value conflicts inherent to a pluralist society. (shrink)

The article considers how Richard Rorty's writings on religion dovetail with his views on the philosophical significance of hope. It begins with a reconstruction of the central features of Rorty's philosophy of religion, including its critique of theism and its attempt to rehabilitate religion within a pragmatist philosophical framework. It then presents some criticisms of Rorty's proposal. It is argued first that Rorty's "redescription" of the fulfilment of the religious impulse is so radical that it is hard to see what (...) remains of its specifically religious content. This casts doubt on Rorty's claim to have made pragmatism and religion compatible. The article then offers an analysis of Rorty's key notion of "unjustifiable hope". Different senses of unjustifiable hope are distinguished, in the course of which a tension between the "romantic" and "utilitarian" aspects of Rorty's pragmatist philosophy of religion comes into view. (shrink)

Rorty uses the private–public distinction as a conceptual tool to uphold the ideal of self–creation (Romanticism) simultaneously to the ideal of solidarity (Enlightenment liberalism). The difficulty of accommodating these two apparently opposing ideals has led Rorty to make inconsistent and contradictory claims about the private–public distinction. This article suggests a way of easing the tension that exists around Rorty’s formulations of the distinction. It does so by turning to the thematic of “self–enlargement” to be found in Rorty’s later writings. By (...) presenting self–enlargement as a common feature of self–creation and solidarity, this reading opens up a way of reconciling these two ideals and mitigating some of the difficulties in Rorty’s private–public distinction. (shrink)

This article critiques Jeffrey Stout's suggestion in Democracy and Tradition that the practice of critical democratic questioning itself forms part of a historically unique secular tradition. While the practice of democratic questioning makes a valuable contribution to the project of fostering an "enlarged mentality" among the adherents of any particular tradition, Stout's contention that this practice itself points to the existence of a substantive tradition, one that stands apart from and is not reliant upon the moral sources of the traditions (...) it engages, remains problematic. (shrink)

In Richard Rorty: Outgrowing Modern Nihilism, Tracy Llanera places Richard Rorty in conversation with philosophers confronting nihilism as a “malaise of modernity.” She shows how Rortyan thought offers a horizontal and relational approach to “redemption,” as opposed to religious or philosophical paths to be saved by higher beings or ideas. This essay focuses on Llanera's redescription of Rorty and whether amplifying Rorty's use of “redemption” and “transcendence” is wise. Leaving behind this laden vocabulary might better serve Llanera's purpose of illuminating (...) a path to outgrow, rather than overcome, the anxiety of nihilism. After exploring Llanera's redescription of Rorty, the essay suggests that a different vocabulary—composed of words such as ease, hope, and comfort, and potentially as capable of supporting Llanera's overarching aim—is available in Rorty's writings. Turning to this other vocabulary might strengthen Llanera's significant contribution to the nihilism debate and to Rortyan and pragmatist philosophy more generally. (shrink)

(2000). Religious narrative, post‐secularism and Utopia. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 3, The Philosophy of Utopia, pp. 205-224.

This paper addresses recent examples of militant atheism. It considers the theistic reply that describes atheism as deriving from a “God-shaped hole” in the human soul. The paper will argue that American pragmatism offers a middle path that avoids militant atheism without suffering from this problem. The paper describes this middle path and considers the problem that is seen in Rorty’s recent work: how the pragmatist can remain critical of religious fundamentalism without succumbing to a militant version of atheism. The (...) solution proposed is tolerant acceptance of religion along with melioristic criticism developed within shared norms of inquiry. (shrink)

This paper first uncovers the subtle spiritual narcissism that has characterized historical approaches to religious diversity and discusses the shortcomings of the main forms of religious pluralism that have been proposed as its antidote: ecumenical, soteriological, postmodern, and metaphysical. It then argues that a participatory pluralism paves the way for an appreciation of religious diversity that eschews the dogmatism and competitiveness involved in privileging any particular tradition over the rest without falling into cultural-linguistic or naturalistic reductionisms. Discussion includes the question (...) of the validity of spiritual truths and the development of a participatory critical theory of religion. The essay concludes with an exploration of different scenarios for the future of religion– global religion, mutual transformation, interspiritual wisdom, and spirituality without religion–and proposes that such a future may be shaped by spiritually individuated persons engaged in processes of cosmological hybridization in the context of a common spiritual family. A participatory approach to spirituality turns the problem of religious plurality into a celebration of the critical spirit of pluralism. (shrink)

Richard Rorty’s muscular liberalism and pragmatic intolerance draw sustenance from Nietzsche as well as from the earlier American pragmatists. We set out the ways in which Rorty adopts and adapts their ideas. We go on to suggest that the cultural ethnocentrism that he advocates carries certain risks, and can be divorced all too easily from his own qualifications, particularly in the post-9-11 scenario. It is our contention that Isaiah Berlin’s case for a pluralist liberalism warrants serious consideration as an alternative.

This article discloses the romantic source of many core terms in Rorty's vocabulary, including redescription, contingency, anxiety of influence, anti-authoritarianism, post-philosophical culture, and political culture. Although Rorty disagrees with Romanticism's indifference toward community, his revisionary pragmatism has a discernable romantic cast.

Critically engages the work of American philosopher Richard J. Bernstein.