This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against (...) the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy’s approach with its emphasis on a multidimensional conception of freedom is very well suited to offer a sophisticated and critical account of freedom of speech in the democratic public sphere. Nevertheless, it has rarely engaged other competing free speech theories in order to offer a valuable social critique of other ways of thinking about freedom of expression. This article tries to fill this gap by critically engaging Robert Post’s theory of freedom of speech based on democratic self-government. On (...) Post’s account, the key to effective democratic self-government is political autonomy, which he reduces to negative liberty and formal equality. I argue that this reduction creates serious problems. A purely procedural account of democracy makes it difficult to politicize new issues in the public sphere and also makes a dominant discourse resistant to contestation. Further, given his theory, Post does not have enough normative resources to offer an account of public justification, which would expand effective political liberty. (shrink)

Autonomy is increasingly rejected as a fundamental principle by liberal political theorists because it is regarded as incompatible with respect for diversity. This article seeks, via an analysis of the Danish cartoon controversy, to show that the relationship between autonomy and diversity is more complex than often posited. Particularly, it asks whether the autonomy defense of freedom of expression encourages disrespect for religious feelings. Autonomy leads to disrespect for diversity only when it is understood as a character ideal that must (...) be promoted as an end in itself. If it by contrast is understood as something we should presume everyone possesses, it provides a strong basis for equal respect among people from diverse cultures. A Kantian conception of autonomy can justify the right to freedom of expression while it at the same time requires that we in the exercise of freedom of expression show respect for others as equals. (shrink)

Past justifications of free expression rely on the crucial role speech plays in deliberative democracies and respecting persons. Beneath each of these justifications lies the common goal of creating greater justice for individuals and groups. Yet 20th century political liberalism limits the kinds of arguments that ought to motivate political decisions. In this paper I explore how an inclusive political decision-making process can bring about a more just world. By relying on personal views and compassion rather than impartiality and reasonability, (...) political actors can engage in a discourse that results in greater understanding among persons and lasting community change. (shrink)

Integrative Social Contracts Theory is a popular framework to assist managers in making decisions on international moral dilemmas. Although the theory has been praised for its comprehensiveness and sophistication, commentators have raised concerns regarding the justification and identification of substantive hypernorms, fundamental moral principles valid across cultures. This paper introduces the deliberative test, a new method for testing the cross-cultural validity of ethical norms in ISCT. The test relies on the concept of Deliberative Capacity, arising from new developments in system-level (...) deliberative democracy research, which studies deliberation at the level of national societies and over time. Based on this recent stream of research, the deliberative test has the potential of providing better guidance for managers to decide which norms to follow in case of conflicting standards between home and host countries. (shrink)

A common objection to the argument for deliberative democracy is that it cannot provide mechanisms for achieving its ideal of all-inclusiveness. This does, however, not in itself refute the deliberative ideal. In a reading of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida’s writings on forgiveness, we argue that forgiving involves a renegotiation of our enemies and of ourselves. Hereby a renegotiation of the seemingly unbridgeable understandings of who our enemies are can be achieved. Forgiving involves a realisation that we have something in (...) common with our foes. This opens the question: Why did our paths separate? We become puzzled and start to search for reasons. This does not mean that we have to accept ways of life that we detest. But it does mean that we need to be able to articulate counter arguments. Hereby limitations of prevailing understandings of who to include in deliberative processes can be overcome. (shrink)