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XI.—The Nature of Morally Good Action

W. D. Ross

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 29 (1):251-274 (1929)

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W. D. Ross’s moral philosophy.Benedicto Acosta - 2020 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 15:41-64.details The present work tries to analyze the moral philosophy of William David Ross. First, Ross's ethics precedents are exposed, focusing on three authors against whom he acknowledges entering into discussion: Kant, the utilitarians and Moore. This is the aim of the second chapter. Next, Ross's proposal is explained through three axes: 1) the theory of moral knowledge, where his well-known intuitionist theory will appear; 2) the doctrine of correction, composed of deontological pluralism; 3) and the doctrine of good, in which (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)Underivative duty: Prichard on moral obligation: Thomas Hurka.Thomas Hurka - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):111-134.details This paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Sidgwick's Axioms and Consequentialism.Robert Shaver - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):173-204.details Sidgwick gives various tests for highest certainty. When he applies these tests to commonsense morality, he finds nothing of highest certainty. In contrast, when he applies these tests to his own axioms, he finds these axioms to have highest certainty. The axioms culminate in Benevolence: “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
On right and good: The problem of objective right: Journal of philosophical studies.W. G. de Burgh - 1930 - Philosophy 5 (19):422-434.details We have been led by our preliminary survey to acknowledge the autonomy of the moral life. The Tightness of an action is something that is sui generis and ultimate. It is vain to seek a reason for the rightness other than the Tightness itself. To the question, “Why ought I to do what I ought?” the only answer is, “Because I ought to do it.” 1 It is with rightness as with truth: Vera idea est norma sui et falsi. In (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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