For a group to be an agent, it must be individuated from its environment and other systems. It must, in other words, be an individual. Despite the central importance of individuality for understanding group agency, the concept has been significantly overlooked. I propose to fill this gap in our understanding of group individuality by arguing that agents are autonomous as it is commonly understood in the enactive literature. According to this autonomous individuation account, an autonomous system is one wherein the (...) constituent processes of the system actively produce and sustain that self-same system, which will run down or fail if any of these constituent processes cease. This definition of autonomy provides us with a precise and operational account of the individuality of group agents. I will then compare this account to those of Carol Rovane and Raimo Tuomela to argue that it offers the best explanation of what kinds of groups are group agents. (shrink)

Within social psychology, group identification refers to a mental process that leads an individual to conceive of herself as a group member. This phenomenon has recently attracted a great deal of attention in the debate about shared agency. In this debate, group identification is appealing to many because it appears to explain important forms of intentionally shared actions in a cognitively unsophisticated way. This paper argues that, unless important issues about group identification are not illuminated, the heuristic function ascribed to (...) this notion for an understanding of shared agency remains dubious at best and unfulfilled at worst. This paper offers such a clarification by distinguishing and describing two different mental processes that constitute group identification: adoption of the group perspective and transformation in self-understanding. It is claimed that the latter process consists in the production of what Ruth Millikan labels “Pushmi-Pullyu representations” and that it is developmentally prior with respect to the ability of adopting the group perspective. (shrink)

In the ethics of public health, questions of virtue, that is, of what it means for public health to act excellently, have received little attention. This omission needs remedy first because achieving improvements in population-wide health can be in tension with goals like respect for the liberty, self-determination, or non-oppression of various individuals or groups. A virtue-ethics approach is flexible and well-suited for the kind of deliberation required to resolve or mitigate such tension. Public health requires practically wise and careful (...) thinking, which virtue ethics brings with it. Furthermore, too tight a focus on delivering outcomes in determining how public health should act has, in some cases, actually undermined its ability to achieve those consequences. However, the main concern about incorporating virtue into public health in a pluralistic society is likely to be that virtue is generally teleological, and we would surely need some widely agreed upon idea of something like flourishing or the common good for this to work. In this paper, I propose that for public health to express virtue in its work, it must express a commitment to justice as it goes about its business promoting and protecting the health of the population. Justice is both a contributor toward better health for groups in society, and a worthwhile goal in its own right. I will sketch an argument that justice as non-oppression – not merely health equity – is the right telos toward which excellent public health should aim in a pluralist society. (shrink)