A historical and philosophical reassessment of the impact of Aristotle and early-modern Aristotelianism on the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant and Aristotle reassesses the prevailing understanding of Kant as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher. Taking epistemology, logic, and methodology to be the key disciplines through which Kant’s transcendental philosophy stood as an independent form of philosophy, Marco Sgarbi shows that Kant drew important elements of his logic and metaphysical doctrines from Aristotelian ideas that were absent in other philosophical traditions, such as (...) the distinction of matter and form of knowledge, the division of transcendental logic into analytic and dialectic, the theory of categories and schema, and the methodological issues of the architectonic. Drawing from unpublished documents including lectures, catalogues, academic programs, and the Aristotelian-Scholastic handbooks that were officially adopted at Königsberg University where Kant taught, Sgarbi further demonstrates the historical and philosophical importance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism to these disciplines from the late sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

O artigo visa mostrar como o gesto filosófico reinholdiano de construção de uma filosofia elementar e o fichteano de fundamentar toda filosofia como ciência rigorosa em uma intuição intelectual alcançada através de um postulado, mais do que uma traição da impostação fundamental da crítica da razão kantiana, refletem uma tentativa de aprofundar elementos implícitos nela, sobretudo no que diz respeito à sua dimensão metodológica. Isto permite estabelecer uma continuidade entre o criticismo de Kant e o chamado de idealismo alemão que (...) ultrapassa toda concepção baseada sobre uma apropriação indevida ou uma assimilação seletiva do criticismo por parte deste último, e pode ser entendida como presentificação. (shrink)

In questo articolo si analizzano congiuntamente l'origine delle idee e il loro uso regolativo. A questo scopo si comincia considerando la connessione tra uso logico della ragione e definizione della ragione in generale come facoltà dei principi. Si considera poi come la rappresentazione di un incondizionato derivi necessariamente dall'uso logico, e come quindi questo implichi necessariamente un uso reale della ragione. Si considera poi come le varie rappresentazioni dell'incondizionato diano origine alle idee trascendentali. Infine, si considera l'uso regolativo delle idee (...) alla luce della pratica di inferire dal quale derivano. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto la contribución de Matías Oroño, intitulada “El conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto”. Esta contribución, en lo esencial, es una crítica a la tesis según la cual es posible encontrar una fundamentación del no-conceptualismo kantiano en el tratamiento de los juicios de gusto. Esta tesis es defendida por Dietmar Heidemann en un artículo que Oroño refuta. En el presente artículo se sostiene que la interpretación de Oroño es acertada, con algunos reparos. Sin embargo, me (...) parece importante señalar que Oroño no cuestiona dos premisas del no-conceptualismo sostenidas por Heidemann que necesitan ser revisadas. Estas premisas son: los elementos no-conceptuales que interesan tienen valor cognitivo, esos elementos son fenoménicos, intencionales, representacionales. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a strong continuity between the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature and the transcendental deduction of the ideas from the first critique. On these grounds, I provide an interpretation of the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature in which I argue that: 1) the necessity of the principle of purposiveness of nature does not derive from its role in solving some specific philosophical problem but from its relation to (...) a cognitive goal; 2) the representation of nature as conforming to the maxims of judgement is a direct, immediate consequence of a certain cognitive goal that the necessity of the empirical laws mentioned by Kant in the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature is not so much their nomic necessity, but their necessity as consequences of higher laws. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism emerged over the course of the 1860s and it occupied a leading position in the German universities from the 1870s until the First World War. Demands for getting "back to Kant" had become common since the early 1860s, and these demands were discussed in the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin; PGB), which was the international organization of Hegelians. In this paper I address some reactions among the PGB members to the 1860s Kant revival. (...) The journal "Der Gedanke", the organ of the PGB, reported closely how Kant returned to the spotlight of German philosophy. The reactions of the PGB members to the Kant revival was not only critical. Over the course of the 1860s the interest on Kant among the members grew little by little. (shrink)