Classification is one of the distinctive features of Paralympic sport. Despite the existence of classification rules and a well-defined classification process, some Paralympic athletes intentionally misrepresent their abilities to classifiers in order to be allocated to a lower performing competition class, in which they secure an unfair advantage over other athletes. Such deception undermines the integrity of the competition by exploiting a vulnerability in the classification process. Such manipulation is hard to mitigate and harder still to prove that an athlete (...) had; intentionally misrepresented their abilities or; failed for innocent reasons to make maximum efforts during the classification or; had acted under coercive pressure from others in their entourage or environment. These challenges are compounded in the case of Paralympic athletes that have an intellectual impairment or who are accompanied by a parent/guardian who acts as a proxy, rendering evaluations as to responsibility even more complex. This article presents a conceptual analyses of intentional misrepresentation of abilities in Paralympic sport, and the differentiation of responsibility for offence thereupon, as stipulated in the draft of the International Standard for Intentional Misrepresentation, accompanying the new 2025 Athlete Classification Code (IPC, Citation2024). Drawing on philosophical and legal analysis we (i) set out existing shortcomings associated with Paralympic classification; (ii) articulate the range of potential intentional misrepresentational acts with respect to classification manipulation; and (iii) articulate the range of negative effects on the integrity of Paralympic sport. (shrink)

My main goal here is to develop a functional analysis of cheating and corruption in sports, and to differentiate cheating within the broader category of corruption. Whereas officials can act corruptly, they cannot cheat. In contrast, sports participants, since they occupy two roles, can do both. I argue that although acts of cheating are acts of corruption, not all corrupt acts by competitors are acts of cheating. I also respond to some skeptical challenges and criticisms of the concept of ‘cheating’ (...) by providing some opposing arguments and a provisional definition. I argue that cheating in sports occurs in the context of a complex institutional practice. It transpires due to some failing in the efforts and/or limitations of sports officials to prohibit it. In central cases it consists in both the functional and ethical violation of the constitutional norms of a sport in the service of obtaining unearned victory for the cheater. (shrink)

I argue that in purely professional games of pure chance, such as slot machines, roulette, baccarat or pachinko, any instance of cheating that successfully deceives the judge can be ‘part of the game’. I examine, and reject, various proposals for the ‘ethos’ that determines how we ought to interpret the formal rules of games of pure chance, such as being a test of skill, a matter of entertainment, a display of aesthetic beauty, an opportunity for hedonistic pleasure, and a fraternal (...) activity. Ultimately, I argue that ‘winning the benefit’ is the only ethos that can apply in purely professional games of pure chance, and that if we interpret the formal rules according to this ethos, cheating that is undertaken with respect for the judge’s authority, but that attempts to cause the judge of the game to ‘voluntarily’ relinquish the benefit of the game by deceiving them into thinking that the formal rules of the game have been followed, is impermissible but acceptable cheating, and is therefore within, rather than outside, the game. Here, I define ‘games of pure chance’ as games in which chance is the only determinant of winning. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I begin to develop and defend a reformed concept of ‘cheating’ as ‘wrongful competitive norm violating’. I then use this to reject Oliver Leaman’s view that cheating is som...

The debate about the Strategic Foul has been rumbling on for several decades and it has predominantly been fought on moral grounds. The defenders claim that the rules of a game must be supplemented by the ‘ethos’ of the game, by its conventions or informal rules. Critics of the Strategic Foul argue that to break the rules deliberately, in order to gain an advantage, is morally wrong, spoils the game, or is a form of cheating. Rather than entering the moral (...) maze I will argue that the Strategic Foul rests on a conceptual mistake. I will contrast the Strategic Foul with the idea of Efficient Breach in the economic approach to law in order to bring out some of the salient features. While doing so I will attempt some cross-fertilisation between jurisprudential insights and philosophical reflection on game rules. Finally, I will re-cast Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules in order to bring out the conceptual mistake more clearly. (shrink)

We present and defend a view labeled “practiceism” which provides a solution to the incompatibility problems. The classic incompatibility problem is inconsistency of:1. Someone who intentionally violates the rules of a game is not playing the game.2. In many cases, players intentionally violate the rules as part of playing the game.The problem has a normative counterpart:1’. In normal cases, it is wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.2’. In many normal cases, it is not wrong (...) for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.According to both formalism and informalism, the rules of the game include the formal rules of the game. Both traditional positions avoid the incompatibility problems by rejecting 1 and 1'. Practiceism rejects 2 and 2’: it maintains that the rules are the rules manifested in playing the game, not the formal rules.Practiceism presents two theses: (... (shrink)

This paper examines the notion of fouls in sports. In the first part of the paper, we examine some actual distinctions and classifications between different kinds of fouls. In the second part we examine the significance, validity, and justification of these classifications from a normative perspective.The term ‘foul’ evokes negative connotation; some would say—negative normative connotations. Conventional wisdom suggests that typically to commit fouls is, by definition, to go against the rules or principles of the contest. Since sport contests are (...) constitutive activities—this means that to foul is to go against the essence of the contest. In other words, to commit fouls seems not to play the game; it seems unsporting. Consider the following typical example: in a premiership match in 2014 Hull’s forward Nikica Jelavic spun around Company and had a clear path to the goal. Manchester City’s defender Vincent Kompany then held him back. Although immediately ejected from the game, it is noteworthy that Kompany... (shrink)

It is customary for institutions that organize sporting competitions and events to exercise a considerable degree of authority over the participants. That authority is often manifested in the enforcement of penalties for infringements of fair play. This paper focuses on one concrete case from soccer, although I take the discussion to extend to other sports as well. I argue that not all fair play rules should be enforced by the respective organizing institutions, and that enforcing all of them indiscriminately is (...) a cause of injustice, rather than promoting fairness in sports. I propose a principled way of making the necessary distinction between those fair play rules that are enforceable and those that are not. (shrink)

The work of Bernard Suits continues to be discussed in the sports philosophy field, over forty years after the publication of his brilliant book, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia. Much of t...

In this paper, we reply to Eric Moore’s argument that Lance Armstrong did not cheat, at least according to one, standard account of cheating. If that is the case, we argue, so much the worse for th...

Athletes who flout doping bans are generally thought to have gained an unfair advantage. In this paper, I critically examine this view. I begin by defending an effort-based account of desert in sport, explaining why it is preferable to the hybrid account that is favoured in the literature. Drawing on the effort-based account, I construct the Unfair Advantage Argument formally, in what I take to be its most plausible form. I then argue that the Unfair Advantage Argument should be rejected, (...) for two main reasons. First, I challenge its assumption that dopers have put in less effort than their opponents. Second, I explain why, even if dopers have put in less effort, they have still exerted a sufficient amount. Though doping is problematic from an institutional perspective, it is not – from a pre-institutional perspective – cause for moral concern. (shrink)

The Greek word mētis (μῆτις) traditionally refers to a particular form of wily intelligence associated with the arts of deception (dolos) and the knowledge of tricks (kerdē), subterfuges, and traps. Mētis evokes innovative and ground-breaking solutions, based on the capability to understand, anticipate, and possibly violate the others’ expectations. Most importantly, mētis presupposes practical wisdom, or prudence (phrόnesis), a dispositional quality that underpins all the virtues that deserve to be cultivated by sportspersons and that is pivotal to perfect sportspersons’ moral (...) character. Not only is prudence required to apply mētis profitably for winning a game, but it is also indispensable to perform consistently with the game’s norms—cognizant of sport values. This analysis of mētis is key to illuminate the embodied dimension of tactical and moral reasoning in contemporary sport practice. In this paper, we first argue that the strategic effectiveness of mētis proves that not only sensorimotor control but also higher forms of intelligence, like strategic reasoning, are embodied and inform skilful performance; second, we argue that relying on mētis is necessary not only to interpret the rules of the game in one’s own favor but also to respect the shared values that these rules uphold in the sport practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI argue that Bernard Suits’ definition of game playing, suitably extended with David Lewis’ account of coordinating conventions, is robust enough to withstand some common objections made ag...

In this paper, I explore the idea that under one way of understanding cheating, Armstrong did not fulfill any of the three necessary conditions: that cheating violates a rule—I will make the case that though doping was against the official rules, it was not against the rules the athletes used; that it is cheating if the intent is to obtain an unfair advantage—I will argue that dopers were not attempting to obtain an unfair advantage, at least on one plausible understanding (...) of fairness; and that cheating requires fair enforcement of the rules—I will show that the official rules against doping were hardly enforced at all, much less fairly enforced, and thus lacked enough sufficient normative force to deem breaking them cheating. (shrink)

In Sport Realism: A Law-Inspired Theory of Sport, Aaron Harper, Associate Professor of Philosophy at West Liberty University, introduces a new realist approach to conceptualize sport. The book is d...