Switch to: References

Citations of:

Kantian Self-Conceit and the Two Guises of Authority

Francey Russell

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):268-283 (2020)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Kant and the Second Person.Janis David Schaab - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):494-513.details According to Darwall’s Second-Personal Account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Kant’s moral theory. Critics object that the Second-Personal Account abandons central tenets of Kant’s system. I respond to these critics’ three main challenges by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the Second-Personal Account. Properly understood, this account is not only congenial to Kant’s moral theory, but also illuminates aspects of that theory which have hitherto received (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Do Good People Love Themselves? On Rational Self-love in Kant.Bas Tönissen - 2024 - Kant Studien 115 (4):433-453.details Kant is frequently read as saying that all self-love is bad, and the virtuous agent is one who suppresses self-love as much as possible. This paper argues that this is mistaken and that the right kind of self-love – what Kant calls rational self-love – plays an important role in a successful moral life. It shows how Kant provides a detailed taxonomy of different kinds of self-love. He contrasts the (practical) incentive of self-love with the (pathological) feeling of it, self-love (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):75-92.details Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis, he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only p... Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Self-Knowledge.Jordan MacKenzie - 2025 - The Monist 108 (1):81-91.details What moral value, if any, is there to unsuccessful self-scrutiny? I answer this question by drawing on Kant’s discussion of the duty of self-knowledge in the Metaphysics of Morals. On my interpretation, the duty of self-knowledge is a demand to understand the generic structure of our moral agency: fulfilling it requires that we appreciate ourselves as fundamentally flawed, but also fundamentally morally worthy. This interpretation renders the duty consistent with Kant’s claims about moral self-opacity and explains why Kant called self-knowledge (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Between ‘Indubitably Certain’ and ‘Quite Detrimental’ to Philosophy: Kant on the Guise of the Good Thesis.Vinicius Carvalho - 2023 - Kantian Review 28 (4):537-553.details Kant clearly endorses some version of the ‘old formula of the schools’, according to which all volition is sub ratione boni. There has been a debate whether he holds this only for morally good actions. I argue that a closer look at the distinction between the good and the agreeable does not support this conclusion. Considering Kant’s account of the detrimental and the correct use of this thesis, I argue that rational beings always will sub ratione boni, even when they (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Martin Sticker, Rationalizing (Vernünfteln) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022 Pp. 75 ISBN 9781108714426 (pbk) $22.95. [REVIEW]Laura Papish - 2022 - Kantian Review 27 (4):671-673.details Download Export citation Bookmark

1