This article reconstructs Henri Bergson’s argument at the beginning of the second chapter of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience for his view that every idea of number involves sp...

This article highlights the mathematical structure of Henri Bergson’s method. While Bergson has been historically interpreted as an anti-scientific and irrationalist philosopher, he modeled his philosophical methodology on the infinitesimal calculus developed by Leibniz and Newton in the seventeenth century. His philosophy, then, rests on the science of number, at least from a methodological standpoint. By looking at how he conscripted key mathematical concepts into his philosophy, this article invites us to re-imagine Bergson’s place in the history of Western philosophy.

In 1911, Bergson visited Britain for a number of lectures which led to his increasing popularity. Russell personally encountered Bergson during his lecture at University College London on the 28th of October, and on the 30th of October Bergson attended one of Russell’s lectures. Russell went on to write a number of critical articles on Bergson, contributing to the hundreds of publications on Bergson which ensued following these lectures. Russell’s critical writings have been seen as part of a history of (...) controversies between so-called ‘Continental’ and ‘Analytic’ philosophers in the twentieth century. Yet Russell’s engagement with Bergson’s thought comes as a response to a particular British form of Bergsonism and is involved with the wider phenomenon of the British import of Bergsonism (by figures connected in different ways to Russell, such as Hulme, Wildon Carr or Eliot). Though this may challenge the view of Russell and Bergson as enacting an early version of the ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide, there are however some particular characterisations of Bergson by Russell which contribute to the subsequent formation of the ‘rotten scene’ (Glendinning 2006: 69) of the divide in the second half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This paper draws upon the work of three different philosophers, from America (Thomas Nagel), France (Henri Bergson) and Britain (Alfred North Whitehead), to argue for (i) the reality of subjectivity, (ii) the nonphysical nature of subjective consciousness that is dependent upon but not determined by the physical nature of the body, and (iii) the potential unity of a new concept of nature-on-the-move, as distinct from the bifurcation of nature that views only the objective as real. It then presents arguments for (...) new understandings of positivism, interpretivism and the critical stance, in a unified and more coherent frame, going beyond Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu, to a more fundamental understanding of the philosophical context, situating IS within a more inclusive concept of nature. (shrink)

The article focuses on the history of the conflict between analytic and continental tradition, which dominated the philosophy of the 20th century. Although both traditions originated from the same intellectual environment and were heavily influenced by Neo-Kantianism, their mutual lack of understanding progressed over time and, on several occasions, the situation grew into open hostility. The article describes the ten most serious conflicts: Russell vs. Bergson, Schlick vs. Husserl, Carnap vs. Heidegger, Ryle vs. Heidegger, Popper's critique of pseudoscience, conference in (...) Royaumont, Searle vs. Derrida, the revelation of Heidegger's Nazi past, Derrida's Honorary Doctorate from Cambridge, and Sokal's scam. At the beginning of the 21st century it turns out that the conflict between analytic and continental philosophy has been exhausted. What is more substantial is the dispute over the philosophical methodology, which is reflected in the division into naturalistic and anti-naturalistic thinkers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain how the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux must be rejected, while the notion of flux should and can be preserved. Against the reductionist account of subjectless change, a modern version of the Heraclitean doctrine advocated by revisionist metaphysics, I argue that (1) the idea of subjectless change is one that can and should be formulated in the established conceptual framework, and (2) subjectlessness is a feature that most aptly characterizes material changes. In (...) essence, I seek to provide a proper accommodation for the notion of flux in a conceptual framework that is traditionally understood (or rather misunderstood) as decidedly excluding it. (shrink)

The paper investigates the history of the introduction of what was later called “analytic philosophy” in October 1911–May 1912. Despite the fact that Russell and Wittgenstein were in full agreement in their antipathy towards the old-style philosophy, for example, that of Bergson, each had his own conception of the New Philosophy. For Russell, it meant “examined philosophy”, or philosophy advanced through “scientific restraint and balance” of our theoretical conjectures, and resulted in a series of logically correctly constructed theories. For Wittgenstein, (...) it resulted in syncopated, short logical-philosophical “discoveries”. In the years to come, the two conceptions of “rigorous philosophy” embraced by Russell and Wittgenstein often came in conflict. (shrink)