Resumen: En el presente artículo me propongo elucidar el significado del concepto “pathos de la distancia” y sus implicaciones ético-políticas, destacando, además, su sentido y coherencia con el conjunto del pensamiento nietzscheano. La tesis fundamental es que el pathosde la distancia, como característica básica del ideal noble, muestra cómo el concepto de preeminencia política en Nietzsche se diluye siempre en un concepto de preeminencia anímica. La reflexión se enmarca dentro de la crítica nietzscheana de la cultura, la política y la (...) educación, y su propuesta de reforma de los valores dominantes de la sociedad, entre ellos, los que configuran la subjetividad y la individualidad. Se estudian las diversas dimensiones del pathos de la distancia: como articulación jerárquica, como principio de individuación, como parte la Gran Política y como elemento del pensamiento de la cría. Palabras clave: Pathos de la distancia, Valor, Moral, Gran Política, Cría. (shrink)

In this paper I consider a cluster of positions which depart from the immortalist and dualist anthropologies of Rene Descartes and Henry More. In particular, I argue that John Locke and Isaac Newton are attracted to a monistic mind-body metaphysics, which while resisting neat characterization, occupies a conceptual space distinct from the dualism of the immortalists, on the one hand, and thoroughgoing materialism of Thomas Hobbes, on the other. They propound a sort of property monism: mind and body are distinct, (...) with distinct characteristics and functions, but are, nevertheless, ontologically interdependent. Consciousness ? the locus of personhood, and thus, a necessary condition for personal immortality ? is an embodied phenomenon; its preservation requires the life and proper functioning of the body. Dying with the dissolution of his body, then, man is a compound wholly mortal. Nevertheless, both Locke and Newton accepted the possibility of personal immortality; with Hobbes, both looked to the Biblical promise of bodily resurrection. For with the re-vitalization of the body ? and a subsequent restoration of consciousness and memory ? personal identity is preserved, even beyond the grave. (shrink)

Descartes explicitly states that virtue is sufficient for attaining happiness. In this paper I argue that, within the framework he develops, this is not exactly true: more than virtuous action is needed to secure happiness. I begin by analyzing, in Section 2, the Cartesian notion of virtue in order to show the way in which it closely connects to what, for Descartes, forms the very essence of morality – the correct use of our free will. Section 3, in turn, discusses (...) Descartes’s view of happiness and its relation to the highest good. Thereby is laid the foundation for Section 4, which offers a reconstruction of the argument that virtue leads to happiness. Section 5 concludes the discussion by suggesting how and why Descartes leaves a crucial premise – an intellectual insight that consists of three main elements – unmentioned when he claims that virtue is sufficient for happiness. (shrink)

The degree to which Hobbes's citizenry retains its right to resist sovereign power has been the source of a significant debate. It has been argued by a number of scholars that there is a clear avenue for legitimate rebellion in Hobbes's state, as described in the Leviathan - in this work, Hobbes asserts that subjects can retain their natural right to self-preservation in civil society, and that this represents an inalienable right that cannot, under any circumstances, be transferred to the (...) sovereign. The conclusion frequently drawn from this feature of Hobbes's account is that it places a considerable limit on sovereign authority. The right to self-preservation has been taken as proof that Hobbes sought to ensure that the sovereign's power relies upon the continual consent of the individuals that make up his or her constituency. I want to examine Hobbes's account of this civil right in Leviathan in order to show that this line of interpretation is ultimately unfounded. While self-preservation results from the individual's own judgment of threats to her personal safety, it is justified in only the most strictly delineated contexts. Judgments regarding the overall peace and security of the state do not, and cannot, fall to individual experiences and judgments. Hobbes is quite adamant that individuals are not appropriate judges of right and wrong action in matters the sovereign legislates. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to the Symposium's concern with epideictic rhetoric. It argues that in the Symposium, as in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, a contrast is drawn between true and false rhetoric. The paper also discusses the dialogue's relationship to drama. Whereas both epideictic rhetoric and drama were directed to a mass audience, the speeches in the Symposium are delivered to a small, select group. The discussion focuses on the style of the speeches delivered by Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates and (...) Alcibiades. Aristophanes speaks in the simple style of comedy, fable and folktale, also used by Protagoras in Plato's Protagoras. Agathon speaks in the high-flown style of Gorgias. Socrates' speech is a miniature Platonic dialogue, and both Alcibiades' speech and Socrates' speech may be compared to satyr play. The paper concludes with a suggestion that the claim at 223D, that the same person should be able to write both comedy and tragedy, refers to style as well as subject-matter. (shrink)

This paper deals with the concepts of science and social control to be found within interwar institutional economics. It is argued that these were central parts of the institutionalist approach to economics as the key participants in the movement defined it. For institutionalists, science was defined as empirical, investigational, experimental, and instrumental. Social control was defined in terms of the development of new instruments for the control of business to supplement the market mechanism. The concepts of science and social control (...) were joined via John Dewey's pragmatic and instrumental philosophy. These ideas provided important links to the ideals of foundations, such as Rockefeller, and thus to access to research funding. Institutionalist concepts of science and social control were, however, displaced after World War II by Keynesian policy and positivist ideas of scientific methodology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe most prominent early modern argument against materialism is to be found in Descartes. Previously I had argued that this argument relies crucially on a robust conception of substance, according to which it has a single principal attribute of which all its other intrinsic qualities are modes. In the present paper I return to this claim. In Section 2, I address a question that is often raised about that conception of substance: its commitment to the idea that a substance has (...) a single such principal attribute. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Daniel Garber have argued that this claim relies on Descartes's identification of substance with attribute. But I argue that it relies on his view that a substance has a single, unitary nature. In Section 3, I examine the role of this conception of substance in arguments found in Malebranche and Leibniz and compare these arguments with Descartes's. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se aborda el proyecto político hobbesiano a la luz de las críticas realizadas por Kant en Teoría y praxis. Específicamente, se considera en detalle la objeción contra el Gobierno despótico, según la cual, el soberano sitúa la felicidad del pueblo como la principal finalidad del Estado y, por ello, acaba fomentando involuntariamente la rebelión. Al respecto, se sostendrá que el planteamiento de Hobbes en el Leviatán evade el foco de los reproches kantianos, justamente porque su particular (...) noción de felicidad impide que esta pueda ser constituida como el objetivo de la sociedad política. A su vez, se arguye que existe una sugestiva modificación terminológica con relación al De Cive, que lleva a considerar la posibilidad de que Hobbes haya prefigurado las críticas reseñadas. (shrink)

This article reassesses Hobbes’s place in the history of ethics based on the first systematic analysis of his various classifications of formal goodness. The good was traditionally divided into three: profitably good, pleasurably good, and morally good. Across his works, Hobbes replaced the last with pulchrum—a decidedly non-moral form of goodness on his account. I argue that Hobbes’s dismissal of moral goodness was informed by his hedonist conception of the good and accompanied by reinterpretations of right reason and natural law. (...) By dispensing moral goodness and insisting on the hedonist and relational nature of the good, Hobbes moreover recast and rendered more urgent the question of why we should be moral. Hobbes is commonly thought to have raised this question so starkly because of his general insensitivity to the demands of justice. My analysis suggests that it may also, or rather, have been due to his restrictive conception of the good. A comparison with other moral philosophers from the period—including Suárez, Gassendi, Locke, and Pufendorf—indicates how unusual Hobbes’s jettisoning of moral goodness was. (shrink)

Dans cette étude, je voudrais considérer l’une des questions les plus anciennes de la philosophie du langage, à savoir : qu’est-ce qui détermine la signification des expressions linguistiques? Prenez un mot comme « eau ». Qu’est-ce qui détermine la signification de ce mot? Il semble qu’il y a au moins deux réponses possibles : la première consiste à dire que la signification du mot est déterminée par mon idée de l’eau, de sorte que ce sont mes pensées internes qui déterminent (...) la significati... (shrink)

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. (...) Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruis.. (shrink)

This paper explores the theory of freedom that Emilie du Châtelet advances in her essay “On Freedom.” Using contemporary terminology, we can characterize this theory as a version of agent-causal compatibilism. More specifically, the theory has the following elements: (a) freedom consists in the power to act in accordance with one’s choices, (b) freedom requires the ability to suspend desires and master passions, (c) freedom requires a power of self-motion in the agent, and (d) freedom is compatible with moral necessity (...) but not with physical necessity. While these elements may at first appear disparate, the paper shows that they fit together quite well. The resulting theory is a surprising combination of doctrines that appear to be based on Samuel Clarke’s libertarian account of free will and doctrines that are reminiscent of the compatibilist accounts of John Locke, Anthony Collins, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes. (shrink)

Scientific realism is discussed in a variety of quantum mechanical settings, and defended against rival views on a number of scores. The search for the hidden is the source of much scientific creativity.

A new realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is introduced. Quantum systems are shown to have two kinds of properties: the usual ones described by values of quantum observables, which are called extrinsic, and those that can be attributed to individual quantum systems without violating standard quantum mechanics, which are called intrinsic. The intrinsic properties are classified into structural and conditional. A systematic and self-consistent account is given. Much more statements become meaningful than any version of Copenhagen interpretation would allow. A (...) new approach to classical properties and measurement problem is suggested. A quantum definition of classical states is proposed. (shrink)

Leibniz’s philosophical and philological interests overlapped at many points, and some of his fundamental philosophical notions shaped his views on language, particularly his thinking about language history, in decisive ways. Although he is better known for his work on universal language, his writings on natural language and language history are worth consideration both for their subtlety and for the insight they give into the complex history of thought on this topic. The principles of sufficient reason, praedicatum inest subjecto, and his (...) doctrine of marks and traces are echoed in his work on natural languages and in his account of their histories. He attempted to reconcile philosophical investigations of the natural languages with the Biblical accounts of the confusion of languages at Babel, and in his approach to etymology he participated in a long tradition of thinking about language and its essence as hidden or secret, the truth of which remains scattered in signs and which etymology alone may occasionally reveal. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to set out the following: firstly, the most important facts from Leibniz’s biography; secondly, the position of Leibniz’s philosophy within the philosophical thought of the 17th century; thirdly, the diverse ways to explicate Leibniz’s philosophical thought that are still in use in literature today; fourthly, basic features which define the general spirit as well as the methods ofLeibniz’s philosophizing.

In his early text, The Limits of State Action, Wilhelm von Humboldt raises the Kantian question of the permissibility and legitimate extent of political and juridical coercion, as his contribution to a debate amongst Kantians launched by the publication in 1785 of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In arguing for a minimal state, concerned exclusively with internal and external security of its members but not at all with their felicity, Humboldt inflects Kantian political thought in the direction of (...) a liberal laissez-faire state, in marked contrast to the strong interventionism that his fellow-Kantian Fichte derived from similar Kantian grounds. The article argues that the underlying conception of the individual retained by Humboldt has markedly Leibnizian traits, namely the notion of freedom as the spontaneous unfolding of a highly personal, monadic developmental trajectory toward perfection, which ought not to be impeded or homogenized by unnecessary state intervention. Humboldt thus represents not only a ‘rightist’ libertarian reading of Kant, but a particular appropriation of significant Leibnizian themes. His combination of these sources is compared with that of other contemporary theorists like Hufeland and Fichte. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo analizamos la reforma que Leibniz propone entre 1677 y 1695 en la noción de cuerpo y, a partir de ello, esclarecemos el concepto de sustancia corpórea que presenta en esos años. En primer lugar, desarrollamos las críticas que esgrime contra la concepción geométrica del cuerpo propia de los filósofos modernos; en segundo lugar, examinamos los cambios que propone en dicha noción y su caracterización en clave de fuerza primitiva pasiva; en tercer lugar, estudiamos la definición hilemórfica (...) de la sustancia corpórea que ofrece y evaluamos el lugar que ella ocupa en su esquema metafísico. (shrink)

The two-electron atom is the simplest nontrivial quantum system not amenable to exact solutions. Today, its relevance in the development of quantum mechanics and its pedagogical value within the realm of atomic physics are widely recognized. In this work, an historical review of the known different methods and results devised to study such a problem is presented, with an emphasis to the calculations of the ground state energy of helium. Then we discuss several, related, unpublished results obtained around the same (...) years by Ettore Majorana, which remained unknown till recent times. Among them a general variant of the variational method appears to be particularly interesting, even for current research in atomic and nuclear physics: it takes directly into account, already in the trial wavefunction, the action of the full Hamiltonian operator of a given quantum system. Further relevant contributions, specialized to the two-electron problem, include the introduction of the remarkable concept of an effective nuclear charge different for the two electrons (thus generalizing previous known results) and an application of the perturbative method, where the atomic number Z was treated effectively as a continuous variable. Finally a survey of results, relevant mainly for pedagogical reasons, is given; in particular we focus on simple broad range estimates of the helium ionization potential, obtained by suitable choices for the wavefunction, as well as on a simple alternative to Hylleraas’ method, which led Majorana to first order calculations comparable in accuracy with well-known order 11 results derived, in turn, by Hylleraas. (shrink)

Si Dios es la razón suficiente del mundo, entonces parece seguirse que todos los eventos son consecuencia necesaria de un ser necesario. Para evadir esta conclusión, Leibniz formula en la década de 1670 una concepción modal que funda la contingencia en un rasgo lógico e intrínseco de las ideas de las cosas: la posibilidad de concebir la idea contraria sin contradicción. Hacia 1686, Leibniz complementa esta primera concepción con lo que considera su solución definitiva al problema de la contingencia: la (...) teoría del análisis infinito. Sin embargo, en otros escritos de ese año, propone dos vías alternativas de fundamentación de la contingencia. Este trabajo sugiere que esa pluralidad de modelos explicativos converge en una concepción integral de las modalidades que subyace como trasfondo de la reflexión modal leibniziana. If God is the sufficient reason for this world, then it seems to follow that every event is a necessary consequence of a necessary being. in order to avoid this conclusion, Leibniz states, during the 1670's, a modal conception that grounds contingency on a logical feature which is intrinsic to the ideas of things: the possibility of conceiving the opposite idea without contradiction. Towards 1686, Leibniz complements this first conception with what he considered to be his definitive solution to the problem of contingency: the theory of infinite analysis. However, in other writings from the same year, he proposes two different ways to explain contingency. This paper suggests that this plurality of models converges in a global conception of modalities, which lies at the background of Leibniz's modal thought. (shrink)

En sus últimos años, Leibniz emplea el concepto de necesidad moral para cualificar la elección divina de lo óptimo. Sin embargo, Leibniz no explica este concepto con precisión. El presente trabajo intenta mostrar que la necesidad moral leibniziana no puede entenderse como una modalidad puramente deóntica, porque ello contraría los fundamentos metafísicos que hacen al carácter teleológico de su ética. El artículo propone también una interpretación del contenido alético de tal noción, basada en la conexión necesaria que Leibniz parece atribuir (...) a la relación entre la voluntad y la tendencia al bien. Dicha necesidad afirmaría que, aun cuando toda elección es contingente, en tanto entraña una infinidad de consideraciones, el Dios leibniziano está metafísicamente necesitado a seguir el criterio de lo mejor. In his last years, Leibniz employs the concept of moral necessity to qualify God's choice of the best. However, he doesn't explain this concept accurately. This paper intends to show that leibnizian moral necessity cannot be conceived as a purely deontic modality, because it would be contrary to the metaphysical grounds which make Leibniz's ethics strictly teleological. This paper also proposes an interpretation of the alethic content of this concept, based on the necessary connection that Leibniz seems to assign to the relationship between free will and the tendency towards good. What this necessity entails is that, for Leibniz, even though the infinity of reasons involved makes every choice contingent, God is metaphysically necessitated to follow the rule of the best. (shrink)

Maxwell’s Classical Electrodynamics (MCED) suffers several inconsistencies: (1) the Lorentz force law of MCED violates Newton’s Third Law of Motion (N3LM) in case of stationary and divergent or convergent current distributions; (2) the general Jefimenko electric field solution of MCED shows two longitudinal far fields that are not waves; (3) the ratio of the electrodynamic energy-momentum of a charged sphere in uniform motion has an incorrect factor of 4/3. A consistent General Classical Electrodynamics (GCED) is presented that is based on (...) Whittaker’s reciprocal force law that satisfies N3LM. The Whittaker force is expressed as a scalar magnetic field force, added to the Lorentz force. GCED is consistent only if it is assumed that the electric potential velocity in vacuum, ’a’, is much greater than ’c’ (a ≫ c); GCED reduces to MCED, in case we assume a = c. Longitudinal electromagnetic waves and superluminal longitudinal electric potential waves are predicted. This theory has been verified by seemingly unrelated experiments, such as the detection of superluminal Coulomb fields and longitudinal Ampe`re forces, and has a wide range of electrical engineering applications. (shrink)

The force law of Maxwell’s classical electrodynamics does not agree with Newton’s third law of motion (N3LM), in case of open circuit magnetostatics. Initially, a generalized magnetostatics theory is presented that includes two additional physical fields B_Φ and B_l, defined by scalar functions. The scalar magnetic field B_l mediates a longitudinal Ampère force that balances the transverse Ampère force (aka the magnetic field force), such that the sum of the two forces agrees with N3LM for all stationary current distributions. Secondary (...) field induction laws are derived; a secondary curl free electric field E_l is induced by a time varying scalar magnetic field B_l, which isn’t described by Maxwell’s electrodynamics. The Helmholtz’ decomposition is applied to exclude E_l from the total electric field E, resulting into a more simple Maxwell theory. Decoupled inhomogeneous potential equations and its solutions follow directly from this theory, without having to apply a gauge condition. Field expressions are derived from the potential functions that are simpler and far field consistent with respect to the Jefimenko fields. However, our simple version of Maxwell’s theory does not satisfy N3LM. Therefore we combine the generalized magnetostatics with the simple version of Maxwell’s electrodynamics, via the generalization of Maxwell’s speculative displacement current. The resulting electrodynamics describes three types of vacuum waves: the Φ wave, the longitudinal electromagnetic (LEM) wave and the transverse electromagnetic (TEM) wave, with phase velocities respectively a, b and c. Power- and force theorems are derived, and the force law agrees with Newton’s third law only if the phase velocities satisfy the following condition: a >> b and b = c. The retarded potential functions can be found without gauge conditions, and four retarded field expressions are derived that have three near field terms and six far field terms. All six far field terms are explained as the mutual induction of two free fields. Our theory supports Rutherford’s solution of the 4/3 problem of electromagnetic mass, which requires an extra longitudinal electromagnetic momentum. Our generalized classical electrodynamics might spawn new physics experiments and electrical engineering, such as new photoelectric effects based on Φ- or LEM radiation, and the conversion of natural Φ- or LEM radiation into useful electricity, in the footsteps of dr. N. Tesla and dr. T.H. Moray. (shrink)

The school epoch: academic philosophy between the 15th and 17th centuries. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, academic philosophy develops with covert collision between the spirit of the classical epoch and of medieval one. The precarious general connection with Aristotle's works does not hamper academic writers from being divided into a lot of movements, every one of them having its own authorities. The strong dialectical dynamics of ascent and the confrontation with the results of experimental sciences give a new form (...) for academic philosophical thought and prepare an advent of philosophical systems of Modern Age (from Wolf to Hegel). (shrink)