This paper takes as its starting point the argument from Eudemian Ethics II,1 which introduces as premisses conclusions from the previous chapters, namely, the chief good of human beings is an end and everybody judges speculative wisdom, moral virtue and pleasure to be ends, either all or some of them. These two claims allow Aristotle to conclude that the most desirable of all goods is in the soul and to proceed arguing to his main conclusion in terms of the ergon, (...) function or characteristic activity, of the soul. It should be noticed, though, that if the ergon of the human soul can explain speculative wisdom and moral virtues to be ends, the same is not so easily defensible in the case of pleasure. In fact, to take pleasure as end seems to take a subjective satisfaction with no matter what as end. Now, the ergon of the soul cannot explain pleasure as an end in this unrestricted way. To solve this difficulty, this paper seeks to interpret a prior passage, I, 5, 1215b15-1216a10, as responsible for restricting the range of pleasures that can be counted as finalities to human beings. (shrink)