The philosophical background important to Mill’s theory of induction has two major components: Richard Whately’s introduction of the uniformity principle into inductive inference and the loss of the idea of formal cause.

This paper revisits John Stuart Mill’s famous proposal for plural voting, according to which universal suffrage is conjoined with the possibility for some to claim and utilise multiple votes if they meet a particular set of qualifications. We observe the proposal in the light of Mill’s own historical context, but we also evaluate it with respect to the changing social and political conditions that ensued. Surely, the proposal faces criticisms in both contexts taken separately, but some of the previously prominent (...) objections retain their force, while others recede in contemporary circumstances. Accordingly, for instance, the paper recognises the force of the objection that the educated experts who are to hold multiple votes are difficult to identify with the ideal of quality decision-making and the common good in mind, but rejects dated assumptions such as that of the overwhelming strength of class bias or the predominantly class-based motivations for social grouping. Most importantly, although the paper ultimately rejects Mill’s plural voting proposal, it supports his attempt to incorporate experts into quality democratic decision-making, and investigates the practical forms of their inclusion. First, we outline the plural voting proposal in the context in which it initially arose. Second, we introduce the first objections to plural voting according to which such a mechanism undermines the educative role that Mill sets for democracy. Third, we discuss the problem of who the handlers of multiple votes – the “educated” – are supposed to be, their class background, the expertise required, and the strength of underlying class biases. Fourth, we look at the different stages of the political decision-making process, in search of possible remedies for the problems brought about by plural voting. Fifth, we assess some of the assumptions underlying Mill’s proposal in light of contemporary society. In summary, we argue for the rejection of the plural voting scheme, but we discuss alternative ways of including experts in the decision-making process. (shrink)

Why did Mill draw such a firm line between nature and society, and what did he mean by the claim that only permanent or necessary truths could be gleaned in nature? Why are the laws of production able to transcend the social realm and thereby attain a higher epistemological standing? Was Mill the first to make this distinction, or does it conform with a long tradition within the history of economic thought?

Northeastern University School of Law, 400 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA. Tel.: 617 363 2019; Fax: 617 373 5056; Email: w.parmet{at}neu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract This paper looks at the American law of quarantine in light of the teachings of John Stuart Mill, whose harm principle has often been used to justify the practice of isolating and/or quarantining individuals to prevent the spread of an infectious disease. The paper shows that despite important (...) parallels between quarantine law and both the authorizing and prohibitive aspects of Mill's harm principle, the contemporary law of quarantine does not reflect either Mill's concern for the potential abuse of executive authority nor his recognition that quarantine is only ethically justified when the broader public health policy environment in which quarantine is applied is itself ethically sound. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The guise of the good doctrine is the view that whatever we desire, we desire it under the guise of the good, i.e. it appears good to us in some way. In this paper I first clarify the role that the doctrine of the guise of the good plays in the first step of J. S. Mill’s proof of the principle of utility (in which he shows that one’s happiness is desirable as an end). Then I provide textual evidence in (...) favour of ascribing the doctrine to Mill, arguing that he commits to it to the extent that he equates finding something pleasant and thinking it desirable. Finally I counter two potential sources of evidence against ascribing the guise of the good to Mill: apparent desires based on ‘fixed ideas’, and those habitual desires which are no longer associated with finding their objects pleasant. I argue that ‘fixed ideas’ do not feed actual desires, and that the habitual desires which seem to escape the guise of the good, even if not uncommon, have a secondary status as desires. (shrink)

The question is raised, what is going on when there is a tendency for something to happen, but it does not happen. A conspicuous case is that in which there is an equilibrium between opposing forces. One answer, given, for example, by Anscombe and Geach, Harre, and Bhaskar, is that such tendencies are in a sense real, though not manifest. The other answer, given, for example, by Braithwaite and Mackie, is that statements of tendencies are conditional statements about what is (...) manifest but ones in which some antecedents are not specified. The first of these answers is criticized and the second defended. (shrink)

Mill's On Liberty is centrally concerned with avoiding social tyranny. But Mill's Principle of Liberty defines interfering, in the context of social pressure, as intentionally punishing and it seems to allow speech and actions that critics have thought would conflict with liberty in self-regarding matters. To critics, Mill draws distinctions among social influences where no genuine difference is to be found and he permits more social pressure than can be accepted by someone who values liberty highly. In this article, I (...) explain where and why Mill draws the line he does between permitted and forbidden influences and show the line is coherent and tracks a genuine difference. I also show that although the Principle leaves residual social pressure, Mill has resources besides the Principle that can prevent social influences that threaten individuality while retaining beneficial social influences. (shrink)

This paper examines John Stuart Mill’s ‘psychological theory’ of the mind, as he set it out in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. After outlining Mill’s theory and the problem he finds with it, the paper discusses four different interpretations that have been suggested, before proposing a new alternative reading. The matter is of intrinsic interest to anyone who sees value in trying to get to the bottom of tricky texts about puzzling questions by great philosophers, but I argue (...) also that the investigation may help us with another vexed interpretative issue relating to an even more famous philosopher, David Hume, and that it may hold lessons for the philosophy of mind today. (shrink)