Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present various (...) challenges to adverbialism – scenarios in which it seems we publicly behave one way, but privately feel another. And I offer a response – Ryle’s stated practice of re-describing those situations in ways that pose no threat to his adverbialism. I also present an interpretation of practical knowledge in Ryle’s work. Knowing how is a special kind of action, undertaken only when we progressively self-modify our behaviours in the presence of new challenges or opportunities. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the prospects for an epistemic norm which relates knowledge-how to showing in a way that parallels the knowledge norm of assertion. In the first part of the paper I show that this epistemic norm can be motivated by conversational evidence, and that it fits in with a plausible picture of the function of knowledge. In the second part of the paper I present a dilemma for this norm. If we understand showing in a broad sense (...) as a general kind of skill teaching, then the norm faces counterexamples of teachers who know how to teach, but not to do. On the other hand, it we understand showing more narrowly as involving only teaching by doing the relevant activity, then the data which initially supported the norm can be explained away by more general connections between knowledge-how and intentional action. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This thesis is about an investigation of how children with philosophical experience use philosophical discussion as a way of doing research. A Lawrence Stenhouse description of 'research' as "systematic and sustained enquiry made public" served as my starting point for what to count as 'research'. As an interpretive case story of children participating in research as co-researchers, this research is about how I engaged in an after-school Discussion Research Group co-research project with seventeen volunteer students from my Philosophy for Children (...) classes. Our co-research was a methodological experiment in merging genres of research in which we adapted and combined Philosophy for Children and qualitative research techniques in a philosophical exploration of philosophical discussion. Bringing together the children's philosophical expertise and my interest in the use of qualitative research methodologies, I explored how and whether 'to do philosophy' is 'to do research'. (shrink)