Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms

Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I consider the prospects for an epistemic norm which relates knowledge-how to showing in a way that parallels the knowledge norm of assertion. In the first part of the paper I show that this epistemic norm can be motivated by conversational evidence, and that it fits in with a plausible picture of the function of knowledge. In the second part of the paper I present a dilemma for this norm. If we understand showing in a broad sense as a general kind of skill teaching, then the norm faces counterexamples of teachers who know how to teach, but not to do. On the other hand, it we understand showing more narrowly as involving only teaching by doing the relevant activity, then the data which initially supported the norm can be explained away by more general connections between knowledge-how and intentional action.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HABKSA
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-05-03
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-04-03

Total views
228 ( #28,234 of 2,455,007 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #24,932 of 2,455,007 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.