Although Aristotle's contribution to biology has long been recognized, there are many philosophers and historians of science who still hold that he was the great delayer of natural science, calling him the man who held up the Scientific Revolution by two thousand years. They argue that Aristotle never considered the nature of matter as such or the changes that perceptible objects undergo simply as physical objects; he only thought about the many different, specific natures found in perceptible objects. Against this (...) view, this book argues that Aristotle offers a systematic account of matter, motion, and the basic causal powers found in all physical objects. It argues that Aristotle not only sees all perceptible objects as sharing certain basic physical properties, but he also holds that perceptible objects have these physical properties because they are ultimately made from physical matter of one kind or another. Finally, it argues that for Aristotle the basic properties of matter, including the basic properties of the material elements, cannot be understood teleologically. (shrink)

Accounting for future generations is central in energy ethics and the ethical matrix can be used to reveal ethical impacts on them. However, the way it integrates future generations is questionable. The aim of this paper is to show why this tool does not consider ethical impacts on future generations appropriately and to propose a novel temporalized framework, which characterizes future people according to temporal, spatial and role features. By stimulating the disclosure of intergenerational conflicts, this temporalized matrix provides support (...) for a more nuanced overview of ethical impacts across generations, crucial in the field of energy ethics. (shrink)

Higher-order theories of consciousness posit that a mental state is conscious by virtue of being represented by another mental state, which is therefore a higher-order representation (HOR). Whether HORs are construed as thoughts or experiences, higher-order theorists have generally contested whether such metarepresentations have any significant cognitive function. In this paper, I argue that they do, focusing on the value of conscious thinking, as distinguished from conscious perceiving, conscious feeling, and other forms of conscious mentality. A thinking process is constituted (...) by propositional-attitude states, and during conscious thinking some or all of these states would be targeted by HORs. Since cases of nonconscious thinking are widely accepted, the question arises as to the use of representing one's thoughts during thinking. Contra the views of Armstrong and Rolls, I argue that HORs do not facilitate first-order thinking. Rather, I propose that such representations enable reasoning about one's act of thinking, and I give various examples of this sort of metacognition in support of the theory. I further argue that the general correlation between complex thinking and its being conscious is merely due to the fact that assessing one's mental act is particularly useful during such thinking, not because consciousness somehow facilitates first-order inference-making, as folk psychology implies. My view is thus consistent with recent empirical evidence that complex thinking sometimes yields better results when nonconscious. (shrink)

Cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) can produce benefits at individual, organizational, sectoral and societal levels. In this article, we argue that the distribution of benefits depends in part on the cognitive frames held by partnership participants. Based on Selsky and Parker's (J Manage 31(6):849-873, 2005) review of CSSPs, we identify three analytic "platforms" for social partnerships — the resource-dependence platform, the social-issue platform, and the societal-sector platform. We situate platforms as prospective sensemaking devices that help project managers make sense of partnerships (...) by calling attention to certain desired features or downplaying other features. We describe the three platforms and contrast them on factors that influence social benefit, including orientation, learning, and power. We provide illustrations of each platform and demonstrate how the choice of platform is consequential for practice, such as how a partnership project gets started, evolves and produces social benefits. (shrink)

There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time, and unity over time. A recent trend in the debate about unity has been to attempt to provide a ‘generalized’ account that purports to solve both problems in the same way. This attempt can be seen in the accounts of Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. In this paper, I argue that there are crucial differences between unity over time and unity at a (...) time that make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. The source of these crucial differences is the phenomenon of the ‘continuity of consciousness’. I argue that accounts of unity over time have to provide an account of this continuity, and that there is no phenomenon analogous to continuity in the case of unity at a time. Attention to the continuity of consciousness reveals crucial structural differences between the two varieties of unity. These structural differences make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. I show that the problems faced by Dainton’s and Tye’s accounts in the light of the structural differences make their accounts of unity appear far less appealing than they might initially have looked. I conclude by noting that, in the light of the important differences between the two varieties of unity, it is a mistake to attempt to model accounts of unity over time on accounts of unity at a time. (shrink)

Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (...) we can learn two extremely important lessons from Broad’s work on temporal experience. -/- The first lesson is that there is a structural problem facing any account that commits to these two principles. This is significant given that a number of recent accounts of temporal experience are so committed. The second lesson is that the problem facing these accounts stems only from commitment to the Thin-PSA and ‘Overlap’, rather than to commitment to a particular conception of how experiences are to be individuated. This, I argue, gives us reason to reject Tye’s recent claim that the problems facing accounts of temporal experience can be dissolved simply by making stipulations about how experiences are to be individuated. (shrink)

Genetic and other biotechnologies are starting to impact significantly upon society and individuals within it. Rose and Novas draw on an analysis of many patient groups to sketch out the broad notion of biocitizenship as a device for describing how the empowered and informed individual, group or network can engage with bioscience. In this paper, we examine critically the notion of biocitizenship, drawing on both sociological fieldwork that grounds the debate in the views of a large and varied group of (...) concerned actors. Using work within green politics, we identify shortcomings in the concept of biocitizenship as it has so far been explicated. The value assumptions lying behind an account of biocitizenship, and its tendency to see issues through a reductive lens, are examined. Alternative views of values and goals, which may undermine any alleged rights and duties, are explored using interviews and other ethnographic data that illustrates the complexity of the terrain. The reductive lens of biocitizenship is explored through contrast with the wider scope of concerns emanating from various sources, including many within green politics. If such complexities are not recognised, there is a danger that a concept of biocitizenship may serve to create and amplify inequalities. Problems with identity issues are key: the construction of identity is complex and many groups are explicitly rejecting the ‘biological’ label. We discuss the multiple relations of citizens with the biotech and pharmaceutical industries. Arguably, existing inequalities in power relationships, exploitation, commodification and ownership patterns are being perpetuated in novel ways through the new biosciences. We pose the question of whether it is possible to construct a concept of biocitizenship that overcomes these problems. (shrink)

The extension of quantum mechanics to a general functional space (“rigged Hilbert space”), which incorporates time-symmetry breaking, is applied to construct extract dynamical models of entropy production and entropy flow. They are illustrated by using a simple conservative Hamiltonian system for multilevel atoms coupled to a time-dependent external force. The external force destroys the monotonicity of the ℋ-function evolution. This leads to a model of the entropy flow that allows a steady nonequilibrium structure of the emitted field around the unstable (...) particles. (shrink)

Empowerment and user participation represents an ideal of power with a strong position in the health sector. In this article we use text analysis to investigate notions of power in a program plan for health workers focusing on empowerment. Issues addressed include: How are relationships of power between users and helpers described in the program plan? Which notions of user participation are embedded in the plan? The analysis is based on Foucault’s idea that power which is made subject to attempts (...) of redistribution will re-emerge in other forms. How this happens, and with what consequences, is our analytical concern. The analysis is contrasted with ‘snapshots’ from everyday life in a nursing home. The program plan communicates empowerment as a democracy-building instrument that the users need. It is a tool for providing expert assistance to the user’s self-help. User participation is made into a tool which is external to the user him-/herself. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the plan’s image of empowerment presupposes an ‘élite user’ able to articulate personal needs and desires. This is not very applicable to the most vulnerable user groups, who thereby may end up in an even weaker position. By way of conclusion, we argue that an exchange of undesirable dominating paternalism for a desirable empowerment will not abolish power, but may result in more covert and subtle forms of power that are less open to criticism. The paper offers insights that will facilitate reflections on the premises for practising empowerment-oriented health care. (shrink)

In the last decade, reading research has seen a paradigmatic shift. A new wave of computational models of orthographic processing that offer various forms of noisy position or context-sensitive coding have revolutionized the field of visual word recognition. The influx of such models stems mainly from consistent findings, coming mostly from European languages, regarding an apparent insensitivity of skilled readers to letter order. Underlying the current revolution is the theoretical assumption that the insensitivity of readers to letter order reflects the (...) special way in which the human brain encodes the position of letters in printed words. The present article discusses the theoretical shortcomings and misconceptions of this approach to visual word recognition. A systematic review of data obtained from a variety of languages demonstrates that letter-order insensitivity is neither a general property of the cognitive system nor a property of the brain in encoding letters. Rather, it is a variant and idiosyncratic characteristic of some languages, mostly European, reflecting a strategy of optimizing encoding resources, given the specific structure of words. Since the main goal of reading research is to develop theories that describe the fundamental and invariant phenomena of reading across orthographies, an alternative approach to model visual word recognition is offered. The dimensions of a possible universal model of reading, which outlines the common cognitive operations involved in orthographic processing in all writing systems, are discussed. (shrink)

Based on observations and interviews collected during a yearlong ethnography of two anatomy laboratory courses at a large Midwestern university, this article argues that students learn anatomy through the formation of an observational-embodied look. All of the visual texts and material objects of the lab—from atlas illustrations, to photographs, to 3D models, to human bodies—are involved in this look that takes the form of anatomical demonstration and dissection. The student of anatomy, then, brings together observation, visual evidence, haptic experience, and (...) anatomical-medical knowledge to identity as anatomy those objects on display. Through an interrogation of and reflection on the bodies of the course, the participants must learn to recognize and appreciate the descriptive and relational values of anatomical evidence, and in the process develop the habitus of anatomists. Drawing from the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Pierre Bourdieu, and Herbert Dreyfus, the author seeks to both uncover how students learn anatomy as well as articulate a theory of embodied learning. (shrink)

After describing the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1996, I argue that the Act ought to be significantly amended. The central objections to CPPA are (1) that it is so broad in its main proscriptions as to violate the First Amendment rights of adults; (2) that it altogether fails to provide minors and their legal guardians with the privacy rights needed to combat the harms associated with certain classes of prurient material on the Internet; and, (3) that the actual (...) rate of technological advance in home computing, and Congress' failure to appreciate how prurient material may be accessed, combined with CPPA to wrongfully expose an increasing number of individuals to possible prosecution and personal ruination. Several other objections are registered along the way, including one aimed at the draconian punishments the law metes out to violators. I close by offering the outlines of an amended version of the law that promises not to violate the rights of adults, that affords children and adults equal and effective protection against the very harmful practices the current law cannot eradicate, and that prescribes punishments that are consistent with the tolerance necessary to support a more democratic vision of the Internet. (shrink)

In my 2013 article, “A New Theory of Free Will”, I argued that several serious hypotheses in philosophy and modern physics jointly entail that our reality is structurally identical to a peer-to-peer (P2P) networked computer simulation. The present paper outlines how quantum phenomena emerge naturally from the computational structure of a P2P simulation. §1 explains the P2P Hypothesis. §2 then sketches how the structure of any P2P simulation realizes quantum superposition and wave-function collapse (§2.1.), quantum indeterminacy (§2.2.), wave-particle duality (§2.3.), (...) and quantum entanglement (§2.4.). Finally, §3 argues that although this is by no means a philosophical proof that our reality is a P2P simulation, it provides ample reasons to investigate the hypothesis further using the methods of computer science, physics, philosophy, and mathematics. (shrink)

in Undetermined Table d’Hôte Ingar Brinck: Investigating the development of creativity: The Sahlin hypothesis 7 Linus Broström: Known unknowns and proto-second-personal address in photographic art 25 Johan Brännmark: Critical moral thinking without moral theory 33 Martin Edman: Vad är ett missförhållande? 43 Pascal Engel: Rambling on the value of truth 51 Peter Gärdenfors: Ambiguity in decision making and the fear of being fooled 75 Göran Hermerén: NIPT: Ethical aspects 89 Mats Johansson: Roboethics: What problems should be addressed and why? 103 (...) Johan Laserna: Ambivalenta bilder 113 Anna-Sofia Maurin: Metaphysical explanation 161 Kevin Mulligan: Is preference primitive? 169 John D. Norton: How does your garden grow? 181 Johannes Persson & Annika Wallin: The distinction between internal and external validity 187 Johanna Seibt: Becoming our selves 197 Paul Slovic, Robin Gregory, David Frank, and Daniel Vastfjall: Confronting the collapse of humanitarian values in foreignpolicy decision making 209 Peter Sylwan: Det eviga livet 215 Claudine Tiercelin: Chance, love and logic: Ramsey and Peirce on norms, rationality and the conduct of life 221 Epilog 257 Frank Ramsey. (shrink)

Many who suffer from eating disorders claim that they see themselves as “fat”. Despite decades of research into the phenomenon, behavioural evidence has failed to confirm that eating disorders involve visual misperception of own-body size. I illustrate the importance of this phenomenon for our understanding of perceptual processing, outline the challenges involved in experimentally confirming it, and provide solutions to those challenges.

The economic paradigms of Ludwig von Mises on the one hand and of John Maynard Keynes on the other have been correctly recognized as antithetical at the theoretical level, and as antagonistic with respect to their practical and public policy implications. Characteristically they have also been vindicated by opposing sides of the political spectrum. Nevertheless the respective views of these authors with respect to the meaning and interpretation of probability exhibit a closer conceptual affinity than has been acknowledged in the (...) literature. In particular it is argued that in some relevant respects Ludwig von Mises´ interpretation of the concept of probability exhibits a closer affinity with the interpretation of probability developed by his opponent John Maynard Keynes than with the views on probability espoused by his brother Richard von Mises. Nevertheless there also exist significant differences between the views of Ludwig von Mises and those of John Maynard Keynes with respect to probability. One of these is highlighted more particularly: where John Maynard Keynes advocated a monist view of probability, Ludwig von Mises embraced a dualist view of probability, according to which the concept of probability has two different meanings each of which is valid in a particular area or context. It is concluded that both John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig von Mises presented highly nuanced views with respect to the meaning and interpretation of probability. (shrink)

The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must examine (...) the classical, spatial metaphysic of space and time, for practical purposes initiated by Galileo, wherein the real has been equated with the quantitative and wherein quality has been stripped from the material world. In this metaphysic, which sees form as quantitative or computable, the origin of qualia is problematic, with a problem of even greater primacy becoming the “memory” that supports the transforming events of perception, e.g., rotating cubes, buzzing flies, twisting leaves. It is this memory, supporting time-extended, flowing events, that necessarily supports all qualia. The concept of storage of “snapshots” of time-flowing events, a notion which the classic metaphysic engenders, is unworkable as a solution to the perception of these flows. Form, in fact being dynamic and defined over flowing fields, equally is a quality, equally requires this memory, and since forms populate the image, the origin of the entire image is indeed a problem. The counter-proposal becomes Bergson’s temporal metaphysic wherein motion is indivisible (or non-differentiable), the global motion of the universal field itself then carrying an intrinsic form of memory. In this framework, with this field viewed as holographic, Bergson provides a unique solution – one that leaves the problem of representation behind – as to how the brain specifies the qualitative image of the dynamically transforming external world. (shrink)

The question “What is the nature of experience?” is of perennial philosophical concern. It deals not only with the nature of experience qua experience, but additionally with related questions about the experiencing subject and that which is experienced. In other words, to speak of the philosophical problem of experience, one must also address questions about mind, world, and the various relations that link them together. Both William James and Kitarō Nishida were deeply concerned with these issues. Their shared notion of (...) “pure experience” is the conceptual cornerstone of their attempt to deal with the philosophical problem of experience. This dissertation is an analysis of “pure experience” and its relevance to several issues in contemporary hilosophy of mind. Drawing upon James’s and Nishida’s “pure experience”, I argue both for a sensorimotor-based, “extended” conception of consciousness and a bodily skills-based account of moral psychology. (shrink)

The project of this thesis is multi-faceted. Starting with an examination of Kant's First Critique, it outlines the inextricable linkage between our understanding of subjectivity and a notion of space. Once such a connection has neen made, it describes the approach necessary to reorient the notions of space and subjectivity that have culminated in the postmodern cry that The Subject is Dead. This approach is named, "Cartography" and is borne out of an examination of the works of Bachelard, Deleuze and (...) Guattari. Given the bases of the area of study, and the way that it will be studied, the next move made in this thesis is to examine the possible and desired outcomes of such an approach. Thus, from reading both Deleuze and Guattari, we will see that a Cartography will reorient that which constitutes subjectivities in such a way as to disable any effort of oppression, and it will redefine our understanding of the space constitutive of these subjectivities as a material one. In a single phrase, then, this thesis can be described thus: To provide for an understanding of a material space and vectors of subjectification, in a way that enhances their mutual construction, so that the active formation of the two can destroy that which organises the subjective oppression currently experienced. (shrink)