It might seem quite commonplace to say that Aristotle identifies fire, air, water and earth as the στοιχεῖα, or ‘elements’ – or, to be more precise, as the elements of bodies that are subject to generation and corruption. Yet there is a tradition of interpretation, already evident in the work of the sixth-century commentator John Philoponus and widespread, indeed prevalent, today, according to which Aristotle does not really believe that fire, air, water and earth are truly elemental. The basic premise (...) of this interpretation is that Aristotle takes fire, air, water and earth to be, in some sense, composite bodies and, as such, analysable into simpler constituents. But, of course, an element of bodies is defined by Aristotle himself as something into which bodies can be analysed, and which does not admit further analysis . So if fire, air, water and earth can be analysed into simpler or more basic constituents, then it would seem to follow that the latter ought to be considered Aristotle's true elements. These are usually identified as the primary contraries hot and cold, dry and wet; many, perhaps most, commentators would insist also upon prime matter as the subject upon which these contraries act. (shrink)

The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For (...) this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories, it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature. (shrink)

Anaximenes famously taught that the sun and other ‘stars’ do not move under the flat earth but around it and explained the night thereby. What he had in mind remains conjectural; the testifying fragments are ambiguous and apparently contradictory. The past 200-odd years have seen a plethora of dissenting interpretations. The bulk of these are here categorised into three groups: that the sun circles at a fixed height above sea level; that it follows the familiar inclined path by day and (...) clings to the northern horizon by night; and that it revolves in a circular orbit inclined relative to the earth. The first two scenarios are repudiated, while the third is fortified with several suggestions. It is argued that Anaximenes’ terms for ‘above’, ‘below’ and ‘around’ did not differentiate the altitudes of celestial bodies relative to the horizon, but the sizes of their orbits – as indicated by their projections on the earth’s plane. The point would have been that bodies in space are far enough from the earth to stay away from anyone’s zenith or nadir – perhaps with exceptions, following pseudo-Plutarch. This approach reconciles the variant readings in the fragments and obviates the need for emendations. The sun would still move through the north at night, but in an arc below the horizon – not horizontally over the Ocean or behind mountains, as some had it. Thus, Anaximenes would have enhanced Anaximander’s discovery that space facilitates inclined circular orbits by surrounding the earth on all sides. Awareness of the far-northern midnight twilight and the aurora borealis may have fed into all of these worldviews, the former legitimately and the latter fallaciously. (shrink)

The present paper deals with eight charges that are frequently leveled against any research that focuses on the agrapha dogmata. The charges are demonstrated to be completely unfounded and, therefore, duly dismissed. In particular, it is argued here that the phrase ta legomena is by no means to be understood as ironic. Consequently, the article rejects the very common picture of Plato as some sort of dogmatist and author of a fixed philosophical system. However, Plato’s philosophy is presented as rather (...) ‘overt’ and ‘straightforward’ in its nature. With the situation being as it is, thorough knowledge of the agrapha dogmata is shown to be an absolute prerequisite for understanding Plato’s dialogues. The paper concludes with an observation that while investigating the issue is completely warranted and does not in any way entail any devaluation of the dialogues, Aristotle’s testimony must also be taken into account. (shrink)

Hitherto reconstructions of Empedocles' cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or a complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle.

Modern logicians have sought to unlock the modal secrets of Aristotle's Syllogistic by assuming a version of essentialism and treating it as a primitive within the semantics. These attempts ultimately distort Aristotle's ontology. None of these approaches make full use of tests found throughout Aristotle's corpus and ancient Greek philosophy. I base a system on Aristotle's tests for things that can never combine (polarity) and things that can never separate (inseparability). The resulting system not only reproduces Aristotle's recorded results for (...) the apodictic syllogistic in the Prior Analytics but it also generates rather than assumes Aristotle's distinctions among 'necessary', 'essential' and 'accidental'. By developing a system around tests that are in Aristotle and basic to ancient Greek philosophy, the system is linked to a history of practices, providing a platform for future work on the origins of logic. (shrink)

Presocratic philosophy, for all its diverse features, is united by the quest to understand the origin and nature of the world. The approach of the Pythagoreans to this quest is governed by their belief, probably based on studies of the numerical relations in musical harmony, that number or numerical structure plays a key role for explaining the world-order, the cosmos. It remains questionable to what extent the Pythagoreans, by positing number as an all-powerful explanatory concept, broke free from Presocratic ideas (...) that certain stuffs or material elements sufficed to account for the source and constitution of the world, but apparently number found such a universal application with them that Aristotle could summarize the Pythagorean position as ‘numbers…are the whole universe’ . Historians of Greek philosophy have generally accepted Aristotle's assessment. Of late, however, certain scholars have argued that the Pythagorean number doctrine is Aristotelian interpretation, unjustly foisted upon the Pythagoreans. Enlisted in support of their arguments are the fragments of Philolaus of Croton. Here we have the foremost representative of fifth-century Pythagoreanism, who states as his basic principles, not numbers exactly, but ‘limiters’ and ‘unlimiteds’, and who, it is argued, regards number solely as an epistemological aid for understanding the structure of reality. So Philolaus is called upon as a witness against Aristotle. The rationale goes something like this: Aristotle most likely had written sources for his knowledge of Pythagorean teachings; the only texts we know of with any certainty are Philolaus' book and the writings of Archytas; since Aristotle treats Archytas separately, he is mainly relying on Philolaus; because Philolaus does not expressly state that things are numbers, Aristotle's interpretation is wrong. (shrink)

The publication of Mr. R. S. Bluck's stimulating Phaedo prompts me to ask the following questions concerning the traditional interpretation of the cosmographical passage beginning 108 e. Do the terms of 108 e-109 a in combination with 110 b 5 ff. and Timaeus 40 b-c and 62 d ff. prove conclusively that in the Phaedo Plato thinks of the earth as a spherical body? Granted that he does, need his description of the earth, as a setting for his eschatological myth, (...) conform with the spherical theory? (shrink)

In her 1996 and 2006 essays “Being and Becoming: Rhetorical Ontology in Early Greek Thought” and “The Task of the Bow: Heraclitus’ Rhetorical Critique of Epic Language,” Carol Poster was the first to argue for the historical and theoretical relevance of Heraclitus in the discipline of rhetoric. Despite the admonitions of Edward Schiappa (1999) and Thomas Cole (1991) against applying rhetorical theories that only emerged after the fourth century BCE to pre- or proto-rhetorical texts, Poster argues that Heraclitus merits the (...) attention of rhetorical as well as philosophical scholarship not only because Heraclitus had such a profound influence on the thought and work of thinkers who would later become the ancient .. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 1 - 24 This article examines Diogenes of Apollonia’s doctrines of intellection and soul in relation to his material principle, air. It argues that for Diogenes both intellection and soul are not, as commonly thought, some sort of air, even though both intellection and soul are to be understood in terms of air and the system of τρόποι of air that he has set up. These new interpretations of intellection and soul yield insight (...) into Diogenes’ claims about the ordering activity of air as intellection and a renewed appreciation for his material monism. (shrink)

As is well enough known, the termphysisin EmpedoclesFr.8 (DK) is cited by Aristotle in theMetaphysics(Δ 4,1014b36-1015a3) as meaning theousiaof natural things, in the sense of the stable substance or form that is the terminus of generation (a10-11). This interpretation is rejected almost unanimously by commentators. The three or four attempts to defend it have not proved convincing. The case now seems officially closed. Yet there remain some loose ends. These are of the kind that would keep bothering television detectives and (...) would cause enough loss of sleep to prompt a fresh investigation of a whole case. Is that procedure called for here? (shrink)

Aristotle and Theophrastus are the two major sources for our knowledge of the atomist theory of weight.In theDe generatione et corruptioneAristotle argues that one atom may be hotter than another and that therefore the atoms cannot be impassible, since an atom which is only slightly hot could not fail to be acted upon by an atom that was very much hotter. The premiss to the argument Aristotle derives in part from a comparison with weight. It would be ridiculous, he claims, (...) to suppose that hotness and coldness belong to the atoms, but that heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness do not belong to them. And in fact, he continues, Democritus does claim that each of the ‘indivisibles’ is βαρύτερον…κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. Aristotle has already supposed that one kind of atom, a round atom, may be accounted as hot. The use of the comparative for weight Aristotle now takes to justify the use of the comparative for heat : from this there follows the argument that the atoms cannot be impassible. (shrink)

The article deals with the oldest criticism of Anaximander’s monism, for which we have evidence, found in John Philoponus’ commentary on the first book of Aristotle’s Physics . Philoponus’ argumentation is analytically examined and explained, its premises brought to light and its conclusions evaluated. It is shown how his inquiry, although anticipating modern discussions about the classification of Anaximander’s doctrine in terms of ‘monism’ and ‘pluralism’, differs from the contemporary approach to the problem when it comes to both results and (...) methodology. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a particular conception of embodied cognition to argue that this cognitive approach can be found in Empedocles in inchoate form. It is assumed that the defining features setting apart embodied cognition from the rest of the cognitive sciences are that the body: (a) significantly constrains the embodied agent’s cognitive skills, (b) regulates the coordination of action and cognition, and (c) serves an integral function in the transmission of cognitive data. Empedocles’ epistemological fragments are examined vis-à-vis these (...) specifications, and the conclusion is reached that Empedocles can safely be regarded as a distant precursor of embodied cognition. (shrink)

In Philolaus’ cosmology, the earth revolves around a central fire along with the other heavenly bodies, including a planet called the counter-earth which orbits below the earth. His theory can account for most astronomical phenomena. A common criticism of his theory since ancient times is that his counter-earth does no work in the system. Yet ancient sources say the planet was supposed to account for some lunar eclipses. A reconstruction of Philolaus’ cosmology shows how lunar eclipses occurring at certain times (...) of day cannot be explained by earth blocking the sun’s light. The counter-earth could explain these eclipses. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es discutir la interpretación tradicional según la cual los razonamientos de Zenón de Elea en contra de la multiplicidad constituyen una defensa de la tesis monista. Intentaré demostrar que las objeciones zenonianas a la multiplicidad suponen una critica previa a la existencia de "lo uno". Por este motivo, Zenón no es monista ni pluralista, sino, más bien, un crítico de las perspectivas metafísicas que consideran al ser en términos numéricos, i. e. como uno o como (...) múltiple. Para ello me concentraré en el análisis de la interpretación que Aristóteles desarrolla sobre la filosofía de Zenón, considerando algunos pasajes de Física, Refutaciones sofísticas y, fundamentalmente, Metafísica, III. 4. 1001b7-13. También incluiré algunos testimonios del comentario a la Física de Simplicio, en los que se discuten las interpretaciones de Eudemo de Rodas y Alejandro de Afrodisia, que ratifican el punto de vista aristotélico sobre la filosofía de Zenón. The aim of this paper is to discuss the traditional interpretation according to which the arguments of Zeno of Elea against multiplicity constitute a defense of monism. I will try to prove that Zeno's objections on plurality suppose a previous critique to the existence of the one. Therefore Zeno is neither a monist nor a pluralist but a philosopher who criticizes metaphysical theories that consider being in numerical terms, i. e. as many or as one. I will focus on the analysis of the interpretation of Zeno's philosophy developed by Aristotle. I will consider some passages from Physics, Sophistical Refutations and mainly Metaphysics III. 4. 1001b7-13. I will also include some testimonies from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics, where he discusses the interpretations of Eudemus of Rhodes and Alexander of Aphrodisias that support the Aristotelian point of view on Zeno's philosophy. (shrink)

(1976). Anaxagoras in Response to Parmenides. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 6, Supplementary Volume 2: New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics, pp. 61-85.

Introduction“What reason is there to suppose that those who did know Parmenides’ poem necessarily thought that he had raised a real problem which they must try to deal with? Empedocles, perhaps also Anaxagoras, knew the poem, but they pursue a very different kind of philosophy from Zeno and Melissus: why, then, must we suppose that they are seeking an alternative answer to the problem posed by Parmenides, and that their ultimate material elements are to be seen as modifications of the (...) Eleatic ἓν έόν?“These rhetorical questions, taken from M. L. West's recent book,Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient,make a useful starting point for this inquiry. They are, of course, what the grammar books call “repudiating questions“: the answer hoped for is “no reason“. The argument with which Mr. West goes on to support his negative implication is not likely to convince many students of the Presocratics. He determinedly makes light of Parmenides’ chains of argument, apparently on the ground that “these were not the actual stages of Parmenides’ thinking” — as if Parmenides ought to have been writing his intellectual autobiography instead of a philosophical argument. (shrink)

Christopher Shields. Aristotle De Anima. Oxford University Press : Oxford, 2016, 415 p. US $ 32.00. ISBN 978-0-19-924345-7.

In this paper, I investigate how Xenophanes was ‘eleaticised’, i.e. attributed theses and arguments that belong to Parmenides and Melissus. I examine texts of Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus in order to determine if they considered Xenophanes as a philosopher and a monist. I show that neither Plato nor Aristotle regarded him as a philosopher, but rather as a pantheist poet who claimed, in a vague way, that everything is one. But Theophrastus interpreted too literally Aristotle’s claims and was the first (...) to make Xenophanes a proper monist philosopher. (shrink)

As a crucial source for Presocratic theories of sense perception, Theophrastus’ De sensibus deserves a closer scrutiny than the placement among A-fragments, as often suggested or instigated. This paper proposes to refine our terminology for labelling the varying quality of reporting within the A-fragments has. It supplements the existing criticism of Diels’ division by analysing neglected features. A reassessment of the assumptions underlying the terms ‘fragment’ and ‘paraphrase’ can contribute to dissolving the sharp distinction between A- and B-fragments in DK. (...) It advocates, not equality for A-fragments, but a more inclusive and accurate evaluation of the passages. (shrink)

This paper concerns the classification of the process of mixture, for Aristotle, and the related issue of the manner in which the ingredients remain present once mixed. I argue that mixture is best viewed as a kind of substantial generation in the context of the GC and, accordingly, that the ingredients do not enjoy the kind of strong presence within a mixture usually attributed to them. To do this, I critically examine the most promising versions of the standard view and (...) offer a new interpretation of Aristotle’s treatment of a puzzle about mixture in GC 1.10. (shrink)

La exposición y crítica de las doctrinas antiguas tiene un lugar importante en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, ciertas dudas se han vuelto corrientes acerca de la confiabilidad de sus descripciones. Más aún, se ha sostenido que Aristóteles deforma la comprensión histórica a través de la introducción de conceptos y términos propios. En este libro se aborda el problema a través de un análisis de las críticas que Aristóteles dirige a la teoría platónica de las Ideas, que permite explicar (...) la constitución y desarrollo de importantes conceptos aristotélicos a partir de la confrontación dialéctica con las doctrinas de su maestro. En efecto, las dificultades genuinas que Aristóteles descubre en el platonismo constituyen el motor para gestar nuevos conceptos, que no son ajenos, sino que surgen como implicaciones del examen crítico. Así, la imposición de términos propios no debe interpretarse como distorsión, sino como el modo que Aristóteles adopta para exhibir su particular solución a los problemas que los filósofos anteriores dejaron sin solución. (shrink)

Frente a quienes sostienen una incompatibilidad entre historia de la filosofía y filosofía, en cuanto plantean una disyuntiva entre una práctica descriptiva y una argumentativa, en este trabajo nos proponemos mostrar, examinando la labor histórico-filosófica de Aris- tóteles, que esa disyuntiva no es excluyente. Para ello, en primer lugar, examinaremos algunos pasajes de su obra en los que ofrece indicaciones metodológicas que permiten comprender la doble función que cumplen las exposiciones críticas de los filósofos precedentes en la constitución misma de (...) su filosofía. En segundo lugar, ilustraremos el tipo de argumentación aristotélica a través del análisis de las críticas que dirige a las Ideas platónicas como causas. Contra Platón, Aristóteles establece que, para dar cuenta de la ingenerabilidad e incorruptibilidad de las formas, no es necesario caracterizarlas como entidades separadas de la materia y del movimiento. Basta asegurar la eternidad de la forma a través de su reproducción en otros individuos de la misma especie. Tal análisis nos permite concluir, finalmente, que filosofía o historia de la filosofía constitu- yen una falsa disyuntiva en Aristóteles, por lo que el examen dialéctico de las doctrinas precedentes es un método adecuado de indagación filosófica. (shrink)

De las muchas virtudes que caben reconocerse en el pensamiento de Cornelius Castoriadis nunca podrá eludirse el valor de su singular aproximación a lo que vino en denominarse “la experiencia griega”. En este artículo trataremos de acompañar su original lectura de la Grecia antigua, retomando la pertinencia y la exactitud con la que Castoriadis se sirvió de la pólis griega para justificar algunos matices velados de nuestras intuiciones políticas. En nuestra exposición trataremos de alinearnos con su original perspectiva, sirviéndonos esencialmente (...) del uso y la recuperación del ápeiron y sus distintas interpretaciones, en Anaximandro, en Aristóteles y, naturalmente, en el propio pensamiento de Cornelius Castoriadis. La conclusión de nuestro planteamiento -y quizá este gesto no sea más que un homenaje velado- aspirará a disentir de alguna de sus propuestas sin por ello dejar de reconocer la originalidad, la valentía y la vigencia de su aportación como lector de la experiencia griega. (shrink)

A pergunta, “Tudo é número?” no título do famoso artigo de 1989 de Zhmud, deixa aberto um desafio para o extremamente importante testemunho aristotélico de que “tudo é número” era a definição fundamental da filosofia pitagórica. Tal desafio não é nada simples, especialmente quando se considera que, até então, as histórias tanto da filosofia quanto da matemática antiga parecem não ter dúvidas de que esta afirmação é correta. Este artigo pretende submeter à avaliação crítica a alegação de Aristóteles de que (...) os pitagóricos acreditavam que “tudo é número”. Nossa análise dos muitos modos nos quais Aristóteles enuncia a tese de que “tudo é número” revelará, para além de variações meramente semânticas, uma contradição teórica fundamental que o próprio Aristóteles parece incapaz de resolver. De fato, três versões diferentes da doutrina estão presentes na doxografia aristotélica: uma identificação dos números com objetos sensíveis; uma identificação dos princípios dos números com os princípios das coisas que existem; uma imitação dos objetos pelos números. Enquanto as versões e parecem identificar, em termos que lembram Platão, os números com a causa material da realidade, a versão, a saber, números como causas formais da realidade, é uma reconstrução aristotélica da teoria pitagórica. Aristóteles teria sido levado a tal reconstrução pela dificuldade que encontrou para aceitar a noção pitagórica material de número, e por considerá-la, para seu gosto, fortemente marcada pela recepção da mesma teoria no ambiente da Academia. (shrink)

In this thesis, I use a close reading of the silent films of Charlie Chaplin to examine a question of listening posed by Jean-Luc Nancy, “Is listening something of which philosophy is capable” (Nancy 2007:1)? Drawing on the work of Nancy, Jacques Derrida and Gayatri Spivak, I consider a claim that philosophy has failed to address the topic of listening because a logocentric tradition claims speech as primary. In response to Derrida’s deconstruction of logocentrism, Nancy complicates the problem of listening (...) by distinguishing between l’écoute and l’entente. L’écoute is an attending to and answering the demand of the other and l’entente is an understanding directed inward toward a subject. Nancy could deconstruct an undervalued position of l’écoute, making listening essential to speech. I argue, Nancy rather asks what kind of listening philosophy is capable of. To examine this question, I focus on the peculiarly dialogical figure derived from Chaplin that communicates meaning without using speech. This discussion illustrates how Chaplin, in the role of a silent figure, listens to himself (il s’écoute) as other. Chaplin’s listening is Nancean resonance, a movement in which a subject refers back to itself as another subject, in constant motion of spatial and temporal non-presence. For Nancy, listening is a self’s relationship to itself, but without immediate self-presence. Moving in resonance, Chaplin makes the subject as other as he refers back to himself as other. I argue that Chaplin, through silent dialogue with himself by way of the other, makes his listening listened to. Chaplin refused to make his character speak because he believed speech would change the way in which his work would be listened to. In this way, Chaplin makes people laugh by making himself understood (se fait entendre) as he makes himself listened to (se fait écouter). In answer to Nancy’s question, I conclude philosophy is capable of meeting the demand of listening as both l’entente and l’écoute when it listens as Chaplin listens. (shrink)

The Middle Included is a systematic exploration of the meanings of logos throughout Aristotle’s work. It claims that the basic meaning is “gathering,” a relation that holds its terms together without isolating them or collapsing one to the other. This meaning also applies to logos in the sense of human language. Aristotle describes how some animals are capable of understanding non-firsthand experience without being able to relay it, while others relay it without understanding. Aygün argues that what distinguishes human language, (...) for Aristotle, is its ability to both understand and relay firsthand and non-firsthand experiences. This ability is key to understanding the human condition: science, history, news media, propaganda, gossip, utopian fiction, and sophistry, as well as philosophy. Ömer Aygün finds Aristotle’s name for this peculiar but crucial human ability of “gathering” both experiences is logos, and this leads to a claim about the specificity of human rationality and language. (shrink)

Although Presocratics in 600 B.C founded new research ways in science and philosophy, wrote the first scientific essays, introduced basic conceptions of deduction, and abandoned mythological explanations, all we have of their works is but the fragments in the works of further doxographers, biographers, historians or philosophers who brought their statements between their own words. This would sometimes result in misunderstanding the presocratics’ purposes. Hermann Diels in his Doxographi Graeci raised a new method for dealing with doxography tradition. Diels’ new (...) approach to doxography returned all this tradition to Aristotle’s pupil, Theophrastus. Some scholars like Jaap Mansfield criticized his disregard for the sophists like Gorgias and Hippias, and the successions of philosophers. According to his criticism, some matters like the Sophists’ influence on Plato, Aristotle’s definition of Doxa in the Placita and the influence of the succession and interpretation tradition on doxogtaphy are more noteworthy than Diels has thought. (shrink)

This page is dedicated to an analysis of the first section of Parmenides' Poem, the Way of Truth, with a selection of critical judgments by the most important commentators and critics. In the Annotated Bibliography I list the main critical editions (from the first printed edition of 1573 to present days) and the translations in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish, with a selection of studies on Parmenides; in future, a section will be dedicated to an examination of some critical (...) variants of the Greek text, with particular attention to corrections to the Diels-Kranz (abbreviated DK) edition of the Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. The fragments of Parmenides' Poem are cited according to Diels-Kranz numbering system as adopted in the 6th edition, Berlin 1952; the Poem is divided into three parts: the Proem fr. I, 1-32; the Way of Truth (Alethéia) from fr. II to VIII, 49, and the Way of Mortal Opinion (Doxa) fr. VIII, 50 to XIX, 3. (shrink)