These questions-in essence 'What are flourishing lives and how can we lead them?'-are long central to philosophy. Now, however, can be addressed in light of new insights in positive psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and behavioral economics as well new research in philosophy itself, including feminist theory, critical race studies, philosophical psychology, neuro-ethics, and more. The thirteen contributors chart new directions for understanding and securing human flourishing. Reflecting the fact that lives and cultures differ, the perspectives are pluralistic. Part (...) One considers the meaning of human flourishing through analyses of: the nature of purposeful, mattering lives; biological, psychological, and social levels of homeostasis; the nature of human agency and the role of narrative in it; the nature of the self and self-fulfillment; the centrality of subjective values and non-subjective conditions that make possible these values; and the need to encompass the wide diversity of human lives. Part Two considers conditions on which flourishing depends. These include: habits flexible enough to confront ever-changing realities; conditions of social justice rather than supposed self-help; epistemic responsibility and sensitivity to social relations; civility and values literacy; educational reconstruction, particularly in the humanities; a cultural focus on eudaimonic values rather than mere technical efficiency and marketplace consumerism; and the role of creative arts in transforming our abilities, promoting genuine self-government, and providing consolation in the face of loss. (shrink)

Purpose: Moral distress occurs when one identifies an ethically appropriate course of action but cannot carry it out. In this conceptualization, medical students may be particularly vulnerable to m...

BackgroundAlthough values have increasingly received attention in psychiatric literature over the last three decades, their role has been only partially acknowledged in psychiatric classification endeavors. The review process of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders received harsh criticism, and was even considered secretive by some authors. Also, it lacked an official discussion of values at play. In this perspective paper we briefly discuss the interplay of some values in the scientific and non-scientific debate around (...) one of the most debated DSM-5 category proposals, the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome. Then, we point out some ethical consequences of a facts-plus-values perspective in psychiatric classification.DiscussionDifferent stakeholders participated in the APS-debate and for analytical purposes we divided them into four groups: researchers in the field of high-risk mental states; the DSM-5 Psychotic Disorders Work Group; patient, carers and advocacy groups; and external stakeholders, not related to the previous groups, but which also publicly expressed their opinions about APS inclusion in DSM-5. We found that each group differently stressed the role of values we examined in the APS-debate. These values were ethical, but also epistemic, political, economic and ontological. The prominence given to some values, and the lack of discussion about others, generated divergent positions among stakeholders in the debate.SummaryAs exemplified by the APS discussion, although medicine is primarily an ethical endeavor, values of different kinds that take part in it also shape to a large extent the profession. Thus, it may be strategic to openly discuss values at play in the elaboration of diagnostic tools and classificatory systems. This task, more than scientifically or politically significant, is ethically important. (shrink)

In recent years so-called Complementary and Alternative Medicine practices have made significant political and professional advances particularly in the United Kingdom : osteopathy and chiropractic were granted statutory self-regulation in the 1990s effectively giving them more professional autonomy and independence than health care professions supplementary to medicine ; the practice of acupuncture is widespread within the National Health Service for pain control; and homoeopathy is offered to patients by a few General Practitioners alongside conventional treatments. These developments have had a (...) number of consequences: one is that both CAM and Conventional and Orthodox Medical professions have had to reappraise their professional identity. In manual therapy for example, questions have been asked about the differences between physiotherapy, osteopathy and chiropractic, and what the justification is for having separate professions. A wider question concerns the relationship between CAM and COM; are CAM distinct professions or should they, as has happened to a limited extent in the UK, be absorbed into the broader field of ‘ Medicine ’ or ‘Health Care’ as adjunctive therapies. CAM professions have also had to develop, implement and enforce codes of practice for practitioners and clarify the scope of practice within a profession. At the heart of these issues lies the need to identify and clarify professional values. A key claim of CAM professions is that their practice is distinct and the outcome of treatment at least as effective and in many cases more effective than with conventional therapies. In addition, what counts as effective outcome is often different from conventional medical understanding, involving more subtle humanitarian considerations, for example. Three values are identified as being commonly held across CAM professions. These are: offering ‘natural’ treatment; being patient rather than disease focussed; and being holistic. However, these may not be as distinctive of CAM as is claimed either because the meaning is unclear or because COM professions claim similar values. The paper argues that the values that inform ‘good practice’ and ‘effective outcome’ should be seen as distinct components of professional competence. This has implications for establishing professional identity and codes of practice. (shrink)

Evaluativists hold that psychiatric disorders have a factual and evaluative dimension and recognize that psychiatric patients have an active role in shaping their symptoms, influencing the development of their disorders, and the outcome of psychiatric therapy. This is reflected in person-centered approaches that explicitly consider the role of values in psychiatric conceptualization, classification, and decision-making. In this respect, in light of the recent partnership between Fulford’s value-based practice (VBP), and Stanghellini’s phenomenological-hermeneutic-dynamical (P.H.D) psychotherapy method, this paper presents a comparative analysis (...) of two person-centered approaches to psychiatric care currently discussed within the literature. I claim that while these approaches share some core ideas, they also present important divergences concerning their axiological underpinnings, which could potentially compromise their partnership. In particular, by exploring their theoretical, practical, and ethical dimensions, I show that these models have different conceptions of what values are, which, in turn, affect their understanding of how values relate to the person and how clinicians can identify them. Finally, I argue that although Fulford’s and Stanghellini’s approaches are prima facie compatible and complementary, developing a “combined analytic-plus-phenomenological form of values-based practice” should address fundamental conceptual issues if it is to become a consistent and coherent method for psychiatric care. (shrink)