It is commonly understood that over-arching transcendental values (TVs) play a major role in directly influencing individual and group behaviours, including those relating to the environment. This paper challenges this approach, by arguing that there is good evidence to indicate that personal contexts – rather than TVs – inform many decisions that individuals need to make. As such, the paper argues that individuals use their TVs as a guide to forming contextual values, in a way that TVs only influence daily (...) behaviours indirectly. In order to review the potential utility of these arguments, we offer a secondary analysis of the International Social Survey Programme. The results indicate that contexts can influence behaviours independently of the set of (transcendental) values that people may hold. (shrink)

In 'No Experience Necessary: Foundationalism and the Retreat from Culture in Environmental Ethics'. Ben A. Minteer forgivably misconstrues my critique of moral pluralism. Contrary to Minteer’s representation: I do not accuse moral pluralists of ‘moral promiscuity’: nor do I posit a ‘master principle’ to govern all human action respecting the environment: and although I offer conceptual foundations for environmental ethics, I do not claim that they rest on certain, a priori, and non-empirical intuitions. Rather, the conceptual foundations I offer for (...) environmental ethics are largely scientific. Contrary to Minteer’s representation: I do consider a multiplicity of contexts in which ethical actions are situated: and I do respectfully attend to and creatively engage a variety of cultural points of view, both western and nonwestern. in constructing environmental ethics. Anti-foundationalists, such as Minteer and Bryan G. Norton, ironically pose an insidious threat to democratic discussion and debate of environmental values, because they themselves posit, but do not frankly acknowledge, foundational beliefs. (shrink)

When one wishes to formulate, evaluate and implement public policies, the existence of a plurality of social actors, with interest in the policy being assessed, generates a conflictual situation. How such a conflict should be dealt with? This paper defends the thesis articulated in the following points: Different metrics are linked to different objectives and values. To use only one measurement unit for incorporating a plurality of dimensions, objectives and values, implies reductionism necessarily. Point can be proven as a matter (...) of formal logic by drawing on the work of Geach about moral philosophy. This theoretical demonstration is an original contribution of this article. Moreover, here the distinction between predicative and attributive adjectives is formalised and definitions are provided. Predicative adjectives are further distinguished into the new categories of absolute and relative ones. The new concepts of set commensurabi... (shrink)

If valuation processes are dualistic in the sense that ethical values are given priority over instrumental values, and if old-growth forests are considered to be valuable in their own right, then the cost-benefits approach to valuing old growth is inappropriate. If this is the case, then ethical standards must be used to determine whether preservation is the correct policy when human material needs and ecosystem preservation are in conflict. Such a standard is suggested and evaluated in the context of the (...) policy debate over the preservation of spotted owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. (shrink)

This paper argues that there may be instances where assessing wildlife for monetary valuation might be quite reasonable and useful for public policy, even when there are strong arguments against valuation of wildlife and nature. A case of deer population management is considered where continued growth of the deer population will lead to more property damage and habitat loss. However, deer population control raises ethical questions on the rights of animals to exist and on the rights of humans to arbitrarily (...) interfere. The contingent valuation methodology is used to value preferences for deer management for the purpose of guiding public policy. The valuation estimates show that ethical concerns about killing deer affect the level of willingness to pay in a quite a logical manner. However, for individuals with rights-based preferences, CVM is not appropriate. The survey results also show that individuals with rights-based preferences are a small minority in this particular example. (shrink)