To correct the misconception that incommensurability implies incomparability, Kuhn lately develops a new interpretation of incommensurability. This includes a linguistic theory of scientific revolutions (the theory of kinds), a cognitive exploration of the language learning process (the analogy of bilingualism), and an epistemological discussion on the rationality of scientific development (the evolutionary epistemology). My focus in this paper is to review Kuhn's effort in eliminating relativism, highlighting both the insights and the difficulties of his new version of incommensurability . Finally (...) I suggest that some of Kuhn's difficulties can be overcome by adopting a concept of rationality that filly appreciates the important role of instruments in the development of science. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo, se defiende un relativismo conceptual sin esquemas conceptuales. En primer lugar, se presenta la crítica de Davidson al relativismo conceptual. Luego, se construye un contraejemplo que cuestiona la eficacia del principio de caridad y se argumenta que, si se trata de sostener el holismo con el fin de evitar el relativismo, habría que aceptar un relativismo moderado que trace la distinción entre un background de creencia y redes internas de creencias. Este relativismo es compatible con el (...) abandono de la idea de un esquema conceptual y, por tanto, no implica ningún tipo de inconmensurabilidad ni de intraducibilidad. ABSTRACT The article defends a conceptual relativism without conceptual schemes. First, it presents Davidson's critique of conceptual relativism. Ten, it goes on to build a counterexample questioning the efficacy of the principle of charity, and argues that upholding holism in order to avoid relativism would entail accepting a moderate relativism that distinguishes between a background of belief and internal networks of beliefs. This relativism is compatible with abandoning the idea of a conceptual scheme, and, therefore, does not imply any type of incommensurability or untranslatability. (shrink)

Relativism in the philosophy of science is widely associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. Kuhn and Feyerabend espoused views about conceptual change and variation of scientific method that have apparent relativistic implications. Both held that scientific theories or paradigms may be incommensurable due to semantic variation. Two ways that truth may be relative because of semantic incommensurability will be distinguished. Davidson’s criticism of the idea of an untranslatable language will be discussed, as well as a response (...) to incommensurability based on the causal theory of reference of Kripke and Putnam. A form of relativism with respect to epistemic rationality may also be derived from the claims of Kuhn and Feyerabend about methodological variation. Kuhn’s initial suggestions about paradigm-dependent standards and absence of extra-paradigmatic standards give rise to a view on which rationality is relative to paradigm. Kuhn’s later view that there is a stable set of shared scientific values is less prone to relativistic interpretation. Feyerabend’s claim that “anything goes” suggests an extreme form of relativism, but should be understood instead as the view that all rules of method may be violated in some circumstances. The latter brings Feyerabend’s view into line with Kuhn’s later view. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo, se defiende un relativismo conceptual sin esquemas conceptuales. En primer lugar, se presenta la crítica de Davidson al relativismo conceptual. Luego, se construye un contraejemplo que cuestiona la eficacia del principio de caridad y se argumenta que, si se trata de sostener el holismo con el fin de evitar el relativismo, habría que aceptar un relativismo moderado que trace la distinción entre un background de creencia y redes internas de creencias. Este relativismo es compatible con el (...) abandono de la idea de un esquema conceptual y, por tanto, no implica ningún tipo de inconmensurabilidad ni de intraducibilidad. ABSTRACT The article defends a conceptual relativism without conceptual schemes. First, it presents Davidson's critique of conceptual relativism. Ten, it goes on to build a counterexample questioning the efficacy of the principle of charity, and argues that upholding holism in order to avoid relativism would entail accepting a moderate relativism that distinguishes between a background of belief and internal networks of beliefs. This relativism is compatible with abandoning the idea of a conceptual scheme, and, therefore, does not imply any type of incommensurability or untranslatability. (shrink)

En este artículo, se defiende un relativismo conceptual sin esquemas conceptuales. En primer lugar, se presenta la crítica de Davidson al relativismo conceptual. Luego, se construye un contraejemplo que cuestiona la eficacia del principio de caridad y se argumenta que, si se trata de sostener el holismo con el fin de evitar el relativismo, habría que aceptar un relativismo moderado que trace la distinción entre un background de creencia y redes internas de creencias. Este relativismo es compatible con el abandono (...) de la idea de un esquema conceptual y, por tanto, no implica ningún tipo de inconmensurabilidad ni de intraducibilidad. (shrink)

Scientific anti-realists who appeal to the pessimistic induction (PI) claim that the theoretical terms of past scientific theories often fail to refer to anything. But on standard views in philosophy of language, such reference failures prima facie lead to certain sentences being neither true nor false. Thus, if these standard views are correct, then the conclusion of the PI should be that significant chunks of current theories are truth-valueless. But that is semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse—a position most philosophers of (...) science, anti-realists included, consider anathema today. Therefore, proponents of the PI confront a dilemma: either accept semantic anti-realism or reject common semantic views. I examine strategies (with particular emphasis on supervaluations) for the PI proponent to either lessen the sting of this argument, or learn to live with it. 1 Introduction2 Designation Failure 2.1 Designation failure leads to truth-valueless sentences2.1.1 Direct reference theory2.1.2 Fregeanism2.1.3 Accounts of reference-fixing: why ‘phlogiston’ fails to designate 2.2 Objection: sentences exhibiting designation failure are false not truth-valueless 2.3 Avoiding truth-valuelessness via controversial semantic positions3 What to do? Closing the Gaps4 Conclusion. (shrink)

Central to Kuhn's notion of incommensurability are the ideas of meaning variance and lexicon, and the impossibility of translation of terms across different theories. Such a notion of incommensurability is based on a particular understanding of what a scientific language is. In this paper we first attempt to understand this notion of scientific language in the context of incommensurability. We consider the consequences of the essential multisemiotic character of scientific theories and show how this leads to even a single theory (...) being potentially 'internally incommensurable'. We then discuss Kuhn's lexicon-based approach to incommensurability and the problems associated with it. Finally we argue that this approach by Kuhn has interesting overlaps with the problem of meaning associated with multisemiosis, particularly the challenge of understanding the process of symbolization in scientific theories. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Gadamer's hermeneutic account of understanding as an alternative to Kuhn's incommensurability thesis. After a brief account of Kuhn's aesthetic account and arguments against it, I argue that the linguistic account faces a paradox that results from Kuhn's objectivist account of understanding, and his lack of historical reflexivity. The statement 'Languages are incommensurable' is not a unique view of language, and is thus subject to contest by incommensurable readings. Resolving the paradox requires an account of incommensurability (...) that is self-referentially consistent, open-ended, and historically reflexive whereby we recognize that our very interest in incommensurability is historically conditioned. By meeting these conditions, Gadamer's account of historical understanding offers a middle ground between two extremes: on the one side is the claim that understanding involves becoming a native of an incommensurable language, and on the other side is the rejection of the prospect of understanding a contextually removed language altogether. Gadamer is discussed as a mediator between Kuhn's epistemic and historical projects, and thus paves the way for a new hermeneutics of science. The notions of traditional horizon, historically effected consciousness, the universality of interpretation, alienation, dialogical openness, and the fusion of horizons are also discussed. (shrink)

The Pessimistic Induction (PI) states: most past scientific theories were radically mistaken; therefore, current theories are probably similarly mistaken. But mistaken in what way? On the usual understanding, such past theories are false. However, on widely held views about reference and presupposition, many theoretical claims of previous scientific theories are neither true nor false. And if substantial portions of past theories are truth-valueless, then the PI leads to semantic antirealism. But most current philosophers of science reject semantic antirealism. So PI (...) proponents face a difficult choice: accept either semantic antirealism or an unorthodox position on reference and presupposition. (shrink)