The main question of this article is given by its title: how inclusive is European philosophy of science? Phrased in this way, the question presupposes that, as a mature discipline, philosophy of science should provide an inclusive account of its subject area. I first provide an explanation of the notion of an inclusive philosophy of science. This notion of an inclusive philosophy of science is specified by discussing three general topics that seem to be missing from, or are quite marginal (...) in, restricted philosophy of science. These topics are the philosophy of historical inquiry, the role of technology in science, and the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. On this basis, I address the question whether European philosophy of science qualifies as more inclusive as compared with Anglo-American philosophy of science. (shrink)

Three new versions of Wason’s 2-4-6 rule discovery task incorporating error rates or feedback of uncertainty reduction, inspired by the error-statistical account in philosophy of science, were employed. In experiments 1 and 2, participants were instructed that some experimenter feedback would be erroneous. The results showed that performance was impaired when there was probabilistic error. In experiment 3, participants were given uncertainty reduction feedback as they generated different number triples and the negative effects of probabilistic error were not observed. These (...) findings are informative not only about rule discovery tasks in general but also about contexts of inference under uncertainty. (shrink)

Popper claims that error indicates what to avoid and there is no recipe for how to proceed. Most rationalist philosophers ignore his arguments and still try to justify their views instead of trying to improve upon them by criticizing them and conjecturing alternatives. In public discourse barren forms of justification are widespread. More and better critical institutions are required, and these require political compromise on shared aims.

My goal, in this paper, is to critically assess the categorization of “interpretations of probability” as it appears in the literature. In some sources only Carnap’s treatment of probability is understood to be the best example of “logical” probability. This is surprisingly narrow and I will here suggest otherwise. In fact, I believe that certain forms of Baysianism should also be included in the logical camp.