In 2008, researchers created human three-dimensional neural tissue – known as the pioneering work of “brain organoids.” In recent years, some researchers have transplanted human brain organoids into animal brains for applicational purposes. With these experiments have come many ethical concerns. It is thus an urgent task to clarify what is ethically permissible and impermissible in brain organoid research. This paper seeks (1) to sort out the ethical issues related to brain organoid research and application and (2) to propose future (...) directions for additional ethical consideration and policy debates in the field. Toward (1), this paper first outlines the current state of brain organoid research, and then briefly responds to previously raised related ethical concerns. Looking next at anticipated scientific developments in brain organoid research, we will discuss (i) ethical issues related to in vitro brain organoids, (ii) ethical issues raised when brain organoids form complexes or have relationships with other entities, and (iii) ethical issues of research ethics and governance. Finally, in pursuit of (2), we propose research policies that are mindful of the ethics of brain organoid research and application and also suggest the need for an international framework for research and application of brain organoids. (shrink)

When does a human being cease to exist? For millennia, the answer to this question had remained largely unchanged: death had been diagnosed when heartbeat and breathing were permanently absent. Only comparatively recently, in the 1950s, rapid developments in intensive-care medicine called into question this widely accepted criterion. What had previously been deemed a permanent cessation of vital functions suddenly became reversible. -/- A new criterion of death was needed. It was suggested that the destruction of the brain could indicate (...) the death of the organism in the presence of external life support. Soon the so-called brain death became the new worldwide standard. In recent years, however, doubts about this neurological criterion have been growing. Is brain death really our death? -/- This is the question that this thesis seeks to answer. To this end, we shall connect the medical debate about the definition of death to the philosophical debate about personal identity. While we will find that the destruction of its brain does in fact not correspond to an organism’s death, we shall also ask whether the assumption that we are essentially organisms is correct. May brain death be the ceasing to exist of a different entity? -/- Substituting clinical case reports and considerations about human physiology for the use of thought experiments, the thesis takes a novel and philosophically unconventional approach to the problem of what we essentially are. We shall analyse various pathological conditions and their respective effects on the bodily and mental characteristics of our existence. We will conclude that brain death is indeed our death – but for reasons entirely different from those cited in the original justification of this criterion. (shrink)

The idea that humans should abandon their individuality and use technology to bind themselves together into hivemind societies seems both farfetched and frightening – something that is redolent of the worst dystopias from science fiction. In this article, we argue that these common reactions to the ideal of a hivemind society are mistaken. The idea that humans could form hiveminds is sufficiently plausible for its axiological consequences to be taken seriously. Furthermore, far from being a dystopian nightmare, the hivemind society (...) could be desirable and could enable a form of sentient flourishing. Consequently, we should not be so quick to deny it. We provide two arguments in support of this claim – the axiological openness argument and the desirability argument – and then defend it against three major objections. (shrink)

I argue that the separation of conjoined twins in infancy or early childhood is unethical. Cases may be divided into three types: both twins suffer from lethal abnormalities, only one twin has a lethal abnormality, or neither twin does. In the first kind of case, there is no reason to separate, since both twins will die regardless of treatment. In the third kind of case, I argue that separation at an early age is unethical because the twins are likely to (...) achieve an irreplaceably good quality of life—the goods of conjoinment—that separation takes away. Evaluation of this possibility requires maturation past early childhood. Regarding the second type, I point out that with conceivable but unrecorded exceptions, these cases will consistently involve sacrifice separation. I present an argument that sacrifice separation is unethical, but in some cases a moral dilemma may exist in which separation and refraining from separation are both unethical. Perhaps in such cases a decision can be made on non-moral grounds; however, the possibility of such a decision serves not to mitigate but to underscore the fact that the separation is unethical. My conclusion, which applies to all three types of cases, is that it is unethical to separate conjoined twins before their developing personalities give some reliable indication as to whether they desire separation and whether they will achieve those goods of conjoinment. (shrink)

The gathering of power unto themselves by physicians, a process supported by evidence-based practice, clinical guidelines, licensure, organizational culture, and other social factors, makes the ethics of power—the legitimation of physicians’ power—a core concept of clinical ethics. In the absence of legitimation, the physician’s power over patients becomes problematic, even predatory. As has occurred in previous issues of the Journal, the papers in the 2016 clinical ethics issue bear on the professionally responsible deployment of power by physicians. This introduction explores (...) themes of physicians’ power in papers from an international group of authors who address autonomy and trust, the virtues of perinatal hospice, conjoined twins in ethics and law, addiction and autonomy in clinical research on addicting substances, euthanasia of patients with dementia in Belgium, and a pragmatic approach to clinical futility. (shrink)

We are cyborgs. We are transhumans; transitory people that exist in a luminal phase, waiting for a transfer to the posthuman world. Our children do not need education; it is cyborgization that ensures their development. This is the idea of transhumanistic philosophy, a thoroughly pedagogic idea. In this paper, I will present basic transhumanism ideas and stress the criticism on education created within this philosophy. This text is neither a systematic study on transhumanism nor a pedagogical analysis. It is merely (...) an attempt at showing teachers how education can be deprecated in modern philosophies that are technologically-oriented. (shrink)

This article examines Derek Parfit's claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity with the right kind of cause. It argues that such psychological accounts of our identity fail, but that their main rivals, biological or animalist accounts do not fare better. Instead it proposes an error-theory to the effect that common sense takes us to be identical to our bodies on the erroneous assumption that our minds belong non-derivatively to them, whereas they in fact (...) belong to them derivatively in virtue of belonging to some proper parts of them, namely certain features of their brains. However, these features do not meet another necessary condition of being the subject or owner of our minds: the condition of being “accessible” so that we can attribute our mental states to them in everyday life. There is also the problem of specifying these features more precisely. Nothing meets these two conditions, so we are not identical to anything. This conclusion fits well with Parfit's claim that personal identity is not what matters. But although this negative claim is true, it is suggested that Parfit's positive account of what matters is mistaken: it is rather psychological similarity than psychological continuity/connectedness that matters. (shrink)