Ruth Tallman has recently offered a defense of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation [1]. According to Tallman, this principle calls for prioritizing adolescents and young adults between 15–40 years of age. In this article, I argue that Tallman’s defense of the modified youngest first principle is vulnerable to important objections, and that it is thus unsuitable as a basis for allocating resources. Moreover, Tallman makes claims about the badness of death for individuals at different ages, but (...) she lacks an account of the loss involved in dying to support her claims. To fill this gap in Tallman’s account, I propose a view on the badness of death that I call ‘Deprivationism’. I argue that this view explains why death is bad for those who die, and that it has some advantages over Tallman’s complete lives view in the context of scarce resource allocation. Finally, I consider some objections to the relevance of Deprivationism to resource allocation, and offer my responses. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: The COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated revisiting the matter of allocating scarce healthcare resources. During pandemics and natural disasters, applying certain allocation methods is inevitable due to an uncontrollable surge in the need for scarce resources, and those methods should distribute potential benefits and burdens according to the principle of justice. This article briefly studies four allocation models and proposes a new approach to maximize total benefits with social and ethical acceptability, equality, and equitability. For accomplishing that goal, the Acceptability, (...) Equality, and Equity (AEE) model recommends six principles, atransparency and equal treatment, b- objective assessment and supervision, c- sustaining ongoing treatments, d- priority to individuals performing crucial tasks, e- scoring system, and f- lottery for individuals with the same conditions. The AEE model suggests allocating scarce resources not only based on medical facts but also social and ethical considerations, such as sustaining ongoing medical procedures for patients who are undergoing medical treatment and winning public support through transparent, objective, and fair implications. METHODS: - RESULTS: - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: -. (shrink)

One prominent view in recent literature on resource allocation is Persad, Emanuel and Wertheimer’s complete lives framework for the rationing of lifesaving healthcare interventions (CLF). CLF states that we should prioritise the needs of individuals who have had less opportunity to experience the events that characterise a complete life. Persadet alargue that their system is the product of a successful process of reflective equilibrium—a philosophical methodology whereby theories, principles and considered judgements are balanced with each other and revised until we (...) achieve an acceptable coherence between our various beliefs. Yet I argue that many of the principles and intuitions underpinning CLF conflict with each other, and that Persadet alhave failed to achieve an acceptable coherence between them. I focus on three tensions in particular: the conflict between the youngest first principle and Persadet al’s investment refinement; the conflict between current medical need and a concern for lifetime equality; and the tension between adopting an objective measure of complete lives and accommodating for differences in life narratives. (shrink)