Euthanasia and the duty to die have both been thoroughly discussed in the field of bioethics as morally justifiable practices within medical healthcare contexts. The existence of a narrow connection between both could also be established, for people having a duty to die should be allowed to actively hasten their death by the active means offered by euthanasia. Choosing the right time to end one’s own life is a decisive factor to retain autonomy at the end of our lives. However, (...) there is no definitive consensus on why physicians should be the ones performing the medical procedure to end a person’s life. The moral problems arising from such assertion are not to be taken lightly, for medical tradition has long regarded the duty not to kill, not to actively end a patient’s life, as the core moral obligation that gives meaning to the medical profession. Our concern is to question the moral justifiability of the arguments offered by physicians not to actively help patients die. (shrink)

Editors' introduction to 3rd thematic issue on philosophy of medicine.

The dead can be harmed by events that happen after their death, and we survivors often have reason to act so as to enhance their welfare.

As they age, many people are afraid that they might become a burden to their families and friends. In fact, fear of being a burden is one of the most frequently cited reasons for individuals who request physician aid in dying. Why is this fear so prevalent, and what are the issues underlying this concern? I argue that perceptions of individual autonomy, dependency, and dignity all contribute to the fear of becoming a burden. However, this fear is misplaced; common conceptions (...) of these values should be re-framed and re-examined. Practices that support a more community-centered type of autonomy can be found in dependency and dignity. This paper offers some practical examples of how to address common end-of-life situations that may cause anxiety to patients who are worried about being a burden. These practices include discussing expectations, both for care and how the relationship among the participants might change, and modeling respectful caregiving behaviors. Most difficult of all, though, includes cultural and societal attitude changes so that people recognize the good in receiving care and get used to the idea that they do not need to do anything to be valuable. (shrink)

This article discusses two views associated with narrative conceptions of the self. The first view asserts that our whole life is reasonably regarded as a single unit of meaning. A prominent strand of the philosophical narrative account of the self is the representative of this view. The second view—which has currency beyond the confines of the philosophical narrative account—is that the meaning of a life story is dependent on what happens at the end of it. The article argues that the (...) connection between these two views is more tentative than often supposed: philosophical narrativists that see life as a single unit of value and meaning nonetheless provide grounds for arguing that the end of life is not the best and may be a particularly bad time to approach and intervene in the matter of how well one's life as a whole has gone. (shrink)

This essay engages with the (re)emergence of psychedelic medicine and the idea of psychedelics drugs and the experiences they induce as a developing therapeutic modality. It does so in the context of the provision of psychedelics to terminally ill patients experiencing existential distress as they approach the end of their lives. Reflecting on such suggestions facilitates an examination of a specific aspect of psychedelics and/ as medicine (or palliative care), namely questions of meaning and meaninglessness. Understood as impacting one’s ability (...) to make or _realise_ meaning in life, existential distress commonly entails a degree of demoralisation. In some cases, individuals can be thought of as inhabiting (and being inhabited by) a sense of meaninglessness. In contrast, the experiences psychedelics seem to induce are often imbued with a great deal of meaning, a sense of which seems to continue long after the psychoactive effects of such drugs have ceased. Whilst briefly considering whether or not meaning can properly be thought of as a matter for healthcare or a medical concern, this paper seeks to highlight some of the implications that the advent of psychedelic medicine might have. By way of a conclusion, I enjoin bioethics in recognising itself as a meaningful cultural discourse that is implicated in the future(s) of medicine, psychedelics and being human. (shrink)