Representations of monadic MV -algebra, the characterization of locally finite monadic MV -algebras, with axiomatization of them, definability of non-trivial monadic operators on finitely generated free MV -algebras are given. Moreover, it is shown that finitely generated m-relatively complete subalgebra of finitely generated free MV -algebra is projective.

A formal system for Ł ${}_{\infty}$ , based on a "game-theoretic" analysis of the Łukasiewicz propositional connectives, is defined and proved to be complete. An "Herbrand theorem" for the Ł ${}_{\infty}$ predicate calculus (a variant of some work of Mostowski) and some corollaries relating to its axiomatizability are proved. The predicate calculus with equality is also considered.

We consider an extension of Gödel logic by a unary operator that enables the addition of non-negative reals to truth-values. Although its propositional fragment has a simple proof system, first-order validity is Π2-hard. We explain the close connection to Scarpellini’s result on Π2-hardness of Łukasiewicz’s logic.

It is shown that the infinite-valued first-order Gödel logic G° based on the set of truth values {1/k: k ε w {0}} U {0} is not r.e. The logic G° is the same as that obtained from the Kripke semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic with constant domains and where the order structure of the model is linear. From this, the unaxiomatizability of Kröger's temporal logic of programs (even of the fragment without the nexttime operator O) and of the authors' temporal (...) logic of linear discrete time with gaps follows. (shrink)

First-order Gödel logics are a family of finite- or infinite-valued logics where the sets of truth values V are closed subsets of [0,1] containing both 0 and 1. Different such sets V in general determine different Gödel logics GV (sets of those formulas which evaluate to 1 in every interpretation into V). It is shown that GV is axiomatizable iff V is finite, V is uncountable with 0 isolated in V, or every neighborhood of 0 in V is uncountable. Complete (...) axiomatizations for each of these cases are given. The r.e. prenex, negation-free, and existential fragments of all first-order Gödel logics are also characterized. (shrink)

In this paper we study the notion of forcing for Łukasiewicz predicate logic (Ł∀, for short), along the lines of Robinson’s forcing in classical model theory. We deal with both finite and infinite forcing. As regard to the former we prove a Generic Model Theorem for Ł∀, while for the latter, we study the generic and existentially complete standard models of Ł∀.

Fuzzy logics are systems of logic with infinitely many truth values. Such logics have been claimed to have an extremely wide range of applications in linguistics, computer technology, psychology, etc. In this note, we canvass the known results concerning infinitely many valued logics; make some suggestions for alterations of the known systems in order to accommodate what modern devotees of fuzzy logic claim to desire; and we prove some theorems to the effect that there can be no fuzzy logic which (...) will do what its advocates want. Finally, we suggest ways to accommodate these desires in finitely many valued logics. (shrink)

The paper presents a particular example of a formula which is a standard tautology of Łukasiewicz but not its general tautology; an example of a model in which the formula is not true is explicitly constructed. Analogous example of a formula and its model is given for product logic.

A very simple many-valued predicate calculus is presented; a completeness theorem is proved and the arithmetical complexity of some notions concerning provability is determined.

A simple complete axiomatic system is presented for the many-valued propositional logic based on the conjunction interpreted as product, the coresponding implication (Goguen's implication) and the corresponding negation (Gödel's negation). Algebraic proof methods are used. The meaning for fuzzy logic (in the narrow sense) is shortly discussed.

ABSTRACT The term fuzzy logic has two different meanings -broad and narrow. In Zadeh's opinion, fuzzy logic is an extension of many- valued logic but having a different agenda—as generalized modus ponens, max-min inference, linguistic quantifiers etc. The question we address in this paper is whether there is something in Zadeh's specific agenda which cannot be grasped by “classiceli”, “traditional” mathematical logic. We show that much of fuzzy logic can be understood as classical deduction in a many-sorted many-valued Pavelka- Lukasiewicz (...) style rational quantification logic. This means that, besides the linguistic or approximation aspects, the logical aspect is present too and can be made explicit. (shrink)

This is an exploratory paper whose aim is to investigate the potentialities of bilattice theory for an adequate definition of the deduction apparatus for multi-valued logic. We argue that bilattice theory enables us to obtain a nice extension of the graded approach to fuzzy logic. To give an example, a completeness theorem for a logic based on Boolean algebras is proved.

In the 1970s, Robin Giles introduced a game combining Lorenzen-style dialogue rules with a simple scheme for betting on the truth of atomic statements, and showed that the existence of winning strategies for the game corresponds to the validity of formulas in Łukasiewicz logic. In this paper, it is shown that ‘disjunctive strategies’ for Giles’s game, combining ordinary strategies for all instances of the game played on the same formula, may be interpreted as derivations in a corresponding proof system. In (...) particular, such strategies mirror derivations in a hypersequent calculus developed in recent work on the proof theory of Łukasiewicz logic. (shrink)

We define and study monadic MV-algebras as pairs of MV-algebras one of which is a special case of relatively complete subalgebra named m-relatively complete. An m-relatively complete subalgebra determines a unique monadic operator. A necessary and sufficient condition is given for a subalgebra to be m-relatively complete. A description of the free cyclic monadic MV-algebra is also given.

In this paper we study the notion of forcing for Łukasiewicz predicate logic (Ł∀, for short), along the lines of Robinson’s forcing in classical model theory. We deal with both finite and infinite forcing. As regard to the former we prove a Generic Model Theorem for Ł∀, while for the latter, we study the generic and existentially complete standard models of Ł∀.

In this paper, I identify the source of the differences between classical logic and many-valued logics (including fuzzy logics) with respect to the set of valid formulas and the set of inferences sanctioned. In the course of doing so, we find the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for any many-valued semantics (again including fuzzy logics) to validate exactly the classically valid formulas, while sanctioning exactly the same set of inferences as classical logic. This in turn shows, contrary (...) to what has sometimes been claimed, that at least one class of infinite-valued semantics is axiomatizable. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of well-known intentional realists have focused their energy on attempts to provide a naturalized theory of mental representation. What tends to be overlooked, however, is that a naturalized theory of mental representation will not, by itself, salvage intentional realism. Since most naturalistic properties play no interesting causal role, intentional realists must also solve the problem of showing how intentional properties , even if naturalized, could be causally efficacious. Because of certain commitments, this problem is especially (...) difficult for intentional realists such as Fodor. In the current paper I focus on the problem as it arises for such realists, and I argue that the best-known solution proposed to date is inadequate. If what I say is correct, then such intentional realists are left with an additional and substantial problem, and one that has generally not been sufficiently appreciated. (shrink)

The history of Fuzziness in Italy is varied and scattered among a num- ber of research groups. As a matter of fact, “fuzziness” spread in Italy through a sort of spontaneous diffusion, and, also subsequently, no one felt the need to cre- ate some “national” common structure like an Association or similar things. Since a cohesive retelling would be next to impossible, a few members of the Italian fuzzy community have been asked to recount their experience and express their hopes (...) for the future. (shrink)