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Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The unity of caring and the rationality of emotion.Jeffrey Seidman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2785-2801.details
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(1 other version)Can realists reason with reasons?Christian Kietzmann - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):159-169.details
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Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
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(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.details
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Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
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Whither anankastics?Billy Dunaway & Alex Silk - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):75-94.details
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Instrumental Reasons.Instrumental Reasons - unknowndetails
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Intention and Predicition in Means-End Reasoning.Stephen J. White - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):251-266.details
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(1 other version)Autonomous Driving and Perverse Incentives.Wulf Loh & Catrin Misselhorn - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (4):575-590.details
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A Realistic Practical Conclusion.Patricio A. Fernandez - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):115-128.details
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Disagreement and inconsistency: a problem for orthodox expressivism.John Eriksson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-17.details
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A New Problem for Internalism.Chad Carmichael - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13187-13199.details
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Blame, Harm, and Motivational Value.Martin Roth - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (1):111-129.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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The Instrumental Rule.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.details
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(1 other version)IX-Against Requirements of Rationality.Anthony W. Price - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):157-176.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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New Work for a Theory of Instrumental Rationality.Keshav Singh - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):537-551.details
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The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons.D. W. Portmore - 2011 - Mind 120 (477):117-153.details
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(1 other version)Against requirements of rationality.Anthony W. Price - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2):157-176.details
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The Unity of Evidence and Coherence.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10289-10312.details
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Unity of Reasons.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):877-895.details
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Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom.Matthew S. Bedke - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85-111.details
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The Instrumental Rule.F. I. X. Jeremy David - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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Reasons, rationality and preferences.Stuart Yasgur - 2011 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):29-64.details
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