Switch to: References

Citations of:

The moral basis of interpersonal comparisons

In Jon Elster & John Roemer (eds.), Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 17--44 (1991)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Extensive Measurement in Social Choice.Jacob M. Nebel - 2024 - Theoretical Economics 19 (4):1581-1618.
    Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, independence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Aspectos metafísicos na física de Newton: Deus.Bruno Camilo de Oliveira - 2011 - In Luiz Henrique de Araújo Dutra & Alexandre Meyer Luz (eds.), Coleção rumos da epistemologia. pp. 186-201.
    CAMILO, Bruno. Aspectos metafísicos na física de Newton: Deus. In: DUTRA, Luiz Henrique de Araújo; LUZ, Alexandre Meyer (org.). Temas de filosofia do conhecimento. Florianópolis: NEL/UFSC, 2011. p. 186-201. (Coleção rumos da epistemologia; 11). Através da análise do pensamento de Isaac Newton (1642-1727) encontramos os postulados metafísicos que fundamentam a sua mecânica natural. Ao deduzir causa de efeito, ele acreditava chegar a uma causa primeira de todas as coisas. A essa primeira causa de tudo, onde toda a ordem e leis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Will Be Best for Me? Big Decisions and the Problem of Inter‐World Comparisons.Peter Baumann - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):253-273.
    Big decisions in a person’s life often affect the preferences and standards of a good life which that person’s future self will develop after implementing her decision. This paper argues that in such cases the person might lack any reasons to choose one way rather than the other. Neither preference-based views nor happiness-based views of justified choice offer sufficient help here. The available options are not comparable in the relevant sense and there is no rational choice to make. Thus, ironically, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Transformative Experience and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):189-216.
    I consider an old problem for preference satisfaction theories of wellbeing: that they have trouble answering questions about interpersonal comparisons, such as whether I am better off than you are, or whether a particular policy benefits me more than it benefits you. I argue that a similar problem arises for intrapersonal comparisons in cases of transformative experience. I survey possible solutions to the problem, and point out some subtle disanalogies between the problem involving interpersonal comparisons and the problem involving transformative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Distributive Justice.Michael Allingham - 2013 - London: Routledge.
    Distributive Justice Theories of distributive justice seek to specify what is meant by a just distribution of goods among members of society. All liberal theories (in the sense specified below) may be seen as expressions of laissez-faire with compensations for factors that they consider to be morally arbitrary. More specifically, such theories may be interpreted […].
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare.Alex Voorhoeve - 2006 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Preferences and Well-Being. Cambridge University Press. pp. 265-79.
    Can a preference-based conception of welfare accommodate changes in people's preferences? I argue that the fact that people care about which preferences they have, and the fact that people can change their preferences about which preferences it is good for them to have, together undermine the case for accepting a preference-satisfaction conception of welfare.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Equal opportunity, equality, and responsibility.Alex Voorhoeve - 2005 - Dissertation, University of London
    This thesis argues that a particular version of equal opportunity for welfare is the best way of meeting the joint demands of three liberal egalitarian ideals: distributional equality, responsibility, and respect for individuals’ differing reasonable judgements of their own good. It also examines which social choice rules best represent these demands. Finally, it defends the view that achieving equal opportunity for welfare should not only be a goal of formal public institutions, but that just citizens should also sometimes be guided (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is cognitive enhacement harmful? Personal affectation and independent value points of view.Daniel Loewe - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):117-129.
    The paper discusses criticisms against pharmacological cognitive enhancement from a liberal perspective. The criticisms point to the consequences of cognitive enhancement in third parties and in the agents, as well as in independent values. According to the article, these criticisms are not convincing. On the contrary, it argues that under certain assumptions there are good reasons in favor of free access to cognitive enhancement.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Rawlsians, Christians and Patriots: Maximin justice and individual ethics.Philippe Van Parijs - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):309-342.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • (1 other version)Rawlsians, Christians and Patriots: Maximin justice and individual ethics.Philippe Van Parijs - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):309-342.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The Metric of Opportunity.Robert Sudgen - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):307.
    There is a long tradition in economics of evaluating social arrangements by the extent to which individuals' preferences are satisfied. This is the tradition of welfarism, which has developed from nineteenth-century utilitarianism. Increasingly, however, the presumption that preference-satisfaction is the appropriate standard for evaluating social arrangements is being challenged by an alternative view: that we should focus on the set of opportunities open to each individual.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Pluralist welfare egalitarianism and the expensive tastes objection.Alexandru Volacu & Oana-Alexandra Dervis - 2016 - Contemporary Political Theory 15 (3):285-303.
    In this article we aim to reduce the force of the expensive tastes objection to equality of welfare by constructing a pluralist welfare egalitarian theory which is not defeated by it. In the first part, we argue that Cohen’s condition of responsibility-sensitiveness is not able to provide a satisfactory rebuttal of the expensive tastes objection for at least a class of theories of justice, namely those that adhere to a methodologically fact-sensitive view. In the second part, we explore the possibility (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Utilitarian Theories Reconsidered: Common Misconceptions, More Recent Developments, and Health Policy Implications.Afschin Gandjour & Karl Wilhelm Lauterbach - 2003 - Health Care Analysis 11 (3):229-244.
    Despite the prevalence of the terms utilitarianism and utilitarian in the health care and health policy literature, anecdotal evidence suggests that authors are often not fully aware of the diversity of utilitarian theories, their principles, and implications. Further, it seems that authors often categorically reject utilitarianism under the assumption that it violates individual rights. The tendency of act utilitarianism to neglect individual rights is attenuated, however, by the diminishing marginal utility of wealth and the disutility of a protest by those (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Social Justice and Individual Ethics.Philippe van Parijs - 1993 - Philosophica 52 (1):40-63.
    . If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Interpersonal comparisons of utility: Why and how they are and should be made.Peter J. Hammond - 1991 - In Jon Elster & John Roemer (eds.), Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 200--254.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Means and Capabilities in the Discussion of Distributive Justice.Gustavo Pereira - 2006 - Ratio Juris 19 (1):55-79.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Social Justice and Individual Ethics.Philippe van Parijs - 1995 - Ratio Juris 8 (1):40-63.
    If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: (1) Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations