ABSTRACT Schmidt introduces the Aristotelian term “koinonia” as denoting a political community which aims to achieve a common good for society as a whole. A good that promotes the flourishing of every party involved. In addition, Schmidt adopts further insight about the term by engaging more thoroughly in discourse about it, realising that this easily extends to the term taking on tenets of communities such as a family. Within family, the terms address even more specific relationships, such as husband and (...) wife, parents and children, sibling relationships, etc. Essentially, Aristotle’s premise of common good persists even in these specific relationships, so much so that Schmidt highlights the pillars which sustain the pursuit of the common good. These pillars are justice, fairness and reciprocity, all grounded in good will and fellowship. This goodwill and fellowship among African parents in a community is to assist each other in raising children in the community and ensure they are grounded in African values, hence the African proverb “a single hand cannot raise a child”. In fact, biological parents may draw from the knowledge of the elderly in the community who can assist in instilling values in the youth. The importance of this is that the elderly in African communities are valued not only as those who sustain order in the community, but are also the custodians of African value systems which younger generations should ideally be grounded in. With the introduction of technology, the digital divide seems to be presenting a challenge when it comes to the solidarity of African parents, as a village, raising their children. Hence, a strategy is required for modern African parents to not abandon this solidarity afforded by their cultural values. The communal way of raising their children should persist in order to preserve the African value of parental solidarity in raising children, even in the midst of what technology and the digital divide presents to the African community. (shrink)

The article exposes diverse historical-philosophical meanings of the concepts of praxis and practice. Using the works of Aristotle, I. Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, K. Marx, H. Lotze, and H. Arendt, the author demonstrates the main ways of distinguishing between these two notions. The article clarifies meanings of praxis and prudence in Aristotle’s philosophy. The crucial transformation of the sense of practice in classical German philosophy, its further neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian interpretations are also considered. The author reveals a range of categorical forms (...) of comprehending the practical and traces the basic directions of the development of definitions of praxis and practice, indicating the historical-philosophical contexts of their evolution. The article compares the conceptions of the acting subject developed by I. Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, K. Marx, and H. Lotze. Special attention is given to the explication of H. Lotze’s practical philosophy in building and distributing the conception of active life. Marxist and Lotzean approaches to praxis are compared, and their role in the formation of its current interpretations is revealed. These interpretations are problematized, taking into account the partly reconstructed initial meanings of praxis in Aristotle’s philosophy. The author justifies the relevance of H. Lotze’s legacy in Russian philosophy, examining the categories of social action and active life, the acting subject and society. The article demonstrates prospects for their reconsideration in social philosophy by approaching H. Lotze’s practical philosophy. The conclusion highlights consequences of the replacement of the Aristotelian definition of praxis with the Lotzean version, the possibility and necessity of reproducing the initial sense of praxis as different from practice in diverse historical-philosophical interpretations. (shrink)