On the occasion of the centennial of his birth, Schrödinger's life and views are sketched and his critique of the interpretation of quantum mechanics accepted at his time is examined. His own interpretation, which he had to abandon after a short time, provides a prime example of the way in which the tentative meaning of central theoretical terms in a new and revolutionary theory often fails. Schrödinger's strong philosophical convictions have played a key role in his refusal to break with (...) many of the notions of classical physics. At the same time, they made him into a keen and incisive critic of the Copenhagen interpretation. His criticism is compared with present views on quantum mechanics. (shrink)

According to the standard view, the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum mechanics originated in discussions between Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927, and was defended by Bohr in his classic debate with Einstein. Yet recent scholarship has shown Bohr’s views were never widely accepted, let alone properly understood, by his contemporaries, many of whom held divergent views of the ‘Copenhagen orthodoxy’. This paper examines how the ‘myth of the Copenhagen interpretation’ was constructed by situating it in the context of Soviet Marxist (...) critique of quantum mechanics in the 1950s and the response by physicists such as Heisenberg and Rosenfeld. (shrink)

Quantum theory determines the evolution of quantum states between quantum jumps. Quantum theory also allows us to calculate rates of quantum jumps and, on a probabilistic level, the outcomes of those quantum jumps. Both quantum jumps and the continuous evolution of quantum states are important in the time evolution of quantum systems, and the scattering matrix ties those seemingly disparate concepts together. Indeed, quantum jumps are so essential in quantum dynamics that we should refocus discussion of a quantum ontology on (...) the power and principal limitations of our knowledge about quantum jumps as encoded in the scattering matrix. On the one hand, one might argue that the lack of a dynamical resolution of quantum jumps indicates an inherent incompleteness of the theory. However, we would rather submit that quantum theory is complete and that the observations indicate a principal limitation to the description of the universe as a smoothly evolving dynamical system. The modern understanding of quantum jumps therefore calls for updates to the Copenhagen interpretation instead of modifications of quantum theory. (shrink)

Most of us are either philosophically naïve scientists or scientifically naïve philosophers, so we misjudged Schrödinger’s “very burlesque” portrait of Quantum Theory (QT) as a profound conundrum. The clear signs of a strawman argument were ignored. The Ontic Probability Interpretation (TOPI) is a metatheory: a theory about the meaning of QT. Ironically, equating Reality with Actuality cannot explain actual data, justifying the century-long philosophical struggle. The actual is real but not everything real is actual. The ontic character of the Probable (...) has been elusive for so long because it cannot be grasped directly from experiment; it can only be inferred from physical setups that do not morph it into the Actual. In this Part III, Born’s Rule and the quantum formalism for the microworld are intuitively surmised from instances in our macroworld. The posited reality of the quanton’s probable states and properties is probed and proved. After almost a century, TOPI aims at setting the record straight: the so-called ‘Basis’ and ‘Measurement’ problems are ill-advised. About the first, all bases are legitimate regardless of state and milieu. As for the second, its premise is false: there is no need for a physical ‘collapse’ process that would convert many states into a single state. Under TOPI, a more sensible variant of the ‘measurement problem’ can be reformulated in non-anthropic terms as a real problem. Yet, as such, it is not part of QT per se and will be tackled in future papers. As for the mythical cat, the ontic state of a radioactive nucleus is not pure, so its evolution is not governed by Schrödinger’s equation – let alone the rest of his “hellish machine”. Einstein was right: “The Lord is subtle but not malicious”. However, ‘The Lord’ turned out to be much subtler than what Einstein and Schrödinger could have ever accepted. Part IV introduces QR/TOPI: a new theory that solves the century-old problem of integrating Special Relativity with Quantum Theory [1]. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of the epistemological situation of Quantum Mechanics is the number of interpretations and the many schools of thought, with no consensus on the way to understand the theory. In this article, I introduce a distinction between orthodox interpretations and heterodox interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: the orthodox interpretations preserve all the quantum principles while the heterodox interpretations replace at least one of them. Then, I argue that we have strong empirical and epistemological reasons to prefer (...) orthodox interpretations to heterodox interpretations. The first argument is that all the experiments on the foundations of Quantum Mechanics give a high degree of corroboration to the quantum principles and, consequently, to the orthodox interpretations. The second argument is that the scientific progress needs a consensus: this consensus is impossible with the heterodox interpretations, while it is possible with the orthodox interpretations. Giving the preference to the orthodox interpretations is a reasonable position which could preserve both a consensus on quantum principles and a plurality of views on Quantum Mechanics. (shrink)

Despite the importance of the variational principles of physics, there have been relatively few attempts to consider them for a realistic framework. In addition to the old teleological question, this paper continues the recent discussion regarding the modal involvement of the principle of least action and its relations with the Humean view of the laws of nature. The reality of possible paths in the principle of least action is examined from the perspectives of the contemporary metaphysics of modality and Leibniz's (...) concept of essences or possibles striving for existence. I elaborate a modal interpretation of the principle of least action that replaces a classical representation of a system's motion along a single history in the actual modality by simultaneous motions along an infinite set of all possible histories in the possible modality. This model is based on an intuition that deep ontological connections exist between the possible paths in the principle of least action and possible quantum histories in the Feynman path integral. I interpret the action as a physical measure of the essence of every possible history. Therefore only one actual history has the highest degree of the essence and minimal action. To address the issue of necessity, I assume that the principle of least action has a general physical necessity and lies between the laws of motion with a limited physical necessity and certain laws with a metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

We expound an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new interpretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. The ψ function is no longer interpreted as a probability amplitude of the observed behaviour of elementary particles but as an objective physical field representing the particles themselves. The particles are thus extended objects whose extension varies in time according to (...) the variation of ψ. They are considered as fundamental regions of space with some kind of nonlocality. Special consideration is given to the Heisenberg relations, the Einstein-Podolsky- Rosen correlations, the reduction process, the problem of measurement, and the quantum-statistical distributions. (shrink)

The apparent dichotomy between quantum jumps on the one hand, and continuous time evolution according to wave equations on the other hand, provided a challenge to Bohr’s proposal of quantum jumps in atoms. Furthermore, Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation also seemed to require a modification of the explanation for the origin of line spectra due to the apparent possibility of superpositions of energy eigenstates for different energy levels. Indeed, Schrödinger himself proposed a quantum beat mechanism for the generation of discrete line spectra (...) from superpositions of eigenstates with different energies. However, these issues between old quantum theory and Schrödinger’s wave mechanics were correctly resolved only after the development and full implementation of photon quantization. The second quantized scattering matrix formalism reconciles quantum jumps with continuous time evolution through the identification of quantum jumps with transitions between different sectors of Fock space. The continuous evolution of quantum states is then recognized as a sum over continually evolving jump amplitudes between different sectors in Fock space. In today’s terminology, this suggests that linear combinations of scattering matrix elements are epistemic sums over ontic states. Insights from the resolution of the dichotomy between quantum jumps and continuous time evolution therefore hold important lessons for modern research both on interpretations of quantum mechanics and on the foundations of quantum computing. They demonstrate that discussions of interpretations of quantum theory necessarily need to take into account field quantization. They also demonstrate the limitations of the role of wave equations in quantum theory, and caution us that superpositions of quantum states for the formation of qubits may be more limited than usually expected. (shrink)

It is argued that the conventional formulation of quantum mechanics is inadequate: the usual interpretation of the mathematical formalism in terms of the results of measurements cannot be applied to situations in which discontinuous transitions (''quantum jumps'') are observed as they happen, since nothing that can be called a measurement happens at the moment of observation. Attempts to force such observations into the standard mould lead to absurd results: ''a watched pot never boils''. Experiments show both that this result is (...) correct when the experiment does indeed consist of a series of measurements, and that it is not when the experiment consists of a period of observation: quantum jumps do happen. The possibilities for improving the formulation by incorporating transitions in the basic postulates are reviewed, and a satisfactory postulate is obtained by modifying a suggestion of Bell's. This requires a distinction between the external description of the whole of a physical system and internal descriptions which are themselves physical events in the system. It is shown that this gives correct results for simple unstable systems and for the quantum-jump experiments. (shrink)

The paper investigates possible readings of the later Heisenberg's remarks on the nature of quantum states. It discusses, in particular, whether Heisenberg should be seen as a proponent of the epistemic conception of states – the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning observers' epistemic relations to these systems. On the one hand, it seems plausible that Heisenberg subscribes to that view, given how he defends the notorious "collapse of the wave (...) function" by relating it to a sudden change in the epistemic situation of the observer registering a measured result. On the other hand, his remarks on quantum probabilities as "potentia" or "objective tendencies" are difficult to reconcile with such a reading. The accounts that are attributed to Heisenberg by the different possible readings considered are subjected to closer scrutiny; at the same time, their respective virtues and problems are discussed. _German_ Diese Arbeit untersucht mögliche Lesarten von Heisenbergs späten Bemerkungen über die Natur von Quantenzuständen. Insbesondere wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Heisenberg als Vertreter der epistemischen Auffassung von Quantenzuständen gelten kann – der Idee, dass Quantenzustände nicht Beschreibungen der objektiven Eigenschaften von Quantensystemen sind sondern die epistemischen Beziehungen von Beobachtern zu diesen Systemen widerspiegeln. Einerseits erscheint es plausibel, dass Heisenberg dieser Sichtweise zustimmt, wenn man sich ansieht, wie er den berüchtigten,,Kollaps der Wellenfunktion" verteidigt, indem er ihn mit einer plötzlichen Änderung in der Kenntnis des ein Messergebnis registrierenden Beobachters in Zusammenhang bringt. Andererseits sind seine Bemerkungen über quantenmechanische Wahrscheinlichkeiten als,,Potentia" oder,,objektive Tendenzen" mit einer solchen Lesart nur schwer in Einklang zu bringen. Die Positionen, die Heisenberg den verschiedenen möglichen Lesarten zufolge vertritt, werden eingehenden Untersuchungen unterzogen; gleichzeitig werden ihre jeweiligen Vorzüge und Probleme diskutiert. (shrink)

In this paper a possible interpretative value of Aristotle’s fundamental ontological doctrine of potentiality and actuality is considered in the context of operationally undoubtedly the most successful but interpretatively still controversial theory of modern physics – quantum mechanics – especially regarding understanding the nature of the world, the phenomena of which it describes and predicts so successfully. In particular, beings of the atomic world are interpreted as real potential beings actualized by the measurement process in appropriate experimental arrangement, and the (...) problem of actual beings of the atomic world is considered in the context of Aristotle’s threefold requirement for the priority of actuality over potentiality – in time, definition or knowledge, and substantiality. (shrink)

Current economic ontology development has failed to confront two important errors associated with historicism. Embracing the linearity of economic value being directly attributed to the labor applied to natural resources taken together with efficiency arguments used to justify monetary policy on both the microlevel (transaction) and macrolevel (global trade), we know these legacies of the scientific method applied to economic systems have left the G-20 paralyzed to deal with structural failings evidenced from banking to business to economic policy. An exploration (...) of the structural modalities that impair our current capacity for adaptation and alternative methods for accounting for value is the basis for this inquiry. Integral accounting is proposed as a more suitable method to transition from scarcity-based market models to abundance-based modes of sustainable engagement. (shrink)

The paper introduces mathematical encoding for subjective experience and meaning in natural cognition. The code is based on a quantum-theoretic qubit structure supplementing classical bit with circular dimension, functioning as a process-causal template for representation of contexts relative to the basis decision. The qubit state space is demarcated in categories of emotional experience of animals and humans. Features of the resulting spherical map align with major theoreties in cognitive and emotion science, modeling of natural language, and semiotics, suggesting several generalizations (...) and improvements. The developed model bridges psychological, quantum-theoretic, and semiotic perspectives, allowing for an integrative account of subjectivity, agency, and meaning in living Nature.Graphical abstract. (shrink)

We question the free energy principle (FEP) as it is used in contemporary physics. If the FEP is incorrect in physics, then it cannot ground the authors' arguments. We also question the assumption that perception requires inference. We argue that perception (including perception of social affordances) can be direct, in which case inference is not required.

In this essay we show that some thesis -contended by some authors searching on physical causation- about causal pseudoprocesses, processes of which the most salient aspect seems to be travelling faster than the speed of light, must be rejected o seriously modified. Secondly, we will argue that there is just one non causal entities category and that special relativity does not provide any particular motivation to appeal to an ontological distinction based on identity over time. In addition, this conclusion we (...) will enable us to offer a more accurate definition of a pseudoprocess than that found in the relevant literature. In third place, we will show in some detail how such processes, understood the way that we suggest here, are and have been valuable methodological tools when studying –through usual measurement procedures- effective causal relations holding in the physical world. Finally, we will connect our conclusions with R. Torretti’s criticism on the relation between ordinary causation and governed-by-differential-equations physical processes and we will show that, although neutral on his anthropocentric background, the account here argued provides, against what Torretti claims, a natural explanation to the physical connection between ordinary causation and causal processes such as studied by physics. (shrink)