In his Doppelvortrag, Edmund Husserl introduced two concepts of “definiteness” which have been interpreted as a vindication of his role in the history of completeness. Some commentators defended that the meaning of these notions should be understood as categoricity, while other scholars believed that it is closer to syntactic completeness. A detailed study of the early twentieth-century axiomatics and Husserl’s Doppelvortrag shows, however, that many concepts of completeness were conflated as equivalent. Although “absolute definiteness” was principally an attempt to characterize (...) non-extendible manifolds and axiom systems, an absolutely definite theory has a unique model and, thus, it is non-forkable and semantically complete. Non-forkability and decidability were formally delimited by Fraenkel and Carnap almost three decades later and, in fact, they mentioned Husserl as precursor of the latter. Therefore, this paper contributes to a reassessment of Husserl’s place in the history of logic. (shrink)

This book offers a historical explanation of important philosophical problems in logic and mathematics, which have been neglected by the official history of modern logic. It offers extensive information on Gottlob Frege’s logic, discussing which aspects of his logic can be considered truly innovative in its revolution against the Aristotelian logic. It presents the work of Hilbert and his associates and followers with the aim of understanding the revolutionary change in the axiomatic method. Moreover, it offers useful tools to understand (...) Tarski’s and Gödel’s work, explaining why the problems they discussed are still unsolved. Finally, the book reports on some of the most influential positions in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, i.e., Maddy’s mathematical naturalism and Shapiro’s mathematical structuralism. Last but not least, the book introduces Biancani’s Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics as this is considered important to understand current philosophical issue in the applications of mathematics. One of the main purposes of the book is to stimulate readers to reconsider the Aristotelian position, which disappeared almost completely from the scene in logic and mathematics in the early twentieth century. (shrink)

We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. (...) This point is illustrated by Carnap’s early semantics and model theory, which he developed within a type theoretical framework and which stand out both for their universalistic treatment and for certain idiosyncratic technicalities by which the construction is supported. One special property is that individuals are context relative in Carnap’s system. This leads to a model theory in which the model domains are more flexible than has been suggested in the literature. (shrink)

Many papers have been devoted to the semantic turn Carnap took in the late 1930s after Tarski had explained to him his method for defining truth and his work on the establishment of scientific semantics. Commentators have often argued that the major turn in Carnap’s approach to languages had already been taken in the Logical Syntax of Language, but they have usually assumed that Carnap was happy to subsequently follow Tarski and adopt Tarskian semantics. In this paper, it is argued (...) that this assumption needs to be qualified and that Carnap was actually far from following Tarski when he decided to complement his syntactic method with a semantic one. Carnap and Tarski had different goals, divergent programs, and dissenting views on truth and semantics. After exploring several possible methods for the explication of logical concepts such as L-truth and L-implication, Carnap opted for definitions based on concepts he had found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Waismann’s work on a logical interpretation of probability. Carnap’s reasons for taking a semantic turn are to be understood in the context of his principle of tolerance. He first hoped he could use Tarski’s technique to recover in the semantic setting the completeness result he had tried to establish in the Logical Syntax. His eventual adoption of non-Tarskian semantics can be accounted for by his program of a logical analysis of science—including empirical science—and his ambition to elaborate a unified logical framework for deductive, inductive, and modal logic, and for explicating analyticity. (shrink)

G. Schiemer has recently ascribed to Carnap the so-called domains-as-fields conception of models, which he subsequently used to defend Carnap’s treatment of extremal axioms against J. Hintikka’s criticism that the number of tuples in a relation, and not the domain of discourse, is optimised in Carnap’s treatment. We will argue by a careful textual analysis, however, that this domains-as-fields conception cannot be applied to Carnap’s early semantics, because it includes a notion of submodel and subrelation that is not only absent (...) from Carnap’s work at that time, but even contradicts it. As a consequence, Schiemer’s defense of Carnap’s extremal axioms against Hintikka’s criticism fails. We will reconcile Carnap’s treatment of extremal axioms and Hintikka’s observation by taking into account the practice of axiomatics in the early twentieth century. If one realises that, in Carnap’s time, a predicate for the domain of discourse was often introduced in the formal theory, and that Carnap defined such predicates from the basic relations of an axiom system, the apparent disagreement between optimising relations and optimising domains disappears. (shrink)

This paper provides a historically sensitive discussion of Carnaps theory will be assessed with respect to two interpretive issues. The first concerns his mathematical sources, that is, the mathematical axioms on which his extremal axioms were based. The second concerns Carnapcompleteness of the modelss different attempts to explicate the extremal properties of a theory and puts his results in context with related metamathematical research at the time.

In Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik and Abriss der Logistik, Carnap attempted to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theories within a single, fully interpreted type-theoretic framework and to investigate a number of meta-logical notions in it, such as those of model, consequence, consistency, completeness, and decidability. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, also in his own considered judgment. A detailed assessment of Carnap’s attempt shows, nevertheless, that his approach is much less confused and hopeless than it has often been made out to (...) be. By providing such a reassessment, the paper contributes to a reevaluation of Carnap’s contributions to the development of modern logic. (shrink)

In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style ofPrincipia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of (...) axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory. (shrink)

Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) was immediately regarded as a clear and faithful presentation of the views of the Vienna Circle to English-speaking readers. Since Ayer wrote this book after his visit to Vienna, where he participated in the meetings of the Circle, one may often hear to this day that he brought logical positivism to England. However, while Ayer’s conception was a form of logical positivism, it significantly differed from its Viennese counterpart(s). The key discrepancies are related to (...) verificationism: this article aims to analyse these discrepancies. It will be claimed that upon his return from Vienna Ayer assumed positions that were no longer, or had never been, held in the Circle: regarding the verification principle, test-statements, phenomenalist reductionism and analyticity. (shrink)