Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science is expressed in his claim that they are not hostile towards each other, i.e., that philosophy is neither for nor against science, though they differ in ambition, strength, and methodology. Their interaction, as this essay suggests, may contribute to the range and diversification of philosophical thinking and to a deeper grasp of the strength and boundary (potential and limitation) of scientific inquiry and knowing. Heidegger’s rethinking of science, especially in his twenty-four (...) “propositions about science”, includes a critical assessment of the status of science in the epoch of modernity; it discerns (discovers, discloses) the truth of science in its relation to the measure of truth in beings, and to the truth of be-ing. The entire inquiry at hand is grounded in be-ing-historical thinking and mindfulness. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article I explore the idea that Heidegger's lectures on The Basic Problems of Phenomenology are of particular importance to our understanding of the relationship between Heidegger and Kant. These lectures can be read as a “historical” commentary on Being and Time. Of course, Heidegger does not present himself as a historian of philosophy, but acts as a philosophical reader of Kant in order to expound the principal ideas of his own philosophy. My central claim is that it is (...) through Kant's philosophy of self-consciousness that Heidegger attempts to provide us with a better understanding of his own conception of self-understanding. (shrink)

Against the consensus that Heidegger reads his own philosophical views into Kant, I argue that Heidegger takes up the main question posed by the first Critique and attempts to identify Kant's best answer to it. Heidegger's method resembles those of Gadamer and Davidson. But by reading the first Critique as offering two conflicting strands of argument, he abandons their aim of maximizing truth, and his theory of error explains why Kant offers the less-promising strand. Heidegger thus provides a distinctive model (...) of charitable, reconstructive interpretation that avoids hermeneutic ventriloquism—a failure to recognize differences of view between interpreter and text. (shrink)