According to Weyl, “‘inexhaustibility’ is essential to the infinite”. However, he distinguishes two kinds of inexhaustible, or merely potential, domains: those that are “extensionally determinate” and those that are not. This article clarifies Weyl's distinction and explains its enduring logical and philosophical significance. The distinction sheds lights on the contemporary debate about potentialism, which in turn affords a deeper understanding of Weyl.

§1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is, in general, to report the state of the art of ordinal analysis and, in particular, the recent success in obtaining an ordinal analysis for the system of-analysis, which is the subsystem of formal second order arithmetic, Z2, with comprehension confined to-formulae. The same techniques can be used to provide ordinal analyses for theories that are reducible to iterated-comprehension, e.g.,-comprehension. The details will be laid out in [28].Ordinal-theoretic proof theory came into existence in (...) 1936, springing forth from Gentzen's head in the course of his consistency proof of arithmetic. Gentzen fostered hopes that with sufficiently large constructive ordinals one could establish the consistency of analysis, i.e., Z2. Considerable progress has been made in proof theory since Gentzen's tragic death on August 4th, 1945, but an ordinal analysis of Z2is still something to be sought. However, for reasons that cannot be explained here,-comprehension appears to be the main stumbling block on the road to understanding full comprehension, giving hope for an ordinal analysis of Z2in the foreseeable future.Roughly speaking,ordinally informativeproof theory attaches ordinals in a recursive representation system to proofs in a given formal system; transformations on proofs to certain canonical forms are then partially mirrored by operations on the associated ordinals. Among other things, ordinal analysis of a formal system serves to characterize its provably recursive ordinals, functions and functionals and can yield both conservation and combinatorial independence results. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program of Friedman and Simpson. We look in particular at: (i) the long arc from Poincar\'e to Feferman as concerns arithmetic definability and provability, (ii) the interplay between finitism and the formalization of analysis in the lecture notes and publications of Hilbert and Bernays, (iii) the uncertainty as to the constructive status of principles equivalent to Weak K\"onig's (...) Lemma, and (iv) the large-scale intellectual backdrop to arithmetical transfinite recursion in descriptive set theory and its effectivization by Borel, Lusin, Addison, and others. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is, in general, to report the state of the art of ordinal analysis and, in particular, the recent success in obtaining an ordinal analysis for the system of -analysis, which is the subsystem of formal second order arithmetic, Z2, with comprehension confined to -formulae. The same techniques can be used to provide ordinal analyses for theories that are reducible to iterated -comprehension, e.g., -comprehension. The details will be laid out in [28].Ordinal-theoretic proof theory (...) came into existence in 1936, springing forth from Gentzen's head in the course of his consistency proof of arithmetic. Gentzen fostered hopes that with sufficiently large constructive ordinals one could establish the consistency of analysis, i.e., Z2. Considerable progress has been made in proof theory since Gentzen's tragic death on August 4th, 1945, but an ordinal analysis of Z2 is still something to be sought. However, for reasons that cannot be explained here, -comprehension appears to be the main stumbling block on the road to understanding full comprehension, giving hope for an ordinal analysis of Z2 in the foreseeable future.Roughly speaking, ordinally informative proof theory attaches ordinals in a recursive representation system to proofs in a given formal system; transformations on proofs to certain canonical forms are then partially mirrored by operations on the associated ordinals. Among other things, ordinal analysis of a formal system serves to characterize its provably recursive ordinals, functions and functionals and can yield both conservation and combinatorial independence results. (shrink)

Constructive and intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theories are axiomatic theories of sets in the style of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) which are based on intuitionistic logic. They were introduced in the 1970's and they represent a formal context within which to codify mathematics based on intuitionistic logic. They are formulated on the basis of the standard first order language of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and make no direct use of inherently constructive ideas. In working in constructive and intuitionistic ZF we can thus (...) to some extent rely on our familiarity with ZF and its heuristics. -/- Notwithstanding the similarities with classical set theory, the concepts of set defined by constructive and intuitionistic set theories differ considerably from that of the classical tradition; they also differ from each other. The techniques utilised to work within them, as well as to obtain metamathematical results about them, also diverge in some respects from the classical tradition because of their commitment to intuitionistic logic. In fact, as is common in intuitionistic settings, a plethora of semantic and proof-theoretic methods are available for the study of constructive and intuitionistic set theories. -/- The entry introduces the main features of Constructive and Intuitionistic ZF and offers links to the relevant bibliography. (shrink)

Apologies. The purpose of the following talk is to give an overview of the present state of aims, methods and results in Pure Proof Theory. Shortage of time forces me to concentrate on my very personal views. This entails that I will emphasize the work which I know best, i.e., work that has been done in the triangle Stanford, Munich and Münster. I am of course well aware that there are as important results coming from outside this triangle and I (...) apologize for not displaying these results as well.Moreover the audience should be aware that in some points I have to oversimplify matters. Those who complain about that are invited to consult the original papers.1.1. General. Proof theory startedwithHilbert's Programme which aimed at a finitistic consistency proof for mathematics.By Gödel's Theorems, however, we know that we can neither formalize all mathematics nor even prove the consistency of formalized fragments by finitistic means. Inspite of this fact I want to give some reasons why I consider proof theory in the style of Gentzen's work still as an important and exciting field of Mathematical Logic. I will not go into applications of Gentzen's cut-elimination technique to computer science problems—this may be considered as applied proof theory—but want to concentrate on metamathematical problems and results. In this sense I am talking about Pure Proof Theory.Mathematicians are interested in structures. There is only one way to find the theorems of a structure. Start with an axiom system for the structure and deduce the theorems logically. These axiom systems are the objects of proof-theoretical research. Studying axiom systems there is a series of more or less obvious questions. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is, in general, to report the state of the art of ordinal analysis and, in particular, the recent success in obtaining an ordinal analysis for the system of-analysis, which is the subsystem of formal second order arithmetic, Z2, with comprehension confined to-formulae. The same techniques can be used to provide ordinal analyses for theories that are reducible to iterated-comprehension, e.g.,-comprehension. The details will be laid out in [28].Ordinal-theoretic proof theory came into existence in (...) 1936, springing forth from Gentzen's head in the course of his consistency proof of arithmetic. Gentzen fostered hopes that with sufficiently large constructive ordinals one could establish the consistency of analysis, i.e., Z2. Considerable progress has been made in proof theory since Gentzen's tragic death on August 4th, 1945, but an ordinal analysis of Z2is still something to be sought. However, for reasons that cannot be explained here,-comprehension appears to be the main stumbling block on the road to understanding full comprehension, giving hope for an ordinal analysis of Z2in the foreseeable future.Roughly speaking,ordinally informativeproof theory attaches ordinals in a recursive representation system to proofs in a given formal system; transformations on proofs to certain canonical forms are then partially mirrored by operations on the associated ordinals. Among other things, ordinal analysis of a formal system serves to characterize its provably recursive ordinals, functions and functionals and can yield both conservation and combinatorial independence results. (shrink)

According to the implicit commitment thesis, once accepting a mathematical formal system S, one is implicitly committed to additional resources not immediately available in S. Traditionally, this thesis has been understood as entailing that, in accepting S, we are bound to accept reflection principles for S and therefore claims in the language of S that are not derivable in S itself. It has recently become clear, however, that such reading of the implicit commitment thesis cannot be compatible with well-established positions (...) in the foundations of mathematics which consider a specific theory S as self-justifying and doubt the legitimacy of any principle that is not derivable in S: examples are Tait’s finitism and the role played in it by Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, Isaacson’s thesis and Peano Arithmetic, Nelson’s ultrafinitism and sub-exponential arithmetical systems. This casts doubts on the very adequacy of the implicit commitment thesis for arithmetical theories. In the paper we show that such foundational standpoints are nonetheless compatible with the implicit commitment thesis. We also show that they can even be compatible with genuine soundness extensions of S with suitable form of reflection. The analysis we propose is as follows: when accepting a system S, we are bound to accept a fixed set of principles extending S and expressing minimal soundness requirements for S, such as the fact that the non-logical axioms of S are true. We call this invariant component the semantic core of implicit commitment. But there is also a variable component of implicit commitment that crucially depends on the justification given for our acceptance of S in which, for instance, may or may not appear reflection principles for S. We claim that the proposed framework regulates in a natural and uniform way our acceptance of different arithmetical theories. (shrink)

Recent work on formal theories of truth has revived an approach, due originally to Tarski, on which syntax and truth theories are sharply distinguished—‘disentangled’—from mathematical base theories. In this paper, we defend a novel philosophical constraint on disentangled theories. We argue that these theories must be epistemically stable: they must possess an intrinsic motivation justifying no strictly stronger theory. In a disentangled setting, even if the base and the syntax theory are individually stable, they may be jointly unstable. We contend (...) that this flaw afflicts many proposals discussed in the literature; we defend a new, stable disentangled theory, double second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

Apologies. The purpose of the following talk is to give an overview of the present state of aims, methods and results in Pure Proof Theory. Shortage of time forces me to concentrate on my very personal views. This entails that I will emphasize the work which I know best, i.e., work that has been done in the triangle Stanford, Munich and Münster. I am of course well aware that there are as important results coming from outside this triangle and I (...) apologize for not displaying these results as well.Moreover the audience should be aware that in some points I have to oversimplify matters. Those who complain about that are invited to consult the original papers.1.1. General. Proof theory startedwithHilbert's Programme which aimed at a finitistic consistency proof for mathematics.By Gödel's Theorems, however, we know that we can neither formalize all mathematics nor even prove the consistency of formalized fragments by finitistic means. Inspite of this fact I want to give some reasons why I consider proof theory in the style of Gentzen's work still as an important and exciting field of Mathematical Logic. I will not go into applications of Gentzen's cut-elimination technique to computer science problems—this may be considered as applied proof theory—but want to concentrate on metamathematical problems and results. In this sense I am talking about Pure Proof Theory.Mathematicians are interested in structures. There is only one way to find the theorems of a structure. Start with an axiom system for the structure and deduce the theorems logically. These axiom systems are the objects of proof-theoretical research. Studying axiom systems there is a series of more or less obvious questions. (shrink)