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Grammar and Grammatical Statements

Severin Schroeder

In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 252–268 (2017)

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The “grammatical” nature of Wittgenstein's private language investigation.Francis Y. Lin - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (2):139-163.details In this paper, I examine the grammatical nature of Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA). On my interpretation, the definition of private language implies that the private speaker has no natural expressions for his sensations. This in turn implies that he has no criterion of correctness for using his sensation‐words. This then implies, together with the grammatical rule that a word is senseless without a criterion of correctness for its use, that private sensation‐words are senseless, and hence also that private language (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Wittgenstein on the impossibility of following a rule only once.Francis Y. Lin - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1):134-154.details ABSTRACTWittgenstein’s remark that one cannot follow a rule only once has generated two puzzles: how can everyone accept it to be true? and why does Wittgenstein advance it? These two puzzles have tormented commentators for decades. In this paper I put forward a new interpretation and explain away the two puzzles. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remark is plain truth and that his motivation behind making it is to dissolve the picture theory of meaning propounded in the Tractatus. This interpretation (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Rationality, Reasons, Rules.Brad Hooker - 2022 - In Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb & Eva Schmidt (eds.), Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock. New York: Routledge. pp. 275-290.details H.-J. Glock has made important contributions to discussions of rationality, reasons, and rules. This chapter addresses four conceptions of rationality that Glock identifies. One of these conceptions of rationality is that rationality consists in responsiveness to reasons. This chapter goes on to consider the idea that reasons became prominent in normative ethics because of their usefulness in articulating moral pluralism. The final section of the chapter connects reasons and rules and contends that both are ineliminable. Download Export citation Bookmark
Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Mental State.Francis Y. Lin - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (4):367-395.details In trying to make clear whether understanding is a mental state Wittgenstein asks a series of questions about the timing and duration of understanding. These questions are awkward, and they have posed a great challenge for commentators. In this paper I review the interpretations by Mole and by Baker and Hacker, and point out their problems. I then offer a new interpretation which shows (1) that a “mental state” in this context means a state of consciousness, (2) that Wittgenstein's questions (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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