Against the background of current debates on the topic of ‘academic freedom’, this article analyses the relationship between academic freedom and truth as found in the philosophical approaches of Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger and Karsten Schubert (et al.). The aim is to show that the two concepts – despite different interpretations and accentuations – are mutually dependent for all authors and are correlated with the dimension of the political. In Kant’s work – as later in the system of the 1949 (...) German constitution – academic freedom and the neutral finding of truth refer to each other and form the basis for a counter-public. Heidegger links the freedom and ‘self-determination’ of the university to a ‘higher’ power and truth, thus preparing the ground for a comprehensive politicisation of the sciences. With a similar, but emancipatory intention Schubert links a ‘critical’ academic freedom to a material concept of truth, which here is given attributes such as ‘strong’ and ‘robust’ and is intended to do justice to the ‘standpoints’ of ‘affected people’. (shrink)