Despite the availability of safe vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, some people will remain vulnerable because they will not be vaccinated. Who are these non-vaccinated people? We can distinguish two groups: (i) persons who cannot be vaccinated for clinical reasons and who, despite having been vaccinated, have not achieved immunity; (ii) persons who voluntarily refuse to get vaccinated. These groups have in common an immune system that will make them vulnerable to COVID-19. The reasons for their vulnerability and the ethical judgment they (...) deserve are different; the solutions offered to them are also different. In the case of those who voluntarily avoid vaccination, States are not compromised to introduce new protective policies. In the case of people who remain involuntarily vulnerable, instead, the response should be articulated on the same rules and principles that inform the social model of disability because they will live with an organic disability. (shrink)

This paper offers an ethical consideration of how fear can be a tool of agents, used to deliberately shift people away from existing beliefs, commitments, or habits, or towards new ones. It contends that properly understanding the ethical dimensions of such uses of fear depends in part on a clear understanding of the dynamics of disorientation that can be involved in such uses. Section two begins with a clarification of the connections between fear, orientation, and disorientation. It suggests that experiences (...) of fear are in some cases either orienting or disorienting, and that the disorienting aspects of fear are in need of more attention. Section three shows how experiences of fear can be tools—they can be cultivated and wielded by agents deliberately for multiple reasons, including sometimes in order to disorient or re-orient others. Section four turns to a moral evaluation of these uses of fear, attending specifically to why the dynamics of disorientation and orientation often involved in experiences of fear are important for understanding the moral status of uses of fear. (shrink)

This article argues that it is possible to act paternalistically towards future people, as long as the following requirements are met: the act/choice is not such that it will prevent the future person from coming into existence; the action/choice is such that it can be taken by the future person herself without significant disadvantage to her; and the act/choice is not such that there is significant uncertainty at the time of choice about the preferences of the future person. I argue (...) that the possibility of acting paternalistically towards future people is of practical as well as theoretical importance. This is true since some of the policies we might choose to pursue on behalf of future people are paternalistic, in particular constitutional policies implemented because we do not trust future people to choose wisely. I end the paper by pointing out why it is valuable to approach intergenerational issues through both the paternalistic prism and the prism of theories of justice. (shrink)