The historiography of immunology since 1999 is reviewed, in part as a response to claims by historians such as Thomas Söderqvist the field was still immature at the time. First addressed are the difficulties, past and present, surrounding the disciplinary definition of immunology, which is followed by a commentary on the recent scholarship devoted to the concept of the immune self. The new literature on broad immunological topics is examined and assessed, and specific charges leveled against the paucity of certain (...) types of histories, e.g. biographical and institutional histories, are evaluated. In conclusion, there are compelling indications that the history of immunology has moved past the initial tentative stages identified in the earlier reviews to become a bustling, pluripotent discipline, much like the subject of its scrutiny, and that it continues to develop in many new and exciting directions. (shrink)

[Przekład] W artykule dokonano przeglądu historiografii immunologii od 1999 roku, co w pewnym stopniu jest odpowiedzią na stanowisko takich historyków jak Thomas Söderqvist, którzy twierdzili, że to pole badawcze nie było wówczas dość rozwinięte (Söderqvist i Stillwell). Najpierw wskazano przeszłe i teraźniejsze problemy, które historiografia ma ze zdefiniowaniem immunologii, a następnie skomentowano ostatnie studia nad pojęciem immunologicznego „ja”. W dalszym toku przeglądu przeanalizowano i oceniono nowe publikacje poświęcone zróżnicowanym zagadnieniom immunologii oraz niektóre charakterystyczne oskarżenia formułowane wobec niedostatku pewnych dziedzin historii, (...) na przykład historii biograficznych i historii instytucji. W podsumowaniu przedstawiono konkurujące ze sobą kierunki, w których rozwinęła się historia immunologii, wychodząc poza wstępne, tymczasowe stadia uchwycone w poprzednim przeglądzie, i stając się wielogłosową, pluripotencjalną dyscypliną, podobną do przedmiotu jej badań. Pokazano też, że historia immunologii nadal rozwija się na wiele nowych i ekscytujących sposobów. (shrink)

Evelyn Fox Keller wrote first biography of the Nobel Prize winning geneticist Barbara McClintock in which Keller discussed how McClintock felt being rejected by her peers in the 1950s because she questioned the dominant idea of the particulate gene and instead proposed that the genetic material jumped positions on the chromosome which indicated that the gene did not control but was controlled by the cellular environment. Keller’s story of McClintock’s life is an account of a woman scientist’s conception of science (...) and how her unorthodox views isolated her from the main stream science. Keller’s biography was read by many in a way that made McClintock a feminist icon by showing how women scientists “see” scientific objects differently and how their science is holistic and hence radically different from the reductionism of male-dominated science. The second biographer Nathaniel Comfort calls this story a myth. In his detailed intellectual biography, Comfort embarks on an energetic journey to separate fact from fiction to dismantle what he calls the McClintock myth. The difference between two biographers is not entirely about evidences or about separating fact from fiction but about their adoption of two contrasting paradigms of scientist’s subjectivity: Keller foregrounds McClintock’s affective self and Comfort her rational. In this commentary I have closely and comparatively read both biographies to revisit Keller’s “myth” and Comfort’s “truth” and to provide yet another interpretation of McClintock’s life and work from the perspective of object relations theories in psychoanalysis. Instead of figuring out the extent to which the myth bears truth as Comfort does, I have asked questions: How and why this private myth was in the making throughout McClintock’s life and work? How this private myth was related to the making of her science? By using developmental psychoanalytical approach, I show that what Comfort calls McClintock’s private myth was not something that was partly fictional and hence incorrect or wrong but it emerged from a deeply and compellingly affective place in McClintock’s life. This so called myth was integral to and fundamentally formative of who she was, a woman and a scientist, and that this myth formatively shaped McClintock’s relationship with science’s objects and science’s subjects. This commentary aims to show the relevance and usefulness of psychoanalytical theories for understanding scientific subjectivities and provides a revision to the neo-Kantian idea of scientist subject—a unified and wilful, self-determined, self-regulated, active, autonomous, and rational subject wilfully driven by social and scientific ethos—generally popular among historians of science. (shrink)