I argue that Plato distinguishes between personal immortality and immortality of the soul. I begin by criticizing the consensus view that Plato identifies the person and the soul. I then turn to the issue of immortality. By considering passages from 'Symposium' and 'Timaeus', I make the case that Plato thinks that while the soul is immortal by nature, if a person is going to be immortal, they must become so. Finally, I argue that Plato has a psychological continuity approach to (...) personal identity. Thus, for Plato, a person becomes immortal by avoiding reincarnation and securing for themselves psychological continuity forever. (shrink)

8000 Word annotated bibliography on the Phaedo, with roughly 70 entries. Note that the subscription version is a bit easier to navigate. The hyperlinks work in this pdf, but you can not as easily jump to the different sections.

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper discusses two debated questions about how best to interpret the contribution to the Symposium that Socrates pretends to derive from Diotima: Within the Lesser Mysteries, is the erōs that is being defined and characterized, with appeal to the notion of “generation in beauty”, a generic erōs that is equivalent to Socratic desire in general, or a specific erōs that is erotic in our sense? Within the Greater Mysteries, is interpersonal erōs maintained, or supplanted? I find that neither answer (...) to unproblematic, but argue that either can be reconciled with the text, and suggest that both leave open the really interesting questions. I then, in answer to, concede that there are radical shifts of focus, but conclude that it is most likely that interpersonal erōs has a continuing role in, eventually, making the lover worthy of “becoming dear to the gods and, if any man can, immortal himself also”. Here I appeal especially to the phrase “ungrudging philosophy”, taking it to signify an activity that is not kept to oneself, but shared with another. (shrink)

Resumen:Este artículo se propone mostrar, en contra de las interpretaciones dominantes, que Platón debió tempranamente postular la supervivencia del alma como un sujeto independiente de daño y beneficio moral con el objeto de completar su defensa de la ética socrática - en particular el principio de Soberanía de la Virtud, central en diálogos tempranos como la Apología, el Critón y el Gorgias. Al dualismo metafísico que resulta de este postulado le denomino ‘dualismo socrático’, para diferenciarlo del dualismo maduro expuesto por (...) Platón en el Fedón.Palabras clave: alma; beneficio; cuerpo; daño; dualismo; ética; Sócrates; supervivencia; virtud. (shrink)