The aim of the paper is to point out the modelling choices that lead to different systems of deontic action logic. A kind of a roadmap is presented. On the one hand it can help the reader to find the deontic logic appropriate for an intended application relying on the information considering the way in which a deontic logic represents actions and how it characterises deontic properties in relation to (the representation of) actions. On the other hand it is a (...) guideline how to build a deontic action logic which satisfies the desired properties. (shrink)

In the paper we present a formal system motivated by a specific methodology of creating norms. According to the methodology, a norm-giver before establishing a set of norms should create a picture of the agent by creating his repertoire of actions. Then, knowing what the agent can do in particular situations, the norm-giver regulates these actions by assigning deontic qualifications to each of them. The set of norms created for each situation should respect (1) generally valid deontic principles being the (...) theses of our logic and (2) facts from the ontology of action whose relevance for the systems of norms we postulate. (shrink)

Reasoning about change is a central issue in research on human and robot planning. We study an approach to reasoning about action and change in a dynamic logic setting and provide a solution to problems which are related to the Frame problem. Unlike most work on the frame problem the logic described in this paper is monotonic. It (implicitly) allows for the occurrence of actions of multiple agents by introducing non-stationary notions of waiting and test. The need to state a (...) large number of frame axioms is alleviated by introducing a concept of chronological preservation to dynamic logic. As a side effect, this concept permits the encoding of temporal properties in a natural way. We compare the relative merits of our approach and non-monotonic approaches as regards different aspects of the frame problem. Technically, we show that the resulting extended systems of propositional dynamic logic preserve (weak) completeness, finite model property and decidability. (shrink)

Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 3(4), 535–553. Segerberg, K. (1995). Conditional action. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas, & A. Herzig (Eds.), Conditionals: From philosophy to computer science, Studies ...

This paper presents an abstract-algebraic formulation of action facilitating reasoning about two opposing agents. Two dual nondeterministic choice operators are formulated abstract-algebraically: angelic (or user) choice and demonic (or system) choice. Iteration operators are also defined. As an application, Hoare-style correctness rules are established by means of the algebra. A negation operator is also discussed.

This article provides an overview of development of Kripke semantics for logics determined by information systems. The proposals are made to extend the standard Kripke structures to the structures based on information systems. The underlying logics are defined and problems of their axiomatization are discussed. Several open problems connected with the logics are formulated. Logical aspects of incompleteness of information provided by information systems are considered.

The aim of this paper is to make a critical assessment of Krister Segerberg''s theory of action. The first part gives a critical presentation of the key concepts in Segerberg''s informal theory of action. These are the ideas that motivate the formal models he develops. In the second part it is argued that if one takes all of Segerberg''s motivating ideas seriously, problems are forthcoming. The main problem is that on this theory the agents seem to be bound to realize (...) all of their intentions, a problem that stems from Segerberg''s attempt to individuate actions in terms of the agent''s intentions. On the ground that this unfortunate result is forthcoming in both of Segerberg''s approaches to the logic of action it is concluded that the conceptual basis of the theory is problematic. (shrink)

Action theory may be regarded as a theoretical foundation of AI, because it provides in a logically coherent way the principles of performing actions by agents. But, more importantly, action theory offers a formal ontology mainly based on set-theoretic constructs. This ontology isolates various types of actions as structured entities: atomic, sequential, compound, ordered, situational actions etc., and it is a solid and non-removable foundation of any rational activity. The paper is mainly concerned with a bunch of issues centered around (...) the notion of performability of actions. It seems that the problem of performability of actions, though of basic importance for purely practical applications, has not been investigated in the literature in a systematic way thus far. This work, being a companion to the book as reported, elaborates the theory of performability of actions based on relational models and formal constructs borrowed from formal lingusistics. The discussion of performability of actions is encapsulated in the form of a strict logical system. This system is semantically defined in terms of its intended models in which the role of actions of various types is accentuated. Since due to the nature of compound actions the system is not finitary, other semantic variants of are defined. The focus in on the system of performability of finite compound actions. An adequate axiom system for is defined. The strong completeness theorem is the central result. The role of the canonical model in the proof of the completeness theorem is highlighted. The relationship between performability of actions and dynamic logic is also discussed. (shrink)