Results for 'Krister Segerberg'

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  1. Modal Logic and Philosophy.Sten Lindström & Krister Segerberg - 2007 - In Patrick Blackburn, Johan van Benthem & Frank Wolter (eds.), Handbook of Modal Logic. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Elsevier. pp. 1149-1214.
    Modal logic is one of philosophy’s many children. As a mature adult it has moved out of the parental home and is nowadays straying far from its parent. But the ties are still there: philosophy is important to modal logic, modal logic is important for philosophy. Or, at least, this is a thesis we try to defend in this chapter. Limitations of space have ruled out any attempt at writing a survey of all the work going on in our field—a (...)
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  2. Deontic Logics Based on Boolean Algebra.Pablo F. Castro & Piotr Kulicki - forthcoming - In Robert Trypuz (ed.), Krister Segerberg on Logic of Actions. Springer.
    Deontic logic is devoted to the study of logical properties of normative predicates such as permission, obligation and prohibition. Since it is usual to apply these predicates to actions, many deontic logicians have proposed formalisms where actions and action combinators are present. Some standard action combinators are action conjunction, choice between actions and not doing a given action. These combinators resemble boolean operators, and therefore the theory of boolean algebra offers a well-known athematical framework to study the properties of the (...)
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  3. DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
    The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal logical (...)
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  4. On the Proper Treatment of Quantification in Contexts of Logical and Metaphysical Modalities.Sten Lindström - 2006 - In Henrik Lagerlund, Sten Lindström & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53. pp. 305-323.
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  5. Completeness and Correspondence in Chellas–Segerberg Semantics.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):891-911.
    We investigate a lattice of conditional logics described by a Kripke type semantics, which was suggested by Chellas and Segerberg – Chellas–Segerberg (CS) semantics – plus 30 further principles. We (i) present a non-trivial frame-based completeness result, (ii) a translation procedure which gives one corresponding trivial frame conditions for arbitrary formula schemata, and (iii) non-trivial frame conditions in CS semantics which correspond to the 30 principles.
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  6. Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL.Sten Lindström & Wiodek Rabinowicz - 1997 - In Lars Lindahl, Paul Needham & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), For Good Measure. Uppsala, Sverige:
    In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality (...)
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  7.  77
    Belief Change for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.
    We discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) for introspective agents: agents who have the ability to form higher-order beliefs. Such agents can reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such a logic, full DDL or DDL unlimited, is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the agent's own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective agent learns more about (...)
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  8.  48
    Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility, by Elinor Mason. [REVIEW]Gunnar Björnsson & Krister Bykvist - forthcoming - Mind:fzaa010.
    Ways to be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility, by MasonElinor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. viii + 227.
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  9.  30
    Reply to Bykvist and Olson.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (3):347-349.
    Reply to Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson's review of Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in Utilitas.
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  10.  15
    The Knowledge Norm of Belief.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43-50.
    Doxastic normativism is the thesis that norms are constitutive of or essential to belief, such that no mental state not subject to those norms counts as a belief. A common normativist view is that belief is essentially governed by a norm of truth. According to Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi, truth norms for belief cannot be formulated without unpalatable consequences: they are either false or they impose unsatisfiable requirements on believers. I propose that we construe the fundamental norm of (...)
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