Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Can an AI-carebot be filial? Reflections from Confucian ethics.Kathryn Muyskens, Yonghui Ma & Michael Dunn - forthcoming - Nursing Ethics.
    This article discusses the application of artificially intelligent robots within eldercare and explores a series of ethical considerations, including the challenges that AI (Artificial Intelligence) technology poses to traditional Chinese Confucian filial piety. From the perspective of Confucian ethics, the paper argues that robots cannot adequately fulfill duties of care. Due to their detachment from personal relationships and interactions, the “emotions” of AI robots are merely performative reactions in different situations, rather than actual emotional abilities. No matter how “humanized” robots (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Revisiting the ought implies can dictum in light of disruptive medical innovation.Michiel De Proost & Seppe Segers - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (7):466-470.
    It is a dominant dictum in ethics that ‘ought implies can’ (OIC): if an agent morally ought to do an action, the agent must be capable of performing that action. Yet, with current technological developments, such as in direct-to-consumer genomics, big data analytics and wearable technologies, there may be reasons to reorient this ethical principle. It is our modest aim in this article to explore how the current wave of allegedly disruptive innovation calls for a renewed interest for this dictum. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • ‘False hope’ in assisted reproduction: the normative significance of the external outlook and moral negotiation.Dorian Accoe & Seppe Segers - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (3):181-184.
    Despite the frequent invocation of ‘false hope’ and possible related moral concerns in the context of assisted reproduction technologies, a focused ethical and conceptual problematisation of this concept seems to be lacking. We argue that an invocation of ‘false hope’ only makes sense if the fulfilment of a desired outcome (eg, a successful fertility treatment) is impossible, and if it is attributed from an external perspective. The evaluation incurred by this third party may foreclose a given perspective from being an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation