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The chain store paradox

Theory and Decision 9 (2):127-159 (1978)

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  1. Imagination in Action.Philipp Dorstewitz - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):385-405.
    Recent interest in phenomena of simulation, pretense, and play has given rise to new philosophical debates on the basic structure of human action and action planning. Some philosophers sought to transform Hume's desire-belief-action model by sophisticating its basic structure. For example, they introduced “hypothetical world boxes” or imaginary “i-desires” and “i-beliefs” into the standard model, in order to account for the representational and motivational structures of imaginary scripts. Others used phenomena of behavior driven by imagination to attempt a more fundamental (...)
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  • Is consequentialism better regarded as a form of reasoning or as a pattern of behavior?Steve Fuller - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-17.
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  • Jonathan Baron, consequentialism and error theory.Sanford S. Levy - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):22-23.
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  • No chain store paradox.Lawrence H. Davis - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (2):139-144.
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  • (1 other version)Environmental ethics and information asymmetry among organizational stakeholders.Subodh P. Kulkarni - 2000 - Journal of Business Ethics 28 (4):215 - 228.
    This paper addresses the conflicting environmental interests of a firm and the community, an important stakeholder. The short-term profit maximization objective of a firm may stand in contrast with what the community wants – a "safe and clean environment". This paper argues that the information regarding the environmental impact of a firm's products, processes, and waste may be asymmetrically distributed between the firm and the community. The resultant information asymmetry may influence the probability of a firm acting opportunistically, and ultimately, (...)
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  • Money-Pump Arguments.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Suppose that you prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. Your preferences violate Expected Utility Theory by being cyclic. Money-pump arguments offer a way to show that such violations are irrational. Suppose that you start with A. Then you should be willing to trade A for C and then C for B. But then, once you have B, you are offered a trade back to A for a small cost. Since you prefer A to B, you (...)
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  • Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2016 - Mind:fzv218.
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  • Intentional time inconsistency.Agah R. Turan - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (1):41-64.
    We propose a theoretical model to explain the usage of time-inconsistent behavior as a strategy to exploit others when reputation and trust have secondary effects on the economic outcome. We consider two agents with time-consistent preferences exploiting common resources. Supposing that an agent is believed to have time-inconsistent preferences with probability p, we analyze whether she uses this misinformation when she has the opportunity to use it. Using the model originally provided by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11(1):322–334, 1980), (...)
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  • Honor and Violence.John Thrasher & Toby Handfield - 2018 - Human Nature 29 (4):371-389.
    We present a theory of honor violence as a form of costly signaling. Two types of honor violence are identified: revenge and purification. Both types are amenable to a signaling analysis whereby the violent behavior is a signal that can be used by out-groups to draw inferences about the nature of the signaling group, thereby helping to solve perennial problems of social cooperation: deterrence and assurance. The analysis shows that apparently gratuitous acts of violence can be part of a system (...)
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  • THE IMAGINATIVE REHEARSAL MODEL – DEWEY, EMBODIED SIMULATION, AND THE NARRATIVE HYPOTHESIS.Italo Testa - 2017 - Pragmatism Today 8 (1):105-112.
    In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct (...)
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  • Modeling Rational Players: Part I.Ken Binmore - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179-214.
    Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can (...)
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  • Goals, values and benefits.Frederic Schick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-29.
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  • Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to (...)
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  • Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem.Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):263-289.
    A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem). Since there is no known endpoint in (...)
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  • Deterrence Games for the 21st Century : Representation, Theory and Evidence.Karl Sörenson - 2022 - Dissertation, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm
    Deterrence is the backbone of military strategy. Dissuading an opponent from taking a specific action by threat of violence is the definition of deterrence. From the outset of the Cold War there has been a strong link between the study of deterrence and game theoretic analysis. There are compelling epistemic reasons for studying deterrence as a game. By doing so, the strategic interaction between actors is placed at the centre of the analysis, mapping the possible outcomes and revealing the strategies (...)
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  • A Decision Theorist’s Bhagavad Gita.Harald Wiese - 2016 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 33 (1):117-136.
    We analyze and interpret the Bhagavad Gītā from the point of view of decision theory. Arjuna asks Krishna for help in his decision of whether to fight or not. Broadly speaking, Arjuna prefers consequentialist arguments, while Krishna stresses the warrior’s svadharma. In doing so, Krishna can be considered to suggest a “new” twist on the standard decision model, in line with reason-based theories of choice. We also argue that Krishna’s svadharmic point of view can fruitfully be seen as an example (...)
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  • Multiple rounds in a chain store game.Michael Melles & Rainer Nitsche - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):571-579.
    In textbook models of reputation, a number of entry games are played sequentially. A multimarket incumbent—the chain store—deters entry of “early” small entrants with a threat of predation. In the last markets of the game, entry occurs stochastically. We show that this stochastic entry is due to a restrictive assumption and vanishes if entrants that initially decided to stay out are allowed to reconsider their decision following entry elsewhere.
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  • Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):975-1022.
    Probably many people have cyclic preferences: they prefer A to B, B to C and C to A for some objects of choice A, B and C. Recent work has resurrected the objection to cyclic preference that agents possessing them are open to exploitation by means of ‘money pumps’. The paper briefly reviews this work and proposes a general approach to problems of sequential choice that makes cyclic preference immune to exploitation by means of these new mechanisms.
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  • On begging the question when naturalizing norms.Leonard D. Katz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-22.
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  • Some examples of nonconsequentialist decisions.Gerald M. Phillips - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):25-26.
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  • Why care where moral intuitions come from?Susan Dwyer - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):14-15.
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  • A Simplified Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games.Bernard Walliser - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (2):163.
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  • Paradoxes of Rationality.Cristina Bicchieri - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):65-79.
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  • (1 other version)Agent connectedness and backward induction.Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann - unknown
    We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that species setup, reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent connectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent connectedness measures the extent to which agents' choices are sequentially stable. Thus describing dynamic games allows to more fully understand strategic interaction over time. In particular, we provide suffcient conditions (...)
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  • Bounded rationality.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):534–563.
    The notion of bounded rationality has recently gained considerable popularity in the behavioural and social sciences. This article surveys the different usages of the term, in particular the way ‘anomalosus’ behavioural phenomena are elicited, how these phenomena are incorporated in model building, and what sort of new theories of behaviour have been developed to account for bounded rationality in choice and in deliberation. It also discusses the normative relevance of bounded rationality, in particular as a justifier of non‐standard reasoning and (...)
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  • Instinctive and cognitive reasoning: A study of response times.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and game situations at gametheory.tau.ac.il. Several thousand observations were collected and the response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences in response time across responses. It is suggested that choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of cognitive reasoning.
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  • Gestalt Justice. The Fusion of Emotion and Cognition in the Gestalt View of Justice.Ekkehart Schlicht - unknown
    The Gestalt view of ethics, as developed by the Gestalt psychologists in the middle of the 20th century, led to a particular theory of justice which avoided the shortcomings of other approaches. It took the rules of justice as being based ultimately on the fundamental laws of our psychological make-up.
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  • Departing from consequentialism versus departing from decision theory.Frank Jackson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-21.
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  • Do, or should, all human decisions conform to the norms of a consumer-oriented culture?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):12-13.
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  • Consequentialism and utility theory.Deborah Frisch - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-16.
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  • The chain-store paradox revisited.Walter Trockel - 1986 - Theory and Decision 21 (2):163-179.
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  • Inconsistencies in extensive games.Martin Dufwenberg & Johan Lindén - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):103 - 114.
    In certain finite extensive games with perfect information, Cristina Bicchieri (1989) derives a logical contradiction from the assumptions that players are rational and that they have common knowledge of the theory of the game. She argues that this may account for play outside the Nash equilibrium. She also claims that no inconsistency arises if the players have the minimal beliefs necessary to perform backward induction. We here show that another contradiction can be derived even with minimal beliefs, so there is (...)
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  • A Misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality.Karl Sörenson - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):575-591.
    Contemporary theories of deterrence place a strong emphasis on coherency between model and theory. Schelling’s contention of irrational threats for successful deterrence abandons the rationality assumption to explain how a player can deter, thereby departing from the standard game theoretic solution concepts. It is a misfit model in relation to a deterrence theory and, therefore, excluded. The article defends and remodels Schelling’s intuition by employing the level-k model. It is shown that an unsophisticated player that randomizes over its strategies brings (...)
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  • Modeling Rational Players: Part II.Ken Binmore - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):9-55.
    This is the second part of a two-part paper. It can be read independently of the first part provided that the reader is prepared to go along with the unorthodox views on game theory which were advanced in Part I and are summarized below. The body of the paper is an attempt to study some of the positive implications of such a viewpoint. This requires an exploration of what is involved in modeling “rational players” as computing machines.
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  • Truth or consequences.John Heil - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):19-20.
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  • Fairness to policies, distinctions and intuitions.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):10-11.
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  • Normative and descriptive consequentialism.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):15-16.
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  • (1 other version)What is This Thing called.Christopher W. Morris - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):87-102.
    Concern for one's "reputation" has been introduced in recent game theory enabling theorists to demonstrate the rationality ofcooperative behavior in certain contexts. And these impressive results have been generalized to a variety of situations studied bystudents of business and business ethicists. But it is not clear that the notion of reputation employed has much explanatory power onceone sees what is meant. I also suggest that there may be some larger lessons about the notion of rationality used by decision theorists.
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  • Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem.Ken Binmore - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):248-261.
    Robert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.
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  • In Search of Lost Deterrence – Two essays on deterrence and the models employed to study the phenomenon.Karl Sörenson - unknown
    To deter is central for strategic thinking. Some of the more astute observations regarding the dynamics of deterrence were made during the Cold War by game theorists. This set the stage for how deterrence has come to be studied. A strong methodological element like the research on deterrence’s reliance on game theory requires examination in order to understand what sort of knowledge it actually yields. What sort of knowledge does one acquire when deterrence is viewed through game theoretic models? How (...)
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  • The Backward Induction Controversy as a Metaphorical Problem.Ramzi Mabsout - 2018 - Economic Thought 7 (1):24.
    The backward induction controversy in game theory flared up and then practically ended within a decade – the 1990s. The protagonists, however, did not converge on an agreement about the source of the controversy. Why was this the case, if opposing sides had access to the same modelling techniques and empirical facts? In this paper I offer an explanation for this controversy and its unsettled end. The answer is not to be found in the modelling claims made by the opposing (...)
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  • The consequences of taking consequentialism seriously.Philip E. Tetlock - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):31-32.
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  • Inappropriate judgements: Slips, mistakes or violations?Peter Ayton & Nigel Harvey - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):12-12.
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  • Moral errors.Clark Glymour - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):17-18.
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  • Nonconsequentialist decisions.Jonathan Baron - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):1-10. Translated by Jonathan Baron.
    According to a simple form of consequentialism, we should base decisions on our judgments about their consequences for achieving our goals. Our goals give us reason to endorse consequentialism as a standard of decision making. Alternative standards invariably lead to consequences that are less good in this sense. Yet some people knowingly follow decision rules that violate consequentialism. For example, they prefer harmful omissions to less harmful acts, they favor the status quo over alternatives they would otherwise judge to be (...)
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  • Information, institutions et temporalité quelques remarques critiques sur l'usage de la nouvelle économie de l'information en histoire.Alessandro Stanziani - 2000 - Revue de Synthèse 121 (1-2):117-155.
    L’article fait Je point sur les thèses néo-institutionnalistes et sur la théorie des jeux telles qu’elles ont été «appliquées» à l’histoire. L’analyse des marchés principaux (travail, terre, crédit) et leur impact sur la théorie du développement sont également présentés. L’auteur prend ensuite en considération la théorie des jeux, il en discute les hypothèses et les présupposés de manière à rendre explicites les usages qui en ont été faits en histoire. La dernière partie introduit des notions plus complexes de rationalité économique, (...)
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  • Broadening the base for bringing cognitive psychology to bear on ethics.Peter Railton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):27-28.
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  • The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory.Rudolf Schuessler - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (2):133-155.
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  • Belief system foundations of backward induction.Antonio Quesada - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):393-403.
    Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.
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  • Backward induction: Merits and flaws.Marek M. Kamiński - 2017 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 50 (1):9-24.
    Backward induction was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats. BI can be also extended to solve complex games that include an infinite number of actions or an infinite number of periods. However, some more complex empirical or experimental predictions remain dramatically at odds with theoretical predictions obtained by BI. The primary example of such a (...)
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