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Game theory and rational decision

Erkenntnis 47 (3):379-410 (1997)

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  1. Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to (...)
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  • Reification as dependence on extrinsic information.Julius Sensat - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):361 - 399.
    Marx criticized political economy for propounding an inverted, mystical view of economic reality. But he went beyond asserting the falsity and apologetic character of the doctrine to characterize it as reflecting a social practice of inversion or mystification — an inverted social world — in which individuals incorporate their own actions into a process whose dynamic lies beyond their control. Caught up in this process, individuals confront aspects of their own agency in the alien or reified form of a given, (...)
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  • Overmathematisation in game theory: pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme. The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms (...)
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