It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in “The Inessential Indexical”, Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in (...) understanding the content of perception and argues that, if the perceptual experiences of different subjects can have the same phenomenology, and thus share a representational content (phenomenal content)—assumptions shared by a well-established research project, including a wide variety of theories—, then phenomenal content exhibit a particular kind of essential indexicality (perspectival). I also discuss how the argument is immune to Cappelen and Dever’s objections to the idea that the content of perceptual experiences is essentially indexical. (shrink)

Among the virtues of relationist approaches to Frege’s puzzle is that they put us in a position to outline structural features of the puzzle that were only implicit in earlier work. In particular, they allow us to frame questions about the relation between the explanatory roles of sense and sameness of sense. In this paper, I distinguish a number of positions about that relation which have not been clearly distinguished. This has a few pay-offs. It allows us to shed light (...) on recent controversies about the ‘essential indexical’, and it also allows us to see what’s at stake between relationists and their opponents. When we see what’s at stake, we can see that we have reason to adopt an account of cognitive significance that incorporates elements of both relationist and Fregean approaches. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. The first concerns the question of whether there is any essential involvement of perspectival thought in intentional agency. I defend the view that the answer is ‘no’ for one kind of perspectival thought, and ‘yes’ for a different kind. Agency does not depend on de se thought, but it does depend on de nunc thought. The second aim of the paper is to defend a claim about the significance of this de se–de nunc contrast as (...) a case study. I argue that the contrast is best explained by a picture on which different kinds of perspectival thought are seen as islands. On this picture, an account of the conceptual role of one kind of perspectival thought won’t settle much about any other kind of perspectival thought. The picture is proposed as a replacement for the standard picture, on which perspectival thought is seen as a natural cognitive kind. (shrink)

There has been much discussion over the last decade between so-called ‘de se skeptics’ and ‘de se exceptionalists’. The debate concerns claims made by John Perry and David Lewis in 1979 on the basis of some now-famous examples they introduced. In this paper, I argue that different problems and questions have commonly been conflated when approaching these issues, and I reframe the whole debate by appealing to two theses on the transparency of mental content that have been widely overlooked. These (...) theses are essential components of the view challenged by Perry and Lewis and are indispensable for understanding the proper nature of the debates and positions in the literature. After distinguishing among three frequently conflated questions, I conclude that Perry’s and Lewis’s examples indeed present a problem for the view they were targeting, but this is not necessarily related to self-locating thoughts or indexical expressions. I also argue that our commitments to potential ‘de se thoughts’ are contingent on our positions regarding the transparency theses. I conclude the paper by exploring the prospects of an approach that, unlike most proposed views, completely abandons the idea that thoughts are relations between agents and contents. (shrink)