In this paper a bootstrap theory of rationality is presented. Such a theory is an attempt to explain how standards of rational inquiry may be rationally revised — without assuming that there are any basic and fixed standards for evaluating such revisions. The general bootstrap idea is briefly presented in the first sections. The main part of the paper consists of a discussion of what normative requirements a bootstrap theory should contain, and a number of requirements on rational revisions are (...) proposed. The final section deals with the question of whether a bootstrap theory is self-referentially coherent. (shrink)

The nature of the distinction between rational andnon-rational accounts of the development of science isanalyzed. These two kinds of accounts differ mostlyin the status which they give to methodologicalprinciples. It is shown that there are severaldimensions with respect to which the status of suchprinciples can resemble more or less the kind ofstatus that a paradigmatic rational account would givethem. It is concluded that, under the most plausibledefinitions of a rational account, the extent to whicha philosophical account of scientific change isrational (...) is a matter of degree, and that there is nosuch clear distinction between the two kinds ofaccounts which some supporters of rational and ofnon-rational accounts have assumed to exist. (shrink)

This article considers the `Strong Programme' account of scientific knowledge from a fresh perspective. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the Strong Programme's monistic intent, that is, its aim to unify considerations of instrumental adequacy and social interests in explanations of the development of scientific knowledge. Although sharing the judgment of many critics that the Strong Programme approach is flawed, the article diverges from standard criticisms by suggesting that the best alternative is not a dualistic framework but (...) a more adequate monistic approach. Key Words: Strong Programme • interests • monism • finitism • classification. (shrink)

This article critiques the idea that, by establishing a general framework within which research must be conducted, philosophical argument can ‘take the lead’ in relation to research. It develops Holmwood’s work in this area by examining the ontological arguments put forward by critical realists, which attempt to establish the fundamental characteristics of the social realm prior to the production of empirically successful research in that realm. The article draws on a contrast with ontological argument in the natural sciences to demonstrate (...) the illegitimacy of this manoeuvre, showing that ontological claims can be given some justification, but only when they are derived from research that is widely held to be empirically successful. Realist ontological claims in the social sciences do not have this basis, and it is argued that Bhaskar’s alternative mode of justification for these claims is unconvincing. Archer’s view is also criticized that critical realist arguments should be given a strong regulatory role in relation to research, illustrating the problems with this by critiquing Cruickshank’s ontologically driven analysis of unemployment and the underclass. The article concludes that social scientific research should be conducted without philosophical legislation. (shrink)

The point of this paper is to provide a principled framework for a naturalistic, interactivist-constructivist model of rational capacity and a sketch of the model itself, indicating its merits. Being naturalistic, it takes its orientation from scientific understanding. In particular, it adopts the developing interactivist-constructivist understanding of the functional capacities of biological organisms as a useful naturalistic platform for constructing such higher order capacities as reason and cognition. Further, both the framework and model are marked by the finitude and fallibility (...) that science attributes to organisms, with their radical consequences, and also by the individual and collective capacities to improve their performances that learning organisms display. Part A prepares the ground for the exposition through a critique of the dominant Western analytic tradition in rationalising science, followed by a brief exposition of the naturalist framework that will be employed to frame the construction. This results in two sets of guidelines for constructing an alternative. Part B provides the new conception of reason as a rich complex of processes of improvement against epistemic values, and argues its merits. It closes with an account of normativity and our similarly developing rational knowledge of it, including (reflexively) of reason itself. (shrink)

We present two case studies from contemporary biology in which we observe conflicts between established and emerging approaches. The first case study discusses the relation between molecular biology and systems biology regarding the explanation of cellular processes, while the second deals with phylogenetic systematics and the challenge posed by recent network approaches to established ideas of evolutionary processes. We show that the emergence of new fields is in both cases driven by the development of high-throughput data generation technologies and the (...) transfer of modeling techniques from other fields. New and emerging views are characterized by different philosophies of nature, i.e. by different ontological and methodological assumptions and epistemic values and virtues. This results in a kind of conflict we call “epistemic competition” that manifests in two ways: On the one hand, opponents engage in mutual critique and defense of their fundamental assumptions. On the other hand, they compete for the acceptance and integration of the knowledge they provide by a broader scientific community. Despite an initial rhetoric of replacement, the views as well as the respective audiences come to be seen as more clearly distinct during the course of the debate. Hence, we observe—contrary to many other accounts of scientific change—that conflict results in the formation of new niches of research, leading to co-existence and perceived complementarity of approaches. Our model thus contributes to the understanding of the pluralization of the scientific landscape. (shrink)

The evolution of sexual reproduction is a striking case of explanatory pluralism, meaning that one needs to refer to more than one explanation in order to adequately account for it. I develop the concept a domain of phenomena in order to analysis this pluralism. Pluralism exists when a phenomenon can be included in more that one homogeneous domain or in a heterogeneous domain. I argue that in some cases domain partitioning can be used to decrease pluralism, but that in the (...) case of sex domains are overlapping and interconnecting, or in other words bear an orthogonal relationship to one another, and hence cannot be partitioned in such a way as to eliminate pluralism. (shrink)

The paper discusses three different ways of explaining the referential stability of concepts of physics. In order to be successful, an approach to referential stability has to provide resources to understand what constitutes the difference between the birth of a new concept with a history of its own, and an innovative step occurring within the lifetime of a persisting concept with stable reference. According to Theodore Arabatzis' 'biographical' approach (Representing Electrons 2006), the historical continuity of representations of the electron manifests (...) itself by the numerical stability of experimental parameters like the charge-to-mass ratio, and the continued acceptance of earlier experiments as manifestations of electron properties. I argue, against Arabatzis' approach, that the stability of experimental parameters justifies the assumption that there exists a chain of representations of a unique theoretical entity only if this stability occurs against the background of evidence for theoretical continuity. The Bain/Norton approach proposes to add exactly this element to the picture, but fails to reach its aim by focusing on formal similarities of Hamiltonians as an indicator of theoretical continuity. I shall argue that theoretical continuity has to be demonstrated rather on the level of particular solutions. This task is accomplished by the semantic embedding approach by means of defining a co-reference criterion for theoretical terms requiring the existence of semantic embedding relations between the terms that occur in particular solutions of different theories. (shrink)

A central aim for philosophers of science has been to understand scientific theory change, or more specifically the rationality of theory change. Philosophers and historians of science have suggested that not only theories but also scientific methods and standards of rational inquiry have changed through the history of science. The topic here is methodological change, and what kind of theory of rational methodological change is appropriate. The modest ambition of this paper is to discuss in what ways results in formal (...) theories of belief revision can throw light on the question of what an appropriate theory of methodological change would look like. (shrink)

The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and (...) logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized. It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy. The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable. It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping. The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality. (shrink)