This chapter explores perspectivism in the American Pragmatist tradition. On the one hand, the thematization of perspectivism in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science can benefit from resources in the American Pragmatist philosophical tradition. On the other hand, the Pragmatists have interesting and innovative, pluralistic views that can be illuminated through the lens of perspectivism. I pursue this inquiry primarily through examining relevant sources from the Pragmatist tradition. I will illustrate productive engagements between pragmatism and perspectivism in three areas: in (...) the pragmatists’ fallibilistic theories of inquiry and truth, in their pluralistic metaphysics, and in their views on cultural pluralism. While there are some potential sticking points between pragmatism and perspectivism, particularly around the visual metaphor of perspective, these philosophical approaches nonetheless have much to learn from each other. Perspectivism is in danger of falling between the horns of pernicious relativism and a platitudinous view of the limits of human perception and cognition. The pragmatists accounts of truth and reality open the possibility of a more thoroughgoing perspectivism. I will follow this thread through Charles S. Peirce’s, William James’, and John Dewey’s theories of inquiry and truth, Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics, James’ radical pluralism, Dewey’s cultural naturalism, Richard Rorty’s anti-essentialism, Jane Addams’ standpoint epistemology, W.E.B. Du Bois’ theory of race consciousness, Horace Kallen’s and Alain LeRoy Locke’s cultural pluralism, and Mary Parker Follett’s account of pluralistic integration. (shrink)

Scientists are always doing experiments or making observations that disappoint them. Most negative experiments are consigned to the file drawer. But in physics, lead is regularly transmuted into gold by treating a negative result as an upper limit—an observation of the maximum strength of the phenomenon under investigation. The logic and sociology of upper limits and the logic and sociology of positive results are different. I explore the difference through a case study in the physical sciences. In the conclusion I (...) ask why social sciences only rarely translate their negative findings into successes.Author Keywords: Physics; Gravitational Waves; Negative Results; Upper Limits; Audiences for Science. (shrink)

Several, seemingly unrelated problems of empirical research in the 'sociology of scientific knowledge' can be analyzed as following from initial assumptions with respect to the status of the knowledge content of science. These problems involve: (1) the relation between the level of the scientific field and the group level; (2) the boundaries and the status of 'contexts', and (3) the emergence of so-called 'asymmetry' in discourse analysis. It is suggested that these problems can be clarified by allowing for cognitive factors (...) as independent ('heterogeneous') variables, in addition to and in interaction with (i.e., not only as attributes of) social factors. In the 'sociology of translation', 'heterogeneity' among scientists, cognitions and textual elements has been made a basic assumption. This heterogeneity is bound together in an 'actor network'. However, since the 'actor network' is an empirical category, the methodological problems remain unresolved. This has consequences for the relation between empirical data and theoretical inferences. (shrink)

Positron emission tomography is a frontiermedical technology that, in contrast to the othercomputer-assisted technologies providing anatomicalpictures, produces functional images. I argue that PETalso opens up an avenue for shifting from images back toanalysis of measurements. Admittedly, quantification of functionrequires structural constraints. I coined the emerginginterpretational framework quantitative anatomyin an attempt to conceptualize the PET merger betweenmeasuring and imaging, the two competing meansmedicine uses to examine the human body. Anatomyjustifies interpretations that fit the existingknowledge of a larger clinical audience, whilestatistical data (...) possess an unexplored potential tointroduce mathematical rigor in the evaluation offunction, but are still a black box for the majorityof clinicians. This epistemological change is beingcarried out by PET users in action as well as indiscourse. (shrink)

Publication of pharmaceutical company-sponsored research in medical journals, and its presentation at conferences and meetings, is mostly governed by ‘publication plans’ that extract the maximum amount of scientific and commercial value out of data and analyses through carefully constructed and placed papers. Clinical research is typically performed by contract research organizations, analyzed by company statisticians, written up by independent medical writers, approved and edited by academic researchers who then serve as authors, and the whole process organized and shepherded through to (...) journal publication by publication planners. This paper reports on a conference of an international association of publication planners. It describes and analyzes their work in an ecological framework that relates it to marketing departments of pharmaceutical companies, medical journals and publishers, academic authors, and potential audiences. The medical research described here forms a new kind of corporate science, designed to look like traditional academic work, but performed largely to market products. (shrink)

During the last few years, several sociological accounts of scientific consensus appeared in which a radically skeptical view of cognitive consensus in science was advocated. Challenging the traditional realist conception of scientific consensus as a sui generis social fact, the radical skeptics claim to have shown that the traditional historical sociologist's supposedly definitive account of scientific consensus is only a linguistic chimera that easily can be deconstructed by the application of different interpretive schema to the given data. I will argue (...) in this article that such an idealistic conception of scientific consensus results from the radical skeptics' failure to take into account the following three factors that are central to the historical sociologist's narrative account of consensus formation: the "judgmental" character of the reconstruction of scientists' beliefs, the hierarchical nature of the consensus change in science, and the importance of the "temporal dimension" in the explanation of scientific consensus formation. To substantiate these three points, I will draw extensively on two recent historical-sociological studies of scientific consensus formation. (shrink)

This paper provides a conceptual analysis of the notion of interests as it is used in the social studies of science. After describing the theoretical background behind the Strong Program's adoption of the concept of interest, the paper outlines a reconstruction of the everyday notion of interest and argues that this same notion is used also by the sociologists of scientific knowledge. However, there are a couple of important differences between the everyday use of this notion and the way in (...) which it used by the sociologists. The sociologists do not use the term in evaluative context and they do not regard interests as purely non-epistemic factors. Finally, it is argued that most of the usual critiques of interest explanations, by both philosophers and fellow sociologists, are misguided. (shrink)