According to dialectical disposition expressivism about conjunction, disjunction, and negation, the function of these connectives is to convey dispositions speakers have with respect to challenging and meeting challenges to assertions. This paper investigates the view’s implications for logic. An interpretation in terms of dialectical dispositions is proposed for the proof rules of a bilateral sequent system. Rules that are sound with respect to this interpretation can be seen as generating an intrinsic logic of dialectical dispo- sition expressivism. It is argued (...) that such a logic will be very weak —weaker than the intersection of minimal logic and FDE. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Stei assumes that the correctness of a logic is a matter of the relation between the formal validity of a logical theory and extra-theoretic validity. I reject the assumption, on the grounds that it’s not clear that extratheoretic validity can be determined independently of formal validity. I formulate instead quietist logical pluralism, which is quietist with respect to the nature of extra-theoretic validity and its relation to formal (...) validity. Because of this, quietist logic pluralism needs a different correctness criterion for logic: correctness is a matter of a logic’s having normative upshot for deductive reasoning. I argue that this approach has the advantage of resisting the collapse of logical pluralism into monism. In particular, I suggest that deductive reasoning has two distinct roles, one with respect to the coherence of our attitudes and another with respect to how our attitudes are based on one another. I give two different normative principles that correspond to these roles; doing so requires abandoning the idea that normative bridge principles are universally quantified over all logics. That idea has been inherited from MacFarlane, but it’s not clear why the pluralist should accept it, as long as she can avoid giving principles that are ad hoc. By tying the principles to crucial roles of deductive reasoning, I aim to avoid both ad hockery and collapse. (shrink)