This paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin’s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal power-conferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of (...) competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice. (shrink)

Legal positivism emerged in response to natural law, as an indictment on the latter’s metaphysical predilections. Natural law dominance created a yearning for empiricism, or even a ‘hard scientism’ in approach to understanding socially constructed phenomenon, including legal praxis. From its Benthamite origins, it has since been developed, with recent, spirited debate still undertaken among towering legal scholars. Although its validity is contested to some, it remains as an analytic point of view of the law. Yet, within its design, there (...) is quite a bit of subject matter put out of view of the positivist, even though it is observable phenomenon within the sphere of legal praxis. This creates a void in which certain problems are unsolvable by the theory of law embodied in positivism. Rather than adjust the theory, the positivists either designate the void as the province for legal decision-making based on an internal morality in hard cases; or it criticises systems that do not strictly adhere to the positivist account as crude in the case of the international legal system. What follows is an account of HLA Hart’s brand of positivism, as it has remained dominant and perhaps the easiest to understand. I then identify subject-matter put out of view of positivism, with reference to Kelsen’s account of ‘authority’. I conclude that the positivist project is incomplete given its limited account of decision-making in hard cases and the international legal system. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to legal ontology, Kenneth Ehrenberg identifies a puzzle concerning _the basic validity rule_ of legal systems: If formal institutions require a codified foundational constitutive rule, then legal systems cannot be formal institutions, since their foundational constitutive rule is necessarily an uncodified basic validity rule. To solve this puzzle, Ehrenberg suggests taking this rule as ‘a foundational and self-identifying institutional fact’. Here, I challenge his solution and the very existence of this puzzle. By arguing, contra Ehrenberg, that (...) the basic validity rule is not the foundational constitutive rule of a legal system, but only the foundational constitutive rule of legal validity; that its codification in fact contributes towards the institutionalisation of a legal system; and that the true foundational constitutive rule of a legal system is the formal group structure of the higher-constitutional organisations, I submit an alternative account of the institutional nature of legal systems. (shrink)

In this paper, I re-interpret Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition using the theoretical framework of J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, in particular by treating recognition, change and adjudi...

In this article, I address general jurisprudence's ‘dirty little secret' or its apparent tension with normative conceptions of democracy. I argue that this tension is not coincidental, but a histor...

Legal theorists standardly hold that stability is one of eight necessary conditions for legal guidance. We lack an adequate explanation, however, of why, exactly, stability is necessary in order that law possess the capacity to guide behavior. Standard explanations, which rely on a claim about reasonable expectations, fail to connect the concepts of stability and legal guidance. In this paper, I argue that, according to the leading conception of legal guidance, stability is, in fact, not necessary in order for law (...) to possess the capacity to guide. In response, I provide an alternative conception of legal guidance, and argue that stability is a necessary attribute if we assume this conception of guidance. More generally, the paper sets out an abstract framework in which claims that this or that property is necessary for legal guidance can be assessed. (shrink)

It is often asserted that people are conditioned to act corruptly by their culture in a way they cannot help themselves. The aim of this paper is to use a multidisciplinary approach, both from political theory and political science, to show that this kind of narrative about corruption is flawed because it is not informative at all about the nature of corruption. This prevents it from leading to any type of meaningful analysis or policy design. We will concentrate on two (...) main flaws: The Triviality Objection, which points out that everything humans do is cultural in some sense or other, and the Circularity Objection, which stresses that attempting to explain why or how corruption becomes part of a specific culture, leads to saying that it is because its members act corruptly. The idea that the cultural causation is flawed becomes persuasive when we contrast that view with our concept of corruption as a special kind of harm to institutional rules: corruption may refer to a parallel set of conventions or rules that undermines the institutional set of morally justified norms. (shrink)

¿Cómo justificar la validez jurídica de aquellas normas cuya creación no puede ser evaluada como regular o irregular por apelación a ninguna otra norma jurídica? Entre las respuestas más ilustres a este problema se cuentan la norma fundante kelseniana y la regla de reconocimiento de Hart, pero cada una de esas ideas ha sido objeto de serias críticas. Eugenio Bulygin ha efectuado aportes decisivos en esta discusión: ha advertido que cuando se examina el fundamento último de la validez de las (...) normas jurídicas es preciso discriminar un sentido prescriptivo y uno descriptivo de validez, y que la norma fundante de Kelsen no es sino el producto de una confusión entre ambos; ha resaltado que la regla de reconocimiento debe interpretarse como una regla conceptual que especifica los criterios de identificación de las normas jurídicas, y ha señalado que las normas de competencia no pueden reconstruirse como normas de conducta. Si bien con tales aportes ha sentado las bases para ofrecer una solución, su reconstrucción requiere de ciertas precisiones para poder ser considerada una respuesta enteramente satisfactoria a la pregunta respecto del fundamento último de la validez jurídica. How is it possible to ground the legal validity of those rules whose creation cannot be assessed as regular or irregular by reference to any other legal rule? Kelsen's basic norm and Hart's rule of recognition are among the most famous answers to this question, but both ideas have been seriously challenged. Eugenio Bulygin has made decisive contributions to this discussion. He has shown that in the analysis of the ultimate ground of validity of legal rules, two different senses of validity should be distinguished: a prescriptive and a descriptive sense, and that the Kelsenian basic norm is nothing but the product of confusion between these two different senses. He has also claimed that the rule of recognition has to be understood as a conceptual rule specifying the criteria of identification of legal rules, and those power-conferring rules cannot be interpreted as prescriptive norms of conduct. Although these contributions have provided a basic framework for a possible solution, Bulygin's ideas need a refinement in order to be considered as a satisfactory answer to the question concerning the ultimate ground of legal validity. (shrink)

Chief Judge Achilles and Judge Hera – uniqueness of proceedings – the nature of judicial decision-making – the judicial order of Mega-city One – source of judicial power – judicial styles – qualities required for judicial office – context of judicial action – requirement of reflection – interpretation and meaning in enforcement of law – adjudicative models – law as horrific – legal theories – Hans Kelsen – Justice Hercules – Jacques DerridaJudge Howard – critical assessment of judicial order of (...) Mega-city One – Hans Kelsen, positivism and democracy – merging of law fondatrice and law conservatrice – the “soul of the law” – fracture of the Rule of Law – fascism – comparisons with fascist regimes of twentieth Century Europe – signifiers in judicial uniform – consequences of dissent – reasons for, and consequences of, resignationChief Judge AchillesJudge HeraJudgement delivered 3 March 2138.Grand Hall of Justice, Mega-city One. (shrink)